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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Why do individuals make their vote decisions at the point in time at which they do, and 
what impact does the time-of-voting-decision (TOVD) have upon other important 
political variables?  Through a series of integrated articles, this dissertation explores the 
causes, correlates and effects of TOVD in Canada.  The first two articles explore the 
relationships between TOVD and political attitudes, employing TOVD as both an 
independent and dependent variable.  The first examines the impact that consistency, 
intensity and direction of summary political attitudes have on TOVD, and introduces a 
new measure of attitudinal ambivalence.  The second article employs cognitive 
dissonance theory to argue that TOVD can influence attitudes towards parties, after an 
election occurs.  The third and fourth articles respectively consider the relationships 
between TOVD and vote sincerity, and an individual’s ability to vote for the party that 
best reflects his or her own policy preferences.  Insincere voters are found to have a 
relatively late TOVD, which the third article attributes to the fact that these individuals 
are able to use the campaign period to update their expectations about the competitive 
prospects of candidates and parties.  The fourth and final article uses TOVD as a 
moderating variable to evaluate the impact of the campaign period on correct voting 
rates.  It finds that late deciders, who are able to use the campaign period to collect 
information to inform their vote decisions, are actually less likely to vote correctly than 
are early deciders.  The dissertation also includes a research note which outlines a new 
method of identifying invalid TOVD responses, and illustrates the importance of 
removing such cases.  As a whole, this dissertation adds significantly to our knowledge 
of TOVD, a variable which, until now, has received relatively little scholarly attention. 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Lazarsfeld et al.’s 1944 work, The People’s Choice, there has been 
significant interest in the study of voting behaviour (see Meisel, 1957, Clarke et al., 
1979; Johnston et al., 1992; Gidengil, 1992, Blais et al., 2002, and Kanji and Archer, 
2002 for some Canadian examples).  Yet the bulk of work in this field deals with the 
subject of vote choice.  That is, scholars have attempted to identify patterns to explain 
why people vote for the parties or candidates they do.  Initial work on this topic 
considered factors such as sociodemographic characteristics (Lazarsfeld, 1948 and the 
Columbia, or sociological vote choice model) and partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960 
and the Michigan, or psycho-sociological vote choice model).  In a theoretical 
contribution to the field, Downs introduced the notion of the ‘rational voter’ – one who 
gathers information on party positions on important issues and then votes for the party 
which will provide that individual with the greatest “benefits” (Downs, 1957).  Finally, 
in a more comprehensive approach to the study of vote choice, scholars have developed 
a multi-stage explanatory recursive model (see Miller and Shanks, 1996; Blais et al. 
2002) which considers sociodemographic characteristics, partisanship, and Downs’ 
notion of rationality, but introduces a greater level of detail with respect to the 
consideration of the underlying values and beliefs of voters, economic perceptions, 
evaluations of government performance, leader evaluations and strategic considerations.  
While there is still much that is unknown about the causes and correlates of vote choice, 
our knowledge of this topic has advanced significantly in the last 65 years. 
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Receiving much less attention from scholars is the question of why people make 
their vote choices when they do.  We know from the small amount of research on the 
topic of the time-of-voting-decision (TOVD) that many voters know long before an 
election which party or candidate they will support, while others take much longer to 
arrive at their decision (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Fournier et al., 
2004).  There remains, however, a significant lacuna in the literature with respect to this 
topic, especially in Canada.  Most of the literature on the subject is based upon 
American data, though even within that country there is a relative scarcity of work 
explicitly related to the topic of TOVD.  In Canada the subject has attracted only a 
modicum of scholarly interest (the two pieces by Fournier et al. from 2001 and 2004 are 
exceptions). 
As a result, we know relatively little in this country about factors which have an 
impact upon whether voters make their voting decisions prior to, or during, a campaign 
(and the point at which these decisions are made during a campaign).  We know even 
less, however, about the impact of TOVD as an independent variable.  Existing work on 
the topic of TOVD generally employs this concept as a dependent variable, rather than 
studying the impact that TOVD may have upon other factors.  This dissertation aims to 
address these gaps in the literature by increasing our understanding of factors that 
influence TOVD, as well as exploring TOVD as an explanatory variable.   
In the academic realm, this type of information is of relevance not only to the 
field of political behaviour, but also to political psychology and marketing.  In addition 
to increasing our knowledge of the subject for strictly academic purposes, however, a 
study on TOVD potentially has important practical implications.  Political actors 
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(including politicians, political parties, interest groups, or any others who may be 
interested in influencing the outcome of an election) have a keen interest in knowing 
which types of individuals are likely to make decisions at specific times and for what 
reasons.  Joslyn (1984) terms late deciders “the battleground of electoral politics” (p. 
59) and Dalton (2006) argues that “[i]ncreasingly, the campaign practitioner’s job is to 
find out who [is most likely to be persuaded during the campaign period] with the hopes 
of learning how to most compellingly communicate with them” (p. 15).  Late deciders 
are the primary audience of campaign communication, and knowing who these 
individuals are helps political actors to tailor messages so that they resonate with such 
voters.  They are targeted by campaigns because of their propensity to change 
allegiances (Wattenberg, 1991).  Targeting this group has the potential to pay dividends, 
whereas aiming advertisements at those faithful to an opponent’s party is a waste of 
campaign resources (Kirkpatrick, 1972).  Dalton et al. (2000) suggest that the segment 
of the electorate composed of campaign period deciders has increased in most 
industrialized countries over the last few decades. Thus, the study of these voters is also 
becoming increasingly important. 
Through a series of integrated articles and a research note, this dissertation 
investigates the causes and correlates of TOVD in Canada.  The first two articles 
explore the relationships between TOVD and political attitudes, employing TOVD as a 
dependent and then an independent variable.  The third and fourth articles consider the 
relationships between TOVD and vote sincerity and an individual’s ability to identify 
and vote for the party that best reflects his or her own policy preferences.  The research 
note deals with concerns over TOVD recall validity.  It illustrates the importance of 
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removing cases with invalid TOVD responses, and outlines a method to identify such 
cases.  Before moving on to consider these matters, however, it is important to describe 
the state of the existing literature on the topic of TOVD. 
 
1.1 - WHO ARE LATE DECIDERS? 
Scholarly work on the topic of TOVD emerged at the same time as the first 
major works on voting behavior (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; 
Cambpell et al., 1960), and American National Election Studies have included a 
postelection question on TOVD since 1952.1  Both the Columbia and Michigan schools 
provide explanations for why individuals decide when they do.  For Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1948), individuals who make their minds up late do so because they are experiencing 
sociodemographic cross-pressures.  If vote choice is largely determined by 
sociodemographic features, as the Columbia school suggests, inconsistencies among 
these variables can make one’s vote choice difficult, or unclear.  “Conflicts and 
inconsistencies among the factors which influence vote decisions” (p. 53) can lead to a 
delay in TOVD as these voters seek out other factors which aid them in making their 
choice.  To proponents of the Columbia School, late deciders have good reasons for 
voting for multiple candidates, and decisions are delayed until an event comes along 
that allows for the resolution of this conflict. 
Yet as the influence of the Columbia school waned, so too did the 
persuasiveness of Lazarsfeld et al.’s explanation.  The Michigan school (see Campbell 
et al. 1960), with its focus on the role of partisanship in voting behaviour, contended 
                                                 
1 Every iteration of the Canadian Election Study, which was first conducted in 1965, has included a 
question on TOVD. 
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that TOVD was determined largely by patterns of partisan attachment.  Individuals with 
the strongest partisan sentiments made their decisions earliest, while those with the 
weakest partisan attachments decided who they would vote for relatively late.  Voters 
were seen as fitting into one of two general groups: (1) the highly partisan, pre-decided 
majority which pays close attention to a campaign, but is unaffected by it, and (2) late-
deciding voters who are uninterested, unknowledgeable, unpredictable and less 
enthusiastic.  The partisans are assumed to be relatively knowledgeable, firmly 
anchored to their party, less centrist and more resilient to messages that oppose their 
predispositions than are non-partisans (Zaller, 1996). 
While partisanship is still seen as a strong determinant of TOVD, its importance 
in the literature has declined over time.  Implicit in the partisanship-focused 
dichotomous model is the assumption that campaigns have relatively little impact upon 
election outcomes.  If sociodemographic characteristics (the focus of the Columbia 
school) and partisanship (the focus of the Michigan school) remain constant over time, 
there is little reason to expect many voters to be influenced during the campaign period.  
If most voters are partisans, while the rest of the population is composed of uninterested 
and unpredictable individuals, one might expect the campaign itself to have only 
“minimal consequences” (Buchanan, 1977).  Nevertheless, over time the proportion of 
the American electorate made up of individuals who are interested in and attentive to 
elections, but who are not highly partisan, has risen, and party identification has 
declined as a correlate of the vote (Chaffee and Rimal, 1996).  These findings present a 
clear challenge to the dichotomous model, since they do not leave room for interested 
and attentive non-partisans. 
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In response to these trends, American scholars have largely abandoned the 
dichotomous model.  In their analysis of the 1976 Presidential election, Chaffee and 
Choe (1980) divide campaign deciders into early- and late-deciding groups (meaning 
that they considered three TOVD groups, including pre-campaign deciders).  Late-
campaign deciders (those who decide in the last week of the election) were found to be 
relatively inattentive and have the lowest levels of partisanship, while pre-campaign 
deciders were highly partisan and moderately attentive.  While these two findings are 
compatible with the dichotomous model, the authors also found that early campaign 
deciders had the lowest levels of partisanship of all three groups, and were highly 
attentive (Chaffee and Choe 1980).  This finding challenges the traditional assumption 
of a monotonic relationship between TOVD and partisanship and attentiveness.  Early 
campaign deciders are said to lack the partisan ties that might lead them to an early 
decision, but rely upon information gathered during a campaign to make their decision.  
Further complicating the debate, Whitney and Goldman (1985) have found that, in 
situations where there is a strong third party candidate present, late deciders are the 
most interested and attentive, while it is early deciders who are relatively uninterested 
and uninformed.  Finally, Dalton has challenged the widely held assumption that late 
deciders are unknowledgeable and inattentive.  He contends that ‘swing voters,’ who 
are “uncommitted to a candidate until the final days of a campaign,” are as politically 
knowledgeable and attentive as earlier deciding voters are (Dalton, 2006, 18).  Clearly 
then, there is a lack of agreement in the literature with respect to how many TOVD 
periods should be considered in a study, and the relationship between TOVD and 
factors like partisanship, attentiveness and knowledge. 
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In Canada, Fournier et al. (2004) consider only two TOVD groups:  pre-
campaign deciders and campaign deciders.  The authors find no statistically significant 
differences among campaign-deciding sub-groups with respect to partisanship, 
attentiveness and knowledge in their examination of the 1997 election, and hypothesize 
that the relative brevity of Canadian campaigns may explain why the distinction 
between early- and late-campaign deciders is not as important in Canada as it appears to 
be in the US.  They nevertheless confirm that partisanship, interest, attentiveness and 
political knowledge have a relationship with TOVD in this country.  The authors also 
discover relationships between several sociodemographic factors and TOVD.  In 
particular, women, the young and those without a university education are relatively late 
deciders (although the authors argue that the only “important difference” between 
TOVD groups is partisanship (p. 668)).  Using American data, Riedel and Dunne (1969-
1970) and Kenski (2007) find that women are less likely to not know who they will vote 
for when interviewed during a campaign than are men.  Lucas and Adams (1978) 
identify two more characteristics of late deciders, concluding that these individuals 
discuss politics less frequently and watch less television news than do early deciders. 
Lachat (2007) offers additional insight into the study of TOVD, as he points out 
that voters are a heterogeneous group, and that factors that influence the political 
decisions of some individuals do little to influence others.  He argues that political 
predispositions, such as political interest, attentiveness, knowledge and partisanship, 
can influence voters differently depending upon the presence or absence of other 
factors.  For instance, individuals who are interested, attentive and knowledgeable 
might be expected to have an early TOVD, as they have a great deal of expertise to 
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draw upon when making their decisions.  Even if such individuals are partisans, this 
factor may have little to do with their TOVD.  Indeed, this person’s partisanship may 
have been influenced by these other factors.  On the other hand, for individuals who are 
uninterested, inattentive and unknowledgeable, a partisan attachment may play a 
significant role in determining TOVD.  If such individuals are partisans, they may resort 
to “low-information rationality” (Popkin, 1991) and use their partisanship as a cue, 
leading them to an early TOVD.  Thus it must be recognized that some of the variables 
known to influence TOVD affect various segments of the population in different ways. 
It has also been argued that TOVD is a function not only of the characteristics of 
individual voters, but also of specific campaign circumstances.  Much of the existing 
literature on TOVD explores the impact of permanent or long lasting individual 
characteristics such as those described above.  However research also exists which 
examines the effects of specific campaigns (Converse, 1962; Bowen, 1994; Chaffee and 
Choe, 1980), and unique electoral circumstances (such as the impact of an especially 
charismatic leader, or unique election issues) have been found to have an impact upon 
TOVD patterns (Chaffee and Rimal, 1996).  Kirkpatrick (1972) has argued that 
competitive circumstances can influence TOVD patterns, noting that some voters delay 
their decisions when they prefer one candidate but expect another to win.   
The findings of O’Keefe, Mendelsohn and Lui (1976) also suggest that TOVD 
may not necessarily be a stable personality trait.  Through a panel study conducted in 
Ohio, the authors find that of the early deciders in the 1972 presidential election, nearly 
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half were classified as “late” deciders in the 1974 gubernatorial or senatorial races.2  
They conclude that TOVD should be considered a function of the circumstances of a 
particular campaign, rather than of individual voters (O’Keefe, et al., 1976).  Whitney 
and Goldman (1985) echo this argument, as after their analysis of the 1976 and 1980 
American Presidential elections they find that TOVD findings from one campaign, at 
one time and place, should not necessarily be generalized to all times and places.  In 
other words, the fact that a voter is an early decider in one election does not necessarily 
mean that he or she will be an early decider in another election. 
We know therefore that both stable variables and election-specific factors have 
the potential to affect TOVD.  While the American literature on this topic is 
informative, the numerous and significant differences between Canada and the US mean 
that it is of uncertain utility in this country.  Factors such as campaign length, party 
system, and even political culture may conceivably have a significant impact upon 
TOVD patterns.  Fournier et al. (2001, 2004) offer some noteworthy examples of work 
on this topic in Canada.  Their first study is focused upon validating TOVD recall 
responses, while the second is focused primarily upon using TOVD as an indicator of 
campaign effects.  Indeed, TOVD is commonly employed to argue that particular 
campaign events are having an impact upon the electorate (Chaffee and Choe, 1980; 
Bowen, 1994; Chaffee and Rimal, 1996; Fournier et al., 2004; Matthes, 2011).  With 
this exception, TOVD is rarely considered as anything other than a dependent variable.   
Accordingly, there is ample room for a study of the causes and correlates of 
TOVD in Canada.  Before outlining each of this dissertation’s theoretically-driven 
                                                 
2 The authors divide voters into only two groups: early and late deciders.  Early deciders are described as 
“those who had decided for their candidate upon that candidate’s nomination,” and late deciders are all 
voters who decide later than that point.   
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articles, however, it is worthwhile to briefly explore some basic TOVD data from recent 
Canadian federal elections.  While the results below do not test the theories discussed 
above, they provide insight into some basic features of TOVD in Canada. 
 
1.2 - SOME PRELIMINARY DATA 
TOVD is defined here with reference to election day; individuals are categorized 
on the basis of the point in time, relative to election day, when they make their decision.  
Voters are classified either as election-day deciders, campaign period deciders 
(excluding election day) or pre-campaign deciders.  This information is determined 
through a single post-election Canadian Election Study (CES) question.  While there 
has been considerable concern about the validity of TOVD recall in American surveys 
(see Campbell et al., 1954; Plumb, 1986; Chaffee and Rimal, 1996), Fournier et al. 
(2001) argue that TOVD data are “highly reliable” in Canada (96).  The authors also 
develop a method of identifying invalid responses (meaning that cases can be removed 
from a dataset).  A research note included in this dissertation builds upon this work, and 
introduces a new method of validating TOVD responses.  TOVD data in the articles that 
follow are validated according to this new method.3 
 While each article in this dissertation focuses on different combinations of 
elections (depending upon the appropriateness of the data available for each election), it 
                                                 
3 TOVD recall validity is not considered in this introductory chapter, as sorting cases on the basis of 
TOVD leads to the removal of large number of pre-campaign and election-day deciders.  This serves to 
overestimate the share of the electorate made up of campaign period deciders, which is a problem if, as is 
the case here, one’s goal is to estimate population wide TOVD patterns. 
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is worth briefly exploring TOVD patterns from recent years.  Table 1-1 shows reported 
TOVD patterns for the 2004, 2006 and 2008 elections, based upon CES data.4 
Table 1-1: Reported TOVD (%) 
  2004 2006 2008 
Pre-Campaign Period 48.13 56.45 52.26 
Campaign Period 38.37 29.10 32.90 
Election day 13.50 14.45 14.84 
N 2360 2630 2808 
 
While results vary slightly from election to election, roughly half of the voters in 
each of these years made their vote decisions before the campaign began, and about one 
voter in seven waited until election day to finalize his or her decision.  Considering the 
fact that reported rates of partisanship (of any strength) were 66.4% in 2004, 72.1% in 
2006 and 70.1% in 2008, these values suggest that, while partisanship may indeed be a 
relatively strong predictor of TOVD, as the Michigan School and Fournier et al. (2004) 
suggest, there are clearly other factors at work influencing TOVD.  Even if all pre-
campaign deciders were partisans (which is not the case), this would mean that a 
significant proportion of the individuals who decided after the campaign began, in each 
election, were also partisans.  CES data reveal that the average partisanship rates for the 
three elections considered above are 84.5% for pre-campaign deciders, 72.3% for 
campaign deciders and 61.9% for election-day deciders.  The results suggest that there 
is a great deal of potential for individuals, including partisans, to be influenced during 
the campaign period, and that depending upon how these late deciders vote, this 
segment of the population could have a significant impact upon election outcomes. 
                                                 
4 All results in this introductory chapter are weighted using the national weight. 
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This leads to the question of how those individuals in each TOVD group cast 
their ballots.  If a party can lock up the support of a large segment of the voting 
population before the campaign even begins, it stands to do quite well, given that such a 
large segment of the electorate decides during this period.  On the other hand, a party 
that performs well during the campaign might be expected to get a large share of the 
votes from campaign period and election-day deciders, which could significantly boost 
its electoral fortunes.  Figure 1-1 shows the breakdown of votes for five parties (the 
Conservatives, Liberals, NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and Greens) according to TOVD group 
for the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections.5   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Votes for other parties or candidates are omitted here. 
13 
 
13 
 
FIGURE 1-1:  VOTE CHOICE BY TOVD GROUP 
 
 
In all three elections the Conservative Party was the most successful at attracting 
pre-campaign deciders.  The party performed especially well among this group in 2008, 
where it was supported by almost half of these voters.  Considering that such a large 
segment of the population decides before the campaign begins, this goes a long way to 
explaining the relatively high level of support that this party received in these elections 
(the Conservatives were the official opposition in 2004 and won a plurality of votes in 
14 
 
14 
 
both 2006 and 2008).  The Bloc was also better at attracting early rather than late 
deciders. 
For their part, the NDP and Greens were more successful at attracting voters 
with a campaign and election-day TOVD than they were at sewing up support before 
these campaigns began.  This pattern is especially pronounced for the Green Party, 
which never won the votes of more than 4% of pre-campaign deciders, but consistently 
received double-digit support from election-day deciders.6  Given the relatively low 
numbers of election-day deciders, however, this did little to boost the electoral fortunes 
of the party. 
Finally, it is worth investigating the stability of TOVD patterns, at the individual 
level, across time.  If it is true that only stable, long-term variables such as 
sociodemographic factors and partisanship influence TOVD, one would expect 
individuals to have the same TOVD from one election to the next.  Conversely, if 
TOVD were influenced only by election-specific circumstances, TOVD stability should 
be quite low.  The 2004 to 2008 versions of the CES contain panel data, which means 
that it is possible to trace TOVD patterns across time, at the individual level.  Table 1-2 
                                                 
6 These findings are largely compatible with the contention by Campbell et al. (1960) and Gopoain and 
Hadjiharalambous (1994) that the choices of late deciders are nearly random in character.  If voters did 
act randomly, one would expect each party to receive 20% of the vote.  Using the following equation, a 
measure of relative randomness can be calculated for each party for each TOVD period (this is the 
equivalent of measuring the average deviation from the value that would be expected if results were 
random):  
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),  
where the parties are represented by various values of i.  
Results suggest that the votes of late deciders tend to be more randomly distributed than those of early 
deciders.  Values for relative randomness for 2004 are 12.4 for pre-campaign deciders, 10.4 for campaign 
deciders, and 8 for election-day deciders.  The corresponding values are 12.4, 10.4 and 8.8 for 2006 and 
11.6, 7.6 and 8.8 for 2008 (note that a high value indicates that votes are less evenly distributed among 
parties). 
The votes of campaign and election-day deciders are more randomly distributed than those of pre-
campaign deciders.  In 2004 and 2006 election-day deciders are the most random.  Only in 2008 are the 
votes of campaign period deciders more evenly distributed than those of election-day deciders. 
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shows rates of TOVD stability, comparing 2004 to 2006 data, and 2006 to 2008 data.  
Note that the columns sum to 100, representing the individuals who made up their mind 
during each respective TOVD period in the first election being considered in each 
instance. 
TABLE 1-2:  STABILITY OF TOVD (%) 
  2004 to 2006 (N = 1107) 2006 to 2008 (N = 805) 
  Pre-Campaign Campaign Election-day Pre-Campaign Campaign Election-day 
Pre-Campaign 81.67 43.50 27.05 72.69 35.56 32.91 
Campaign 14.59 44.68 38.52 21.77 53.56 36.71 
Election-day 3.74 11.82 34.43 5.54 10.88 30.38 
Note: Chi-squared results are significant at > 99% level 
 
 By far the largest values in Table 1-2 represent those individuals with a pre-
campaign TOVD in consecutive elections—the vast majority of those with a pre-
campaign TOVD in one election have a pre-campaign TOVD in the next election as 
well.  It is uncommon for a pre-campaign decider to become a campaign decider in the 
next election, and very rare for one to switch to an election-day TOVD.  Campaign 
deciders in one election are more likely to have a campaign-period TOVD in the next 
election than to decide at any other point in time, although the relationship here is much 
weaker than it is for pre-campaign deciders.  Finally, those individuals who have an 
election-day TOVD are distributed rather evenly among TOVD periods in the next 
election.  There is very little consistency among this group.  It thus appears as though, at 
least for some voters, one’s TOVD in the previous election is a relatively good predictor 
of TOVD at the next election. 
 Not only is there is consistency in TOVD among early deciders, but these 
individuals consistently vote for the same party over time.  Not surprisingly, early 
deciders tend to vote for the same party in consecutive elections, while late deciders are 
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much less predictable.  88% of pre-campaign deciders in 2004 voted for the same party 
in 2006, while the corresponding rate for 2006 to 2008 is over 82%.  In contrast, only 
51% of election-day deciders in 2004 voted for the same party in 2006, while this value 
falls to 40% for the 2006 and 2008 elections.  Perhaps not surprisingly then, TOVD and 
vote choice data appear to be fairly strong predictors of future TOVD and vote choice 
patterns.  These results also lead to the conclusion that TOVD likely is determined by 
different factors for different people; voters are not a homogenous group.  The data are 
compatible with the contention that long-term factors influence TOVD for some voters, 
but that other voters are influenced during the campaign period. 
The articles that comprise this dissertation consider the influence of both long 
and short-term factors upon TOVD, but they also consider TOVD as an explanatory and 
moderating variable.  While political scientists have made inroads in explaining TOVD, 
this variable is rarely used to explain other political phenomena.  This dissertation turns 
next to a brief explanation of the articles to follow. 
 
1.3 - THE CAUSES, CORRELATES AND EFFECTS OF TOVD 
 This dissertation includes a series of four integrated articles and a research note, 
each of which tackles a discrete question relevant to the topic of TOVD.  As previously 
mentioned, the first two articles explore the relationship between political attitudes and 
TOVD.  The third and fourth articles use TOVD to explore other political phenomena, 
specifically voter insincerity and rates of correct voting.  Finally, the research note 
evaluates the validity of TOVD data and introduces a new method of identifying invalid 
cases for removal. 
17 
 
17 
 
The first article explores the relationship between TOVD and several measures 
of attitudinal consistency, intensity, and direction, and contrasts the power of these 
measures to explain why individuals finalize their vote decisions when they do.  Based 
upon 2008 Canadian Election Study data, the article finds that an early TOVD is likely 
when attitudes are consistent or of low intensity, or when individuals have stronger 
negative than positive attitudes towards the party they vote for (i.e. the direction of 
summary attitudes should lead one away from that party).  Some of the attitudinal 
measures considered tap into more than one of these dimensions, and those variables 
which tap into multiple dimensions are found to better explain TOVD patterns than 
those based upon only one dimension.  A new measure of attitudinal ambivalence is 
introduced in order to tap into all three dimensions, and this measure is found to have 
the greatest power to explain TOVD of any of the attitudinal variables considered. 
The article also argues that existing measures of these three attitudinal 
dimensions are based upon too few of the factors known to influence vote decision.  
Lavine (2001) explores the relationship between ambivalence and TOVD, but only 
considers feelings towards presidential candidates.  Berelson et al. (1954) evaluate the 
impact of cross-pressures upon TOVD, but focus upon sociodemographic 
characteristics alone.  Fournier (2005) and Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) consider a broader 
array of factors when exploring the relationship between attitudinal conflict and TOVD, 
but only include the six strongest correlates of vote choice.  Moreover, with the 
exception of Fournier (2005), these studies deal exclusively with American TOVD data, 
which, as noted above, have been found to be problematic.  This study builds upon 
previous work by employing a multi-stage recursive model of vote choice as a 
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framework to broaden the array of variables included in the calculation of summary 
attitudinal measures.  The model (see Miller and Shanks, 1996, Blais et al., 2002; 
Gidengil et al., 2009) includes a considerable variety of factors known to influence vote 
decision and provides a relatively comprehensive account of the correlates of vote 
choice.7  The article also posits that, since some factors have a stronger relationship 
with vote choice than do others, some factors should be weighted more heavily when 
evaluating conflict, intensity and direction.  It introduces a method of weighting the 
correlates of vote choice when combining factors into summary attitudinal measures. 
The dissertation’s second article begins by arguing that, while most political 
scientists use attitudes to explain behaviour, behaviour can also have an impact upon 
attitudes.  Informed by the lessons of cognitive dissonance theory, this article explores 
the impact of cognitive, affective and behavioural factors upon changes in attitudes 
towards parties between pre- and post-election election study questionnaires.  The 
fundamental premise of dissonance theory is that individuals are motivated to seek 
consistency among their cognitions (defined here as thoughts, pieces of knowledge or 
beliefs) (Worchel et al., 2000).  First proposed by Festinger (1957), the theory suggests 
that when pertinent cognitions are inconsistent (or dissonant) with one another, a sense 
of psychological discomfort can arise.  One way of reducing this discomfort is to alter 
cognitions (only some of which are malleable) so that they become consistent (or 
consonant) with one another.  This article explores the circumstances under which 
dissonance motivates individuals to change their attitudes towards parties.   
                                                 
7 The stages of the model are: sociodemographic characteristics, underlying values and beliefs, 
partisanship, economic perceptions, issue opinions, evaluations of government performance and leader 
evaluations 
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With reference to TOVD, the article contends that the time at which an 
individual finalizes his or her vote decision can influence the extent to which attitudes 
towards parties shift after one has voted.  At the time of the post-election interview, 
knowledge of one’s TOVD becomes a cognition that feeds into the process whereby 
ratings of parties are determined.  While several dissonance-related factors are found to 
influence post-election attitude change, all other things equal, individuals who decide 
early on who they will vote for will tend to justify their TOVD by assigning a higher 
rating to the party voted for relative to the parties not voted for.  This article provides 
insight into the complex relationship between behaviour, knowledge and beliefs, as well 
as the dynamic nature of political attitudes.  
The third article explores the relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD.  A 
sincere voter is one who casts a ballot for a party or candidate that is one’s genuine first 
preference.  Among insincere voters, strategic (or tactical) voters receive the greatest 
amount of scholarly attention (see Black, 1978; Blais and Nadeau, 1996; Blais et al., 
2001).  Largely overlooked, however, is another type of insincere voter:  the protest 
voter.  This article introduces a new method of identifying protest voters using CES 
data, defining them as those individuals who wish to express their political 
dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not their 
genuine first preference.  In contrast, a strategic vote is a vote for a party or candidate 
that is not one’s favourite, cast in the hope of affecting the outcome of an election (Blais 
et al., 2001).  In both cases, these insincere voters factor their expectations about how 
competitive each party is into their vote decisions.  Protest voters intentionally vote for 
a party that they see as uncompetitive, while strategic voters abandon their most 
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preferred party because it is uncompetitive, in order to prevent some party that they 
dislike from winning.  Insincere voters who are influenced by information collected 
during a campaign about competitive circumstances are likely to be campaign-period 
deciders.  This article tests Kirkpatrick’s (1972) contention that competitive 
circumstances can influence TOVD patterns. 
The third article thus contributes to the literature on the relationship between 
campaign effects and TOVD.  While some scholars have contended that campaigns 
have little impact upon election outcomes (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 
1954), if competitive considerations are shown to have an impact upon TOVD, this 
provides compelling evidence that, for a particular subset of the population, the 
campaign can have a significant impact.  As information on the competitive prospects of 
parties is widely available and frequently updated during the course of an election 
campaign (Andersen, 2000), it stands to reason that there is a high probability that 
individuals who base their vote decisions upon such factors will make their vote 
decisions during that period.  In contrast, voters who do not factor competitive 
considerations into their vote decisions will not be influenced by polling results, or any 
other source of information they are exposed to during the campaign period about the 
competitive prospects of the parties.  Accordingly, the expectation here is that insincere 
voters will tend to make their vote decisions later than will sincere voters. 
This dissertation’s fourth and final article explores the notion of a “correct” vote 
(as introduced by Lau and Redlawsk, 1997) using Canadian data.  Following Lau and 
Redlawsk, a “correct vote” is the vote choice individuals would make under conditions 
of perfect information.  In other words, a vote is “correct” if is cast for the party or 
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candidate which a voter should vote for, based upon a fully informed comparison of the 
issue positions of individuals to those of political candidates.  To determine levels of 
correct voting, the article compares the positions of individuals (determined through 
Canadian Election Study, or CES, data) to those of parties (based upon data from the 
Comparative Manifestos Project, or CMP) in seven dimensions of political competition 
to create an overall measure of correct voting.  The first goal of the article is thus to 
evaluate the extent to which Canadians are capable of identifying and voting for the 
party that best reflects their own self-reported preferences and interests.   
 TOVD comes into play in the second part of the article, where the aim is to 
evaluate whether the campaign period helps individuals to vote correctly.  Individuals 
have the opportunity to learn about party policy positions during the campaign, but 
whether they use this opportunity to make a ‘better’ vote choice has yet to be 
determined.  The amount of attention that respondents report having paid to the 
campaign is employed as a proxy for campaign knowledge (which includes knowledge 
of party policies), and TOVD is introduced as a moderating variable to explore in detail 
the relationship between attentiveness and correct voting.  If correct voting is desirable, 
as the article argues, then the campaign can be said to have a positive impact if it 
improves the ability of the electorate to vote correctly.   
The dissertation concludes with a brief research note on the validation of TOVD 
data.  Since TOVD data are known to be of questionable quality, there is a need to 
ensure that only cases with valid TOVD responses are included in studies where TOVD 
serves as either a dependent or independent variable.  Fournier et al.’s (2001) method of 
validating Canadian TOVD data is augmented to account for changes in CES TOVD 
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question format.8  A new method of validating and sorting CES cases on the basis of 
TOVD validity is introduced (this method, termed the “partially restrictive” method, is 
applied to each of the dissertation’s articles).  The research note also illustrates the 
importance of removing invalid cases, by comparing valid and CES cases with valid 
and invalid TOVD responses on the basis of several variables known to have a 
relationship to TOVD. 
 The components of this dissertation make a significant contribution to our 
knowledge of the causes and correlates of TOVD in Canada.  They consider previously 
overlooked variables in explaining TOVD patterns, and use TOVD in novel ways to 
evaluate this factor as an explanatory variable.  While TOVD is an important concept in 
all four articles, these works also add to the literature on a variety of other topics, 
including ambivalence, cognitive dissonance theory (and political psychology more 
broadly), campaign effects, voter sincerity, and the increasingly prominent literature on 
correct voting.  Together, these works represent a noteworthy step forward in 
understanding TOVD in Canada. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Prior to 2006 CES respondents were given five TOVD options (before the campaign, and four 
campaign-period options).  Since 2006, there have been only three options (before the campaign and two 
campaign-period options). 
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2 – EXPLAINING THE TIME-OF-VOTING-DECISION USING 
MEASURES OF ATTITUDINAL CONFLICT, INTENSITY AND 
DIRECTION 
 
 
What causes individuals to make their vote decisions at the point in time at 
which they do?  We know from the small amount of existing research on the topic of 
the time-of-voting decision (TOVD) that many voters know long before an election 
which party or candidate they will support, while others take much longer to arrive at a 
crystallized decision (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Fournier et al., 
2004).  However, aside from a few socio-demographic factors, partisanship, and 
measures of political attentiveness and knowledge (Fournier et al., 2001), we know 
little of the causes and correlates of TOVD.   
The lack of attention to the study of TOVD patterns is surprising considering the 
potential practical implications of knowledge of this sort.  Political actors no doubt have 
a keen interest in knowing what types of individuals are likely to make decisions at 
specific times and for what reasons, and how best to target such voters with political 
communication.  In the academic realm, this type of information is of relevance not 
only to the field of political behaviour, but also to political psychology and marketing.  
The market for research on this topic is thus both practical and academic. 
Three concepts that have received modest attention in the literature on TOVD 
are the consistency, intensity, and direction of political attitudes.  Consistency, or the 
extent to which attitudes or considerations are in conflict with one another, is typically 
evaluated through measures of ambivalence, which is defined here as the simultaneous 
presence of both positive and negative attitudes towards a candidate or party.  These 
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attitudes may be contradictory (i.e. they may lead one to support different parties), 
reinforcing (i.e. they may both lead to the same party), or irrelevant (i.e. they may not 
have an impact upon a vote choice) (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002).  For a sense of 
inconsistency, or ambivalence, to exist, coexisting contradictory factors must be 
present.  The second dimension of attitudes explored here, intensity, is defined as the 
strength or depth of feeling a person attaches to his or her opinions (Katz, 1944).9  
Voters who are relatively indifferent with respect to individual political attitudes 
towards candidates or parties can be said to have opinions of weak intensity.  Finally, 
the direction of summary evaluations of candidates or parties can be determined by 
combining information from a series of relevant political attitudes.  Individuals who 
have stronger positive than negative attitudes towards the party they vote for are said 
here to be voting in a positive direction.  Perhaps surprisingly, many individuals vote 
for a party towards which they have more negative than positive attitudes.   
The primary aim of this article is to explore in detail the relationship between 
the time at which an individual finalizes a vote decision, relative to election-day, and 
the consistency, intensity and direction of factors known to be related to vote choice.  
The explanatory power of existing measures of these attitudinal dimensions is 
contrasted to that of a new measure introduced here.  Based upon the limited amount of 
existing research on these relationships, the fundamental expectations are that an early 
TOVD will be associated with low levels of inconsistency (Berelson et al., 1954; 
Lavine, 2001), high levels of intensity (Fournier, 2005; Petty and Krosnick, 1995), and 
summary evaluations in the direction of the party voted for (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008).  
                                                 
9 In some cases this concept is referred to as attitudinal “extremity,” and refers to the distance between a 
person’s attitude evaluation and the midpoint on a bipolar attitude scale (see Abelson 1995). 
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It is also expected that TOVD patterns will be better explained when summary 
attitudinal measures take several of these dimensions into account.  Since American 
TOVD data have been found to have a significant validity problem (Plumb, 1986; 
Chaffee and Rimal, 1996), Canadian data (from the 2008 Canadian Election Study, or 
CES) are employed to test these expectations (Fournier et al., 2001, have shown that 
Canadian data are relatively reliable). 
In addition to exploring the relationships between TOVD and these attitudinal 
dimensions, this article makes several noteworthy contributions to the literature.  First, 
it introduces a new summary attitudinal measure which takes into account conflict, 
intensity and direction (existing measures are currently based upon only one or two of 
these factors), and the explanatory power of this new variable is contrasted to that of 
existing indicators through a series of bivariate regression models with TOVD as the 
dependent variable.  Second, the article considers a wider range of factors known to 
influence vote choice than existing work on this topic.  All attitudinal measures are 
calculated here on the basis of variables from the many stages of the multi-stage 
recursive model of vote choice.  The model, which was first proposed by Miller and 
Shanks (1996), and has been subsequently adapted for Canada by authors associated 
with the CES (see Blais et al., 2002 and Gidengil et al., 2009), outlines a variety of 
categories of factors known to have a relationship with vote choice (the stages of Blais 
et al.’s, 2002, model are: sociodemographic characteristics,10 underlying values and 
                                                 
10 Strictly speaking, sociodemographic characteristics are not attitudes.  However, these factors have long 
been known to have a relationship with vote choice (Berelson et al., 1954).  For instance, religious groups 
are often associated with support for various parties, although the reasons for such relationships are not 
always well understood (see Blais, 2005).  While Blais et al. (2002) posit that sociodemographic factors 
can influence attitudes from other stages of the multi-stage recursive model, the fact is that the effects of 
sociodemographic variables are not fully washed away when included in multivariate vote choice models 
with variables from the other stages of the model.  One possible reason for this may be that that these 
30 
 
30 
 
beliefs, partisanship, economic perceptions, issue opinions, evaluations of government 
performance and leader evaluations) and provides a relatively comprehensive account 
of the correlates of vote choice.   
Finally, this article is unique in that it recognizes that, if some attitudes are more 
consequential to vote choice than are others, some attitudes will be more influential to 
the relationship between TOVD and attitudinal consistency, intensity and direction.  
The strength of the relationships between vote choice and each stage of the multi-stage 
recursive model are evaluated, and this information is used to assign weights to each 
stage (and, where applicable, to each variable within each stage).  The calculated 
weights are party specific to account for the possibility that factors may differ in 
importance depending upon which party one supports.  This information is incorporated 
into the calculation of the new summary measures of conflict, intensity and direction.  It 
is anticipated that the weighted variables will better account for TOVD patterns than 
will their unweighted counterparts.  
 
2.1 - TOVD AND ATTITUDINAL CONFLICT, INTENSITY AND DIRECTION 
Since Lazarsfeld et al.’s 1944 work, The People’s Choice, there has been 
significant interest in the study of voting behavior (see Gidengil, 1992, Blais et al. 2002 
and Gidengil et al. 2009 for some noteworthy Canadian examples), and the bulk of 
                                                                                                                                               
variables could be tapping into some latent attitudes not otherwise included in the model.  Additionally, it 
has been illustrated that voters will tend to delay their TOVD if they see their social networks (which may 
be influenced by factors such as religion, race or income), as being politically at odds (or inconsistent) 
with their own preferences (Mutz, 2002).  Accordingly, the sociodemographic stage of the model is 
retained in the analyses below.  All references to attitudinal consistency, intensity and direction here 
should be interpreted to include sociodemographic factors. 
As it turns out, when the attitudinal measures considered below are calculated by omitting 
sociodemographic variables, the results in Table 2-2 change very little and the article’s substantive 
conclusions remain the same.   
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work in this field deals with the subject of vote choice.  That is, scholars have attempted 
to identify patterns to explain why people vote for the parties or candidates they do.  
Receiving relatively little attention, however, is the question of why people make their 
vote choices when they do.  The majority of research aiming to explain TOVD patterns 
originates from the United States, where researchers have explored the relationship 
between TOVD and sociodemographic cross pressures (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948, Berelson 
et al. 1954), partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960), gender (Riedel and Dunne, 1969-
1970; Kenski 2007), political interest and attentiveness (Chaffee and Choe, 1980; 
Whitney and Goldman, 1985; Lucas and Adams, 1978), and the perceived 
competitiveness of one’s preferred candidate (Kirkpatrick 1972).   
Unfortunately, however, American National Election Study TOVD data have 
been found to be largely unreliable (Plumb 1986, Chaffee and Rimal 1996).  Whether 
survey respondents are intentionally dishonest about their TOVD information 
(Bradburn et al., 1979; Clausen, 1968) or they are genuinely unable to ascertain when 
their decisions are finalized (Plumb, 1986), the fact that American TOVD data are so 
flawed means that the conclusions of research based upon these data must be treated 
with caution.  In contrast, however, CES TOVD data have been described as “highly 
reliable” (Fournier et al., 2001).11  Fournier et al. have shown that roughly 80% of CES 
respondents provide accurate TOVD responses, and introduced a method whereby 
invalid TOVD responses can be identified for removal.  Canadian data thus are suitable 
for an analysis of the relationship between TOVD and measures of attitudinal 
consistency, intensity and direction. 
                                                 
11 Possible reasons for this difference include different campaign lengths and election study question 
format. 
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The study of how attitudes relate to and influence one another, how they 
combine to form summary evaluations of an attitude object, and how attitudes influence 
behaviour has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention.  Psychologists 
(e.g. Cacioppo et al., 1997; Tesser and Martin, 1996) and political scientists (e.g. Zaller 
and Feldman, 1992; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Meffert et al., 2004) have recognized 
that summary evaluations of attitude objects are influenced by a number of discrete 
attitudes, and that these attitudes are not necessarily compatible with one another.  
These opinions may be inconsistent, they may be held with different degrees of 
intensity, and some types of attitudes may be more consequential to summary 
evaluations than others.  Authors like Heider (1946), Lewin (1951), and Festinger 
(1957) recognized that conflicting attitudes can lead to psychological tension and, in 
some cases, attitude change.  The intensity, or strength, of attitudes has also been 
extensively studied (Katz, 1944; Scott, 1968; Petty and Krosnick, 1995), and both 
attitudinal consistency and intensity are known to moderate the attitude-behaviour 
relationship (Raden, 1985).   
In contrast, study of the relationships between political attitudes and TOVD has 
received a modest amount of scholarly attention.  According to Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), 
late deciders are those who are experiencing sociodemographic cross-pressures.  In 
other words, these voters exhibit some sociodemographic characteristics associated with 
a vote for a particular candidate, and others associated with a vote against that candidate 
(the assumption is that sociodemographic characteristics somehow shape political 
attitudes).  Cross-pressure theory suggests that “conflicts and inconsistencies among the 
factors which influence vote decisions” (p. 53) can lead to a delay in TOVD, as 
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individuals will tend to avoid making a decision until it becomes necessary to do so.  If 
vote choice is influenced heavily by sociodemographic factors, as the Columbia school 
suggests, inconsistencies among these variables can make one’s vote choice difficult, or 
unclear.  In related, more recent work, Nir (2005) has shown that voters tend to decide 
later if they perceive their social networks (which can be based upon sociodemographic 
factors such as religion, race or income) as being split in partisan terms.  There is good 
reason to expect, therefore, that conflict with respect to some of the determinants of 
vote choice will lead to a relatively late TOVD. 
By focusing only upon sociodemographic characteristics, which are relatively 
stable over time, the Columbia School downplays the importance of the campaign 
period.  Regardless of what occurs during the course of a campaign, individuals who are 
strongly aligned with a particular party are expected to make their minds up early, and 
those who are cross-pressured are expected to make their minds up late.  Heider’s 
(1946) cognitive balance theory, which has also been used to explain why some voters 
with inconsistent (or unbalanced) attitudes have a delayed TOVD (Kirkpatrick, 1972), 
performs slightly better in this regard.  Whereas cross-pressure theory focuses upon 
avoidance of decision making, cognitive balance theory is focused upon the resolution 
of inconsistencies (or a shift towards greater consistency).  Heider’s theory is 
compatible with dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which suggests that voters will 
seek consistency among attitudes by changing some of those attitudes.  It also allows 
for campaign events to have an influence upon attitudes, as this theory recognizes the 
malleability of attitudes (sociodemographic factors, in contrast, are largely stable). 
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Accordingly, it is anticipated here that attitudinal conflict will be related to a 
relatively late TOVD.  Aside from the logic of the cross-pressures and cognitive balance 
theories presented above, researchers have discovered that the attitudes of ambivalent 
individuals are relatively pliable in the face of persuasive information (Bassili, 1996; 
MacDonald and Zanna, 1998; Armitage and Conner, 2000) and that ambivalence is 
related to response instability (Conner and Sparks, 2002; Craig et al., 2005).  In 
contrast, even if exposed to persuasive arguments, unambivalent individuals are 
unlikely to change their opinions.  Existing attitudes may enable such individuals to 
reject arguments which are incompatible with existing beliefs, or new information may 
not be persuasive enough to cause attitude change (Zaller, 1992).  In the context of a 
political campaign, this suggests that ambivalent individuals (those with inconsistent 
attitudes) are more likely to change their minds during the campaign period than are 
non-ambivalent voters, which makes them late deciders by definition. 
The intensity of attitudes towards an attitude object is also expected to influence 
TOVD.  Individuals who have intense attitudes are more likely to have an early TOVD 
than are those individuals with weaker attitudes (even if attitudes are of equal 
consistency).  Weak attitudes are known to be relatively malleable (Petty and Krosnick, 
1995; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Fournier, 2005), and individuals with strong attitudes 
are known to be resistant to persuasion (Zaller, 1992), meaning that the campaign 
period is likely to have relatively little effect upon individuals who hold intense 
attitudes.  Accordingly, individuals who tend to hold intense attitudes towards their vote 
decision are expected to have an early TOVD.   
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Finally, the direction of summary evaluations is expected to have a relationship 
with TOVD.  As noted above, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) found that the predictability of 
vote choice (as measured through the direction of summary evaluations) has a strong 
relationship with American TOVD data.  Additionally, it is known that strategic and 
protest voters tend to have a late TOVD (McGregor, working paper).  These groups of 
voters are, by definition, voting for a party that is not their most preferred, and thus it is 
likely that summary evaluations of that party will be in the negative direction.  Voters 
with positive summary evaluations of the party they vote for thus are expected to be 
more likely to have an early TOVD than are those with negative summary evaluations. 
If the consistency, intensity and direction of attitudes have a relationship with 
TOVD, it stands to reason that attitudinal measures which tap into more than one of 
these dimensions should better explain TOVD patterns than should measures based 
upon only one dimension.  It is known that intense attitudes tend to be relatively central 
to decisions (i.e. they are factored heavily into summary evaluations) and shape other, 
less intense attitudes (Herzon, 1975).  In other words, if an individual feels strongly 
with respect to one political opinion, it may influence other relevant opinions so that 
they become compatible with one another.  Thus individuals with intense attitudes are 
likely to also hold relatively consistent attitudes, and summary evaluations of these 
attitudes are likely to be in the direction of the party voted for.  Nevertheless, 
consistency, intensity and direction cannot simply be assumed to correspond with one 
another for all voters.  The relationships between TOVD and several measures of 
attitudinal conflict, intensity and direction are considered below, and some of these 
measures take more than one attitudinal dimension into account.  It is expected here that 
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measures which are based upon information from more than one of these dimensions 
will better explain TOVD than will measures based upon only one of these factors.  
In addition to exploring the explanatory power of several measures of 
consistency, intensity and direction, this article improves upon existing measures of 
political ambivalence (a concept closely related to the three dimensions of attitudes 
under study here) in two ways.  First, existing measures are based upon very few of the 
determinants of the vote choice.  The Columbia school’s focus upon sociodemographic 
characteristics has long been deemed inadequate, but more recent work on the 
intersection of TOVD and attitudinal conflict also leaves room for improvement.  
Lavine (2001) only considers attitudes towards presidential candidates in his measure of 
ambivalence, ignoring important information like partisan identification and evaluations 
of past government performance.  Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) and Fournier (2005) also 
include only include six attitudes (the factors with the strongest relationship with vote 
choice) in their measures.  While these measures represent a noteworthy improvement 
over the Columbia approach, they nevertheless ignore several important known 
correlates of vote choice (a fact which Lewis-Beck et al. themselves concede). 
The multi-stage recursive model (see Blais et al., 2002) provides a 
comprehensive account of the factors known to have a relationship with vote choice, 
and is used here to determine which factors should be included in summary attitudinal 
measures.  Despite the relatively poor quality of American TOVD data, one observation 
from the American literature that is accepted here is the assertion that TOVD can be 
influenced by both long and short-term factors.  Permanent, or relatively stable, factors 
like partisanship and gender can have a relationship with TOVD (Campbell et al., 1960; 
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Chaffee and Choe, 1980; Kenski, 2007), as can more transient, short-term 
considerations such as candidate evaluations (Converse, 1962; Bowen, 1994; Chaffee 
and Rimal, 1996).  When exploring the relationship between attitudes and TOVD, it 
therefore stands to reason that measures of attitudinal conflict, intensity and direction 
should take both long- and short-term factors into account.  The version of the multi-
stage recursive model employed by the CES authors includes both long-term 
(sociodemographic variables, underlying values and beliefs, party identification) and 
short-term (economic perceptions, issue opinions, evaluations of government 
performance, and leader evaluations) variables.  The assumption here is that, since vote 
choice can be affected by this entire array of factors, each of these factors has the 
potential to have an impact upon TOVD.   
The second way in which existing measures of conflict, intensity and direction 
are improved upon here is by recognizing that some attitudes will be more influential to 
summary evaluations than will others.  Attitudes are generally assigned equal levels of 
importance in the calculation of attitudinal conflict (Fournier 2005; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2005).  However, we know that some factors are more important to vote decisions than 
are others (Blais et al., 2002; Gidengil et al., 2009).  It stands to reason, therefore, that 
some factors will be more influential than others when it comes to summary measures 
of attitudinal conflict, intensity and direction.  For example, if an individual has one 
factor predisposing him or her to vote for a particular party, and another which leads 
away from that same party, a person may or may not feel conflicted, depending upon 
how important each of the two factors are to his or her vote decision.  If one factor is 
much more important to the person’s decision than is the other, he or she can be 
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expected to feel relatively little attitudinal conflict, as compared to a situation where the 
two factors are of the same importance.  When the two factors are equally important, 
TOVD is expected to be later than if one factor is much more important than the other.   
The strength of the relationships between vote choice and the stages of the 
multi-stage recursive model (and the variables are included in each stage of the model), 
are evaluated here (this process is outlined in detail in Appendix 2-1).  The attitudinal 
measures considered below are calculated by weighting the stages and variables 
included in the multi-stage recursive model, according to the strength of the relationship 
between these factors and vote choice.  It is anticipated that measures based upon these 
weights will be better able to explain TOVD patterns than will unweighted measures. 
To summarize, this article’s expectations are as follows: 
 
H1:   An early TOVD will be associated with low levels of attitudinal conflict, high 
 levels of attitudinal intensity, and summary evaluations in the direction of the 
 party voted for. 
H2:   TOVD patterns will be better explained by attitudinal measures which tap into 
 more than one of these dimensions than they will by measures based upon only 
 one factor. 
H3:   The capacity of measures of attitudinal conflict, intensity and direction to 
 account for TOVD patterns will be increased when weights are included in the 
 calculation of these measures, to take into account the relative importance of 
 each attitude to summary evaluations. 
 
 
2.2 - DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study’s dependent variable, TOVD, is defined with reference to election-
day; voters are categorized on the basis of the length of time prior to an election that 
they make their decision.  The TOVD periods considered here are the period before the 
start of the campaign, the campaign period (excluding election-day) and election-day.  
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TOVD is measured through a single question in the post-election segment of the CES.12  
The validity of TOVD responses is evaluated using McGregor’s (working paper) 
partially restrictive method, and invalid cases have been removed. 
In total, six measures of attitudinal conflict, intensity and direction are compared 
here to TOVD.  With the exception of subjective ambivalence (discussed below), it is 
possible to factor information from all seven stages of the multi-stage recursive model 
into the calculation of each of these measures.  These variables thus are based upon 
almost 50 survey questions,13 and take into account an individual’s sociodemographic 
characteristics,14 underlying values and beliefs,15 partisan attachments,16 economic 
perceptions,17 issue opinions,18 leadership evaluations,19 and opinions of the current 
                                                 
12 The CES TOVD question is as follows:  When did you decide that you were going to vote [for party 
X]?  Potential responses are:  Before the campaign began, during the campaign, election day, don’t know, 
and refusal.  Interviewees who gave the last two responses have been removed from the dataset. 
13 Appendix 2-III lists all CES questions used here. 
14 The sociodemographic factors and underlying beliefs considered here are the same as those employed 
by Gidengil et al. (2009).  The one exception is religious fundamentalism, which is not considered here.  
The CES question on fundamentalism is only asked to Christians, and excludes individuals who could be 
fundamentalists of other religions. 
The sociodemographic factors considered are:  race (visible minority or not), language (French or not), 
Catholic or not, public sector worker or not, union member or not, university educated or not, gender, 
rural or urban resident, religion (Catholic, Protestant or non-Christian), age (under35, 35-54, or over 54), 
income (lowest quartile, highest quartile, two middle quartiles), and region.  Variables are coded as either 
0 or 1, so nominal variables are made into a series of dummy variables. 
15 The values and beliefs considered are:  free enterprise, social conservatism, feelings towards Quebec, 
regional alienation and political disaffection.  In most cases several questions (listed in Appendix 2-III) 
are combined to determine a score for each factor for each individual. 
16 Individuals are categorized as either partisans of the party voted for, non-partisans, or partisans of a 
party other than that which they voted for. 
17 Economic perceptions are based upon blame or credit individuals assign to the federal government for 
sociotropic or egocentric economic factors. 
18 Four issues are considered: fighting crime, improving healthcare/social welfare programs, creating 
jobs/dealing with the economy and protecting the environment.  Individuals are asked which party they 
think is the best to deal with each issue.  Voting for the party that is best to deal with an issue is a positive 
factor, and voting for another party is a negative factor. 
19 Leadership evaluations are based upon 100-point feeling thermometer questions.  The rating of two 
party leaders is considered for each case:  that of the party that one votes for, and that of the highest-rated 
leader of the parties not voted for (the Bloc Quebecois leader is not considered outside of Quebec).  
Values for this stage of the model are based upon the difference between these two scores.  If the rating of 
the leader of the party voted for is greater than that of the highest other party leader, the score is positive, 
and if the rating is lower the score is negative. 
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government’s performance.20  Omitting any of these stages would make it more likely 
that factors important to individual voters would be ignored.21  Survey responses are 
translated into positive or negative attitudes, depending upon the party voted for.  For 
example, if a person approves of the Government’s performance, this would be 
considered a positive attitude if that person votes for the Conservatives (the incumbent 
party), but a negative attitude if that person votes for any other party.  Similarly, if one 
votes Liberal, but is a partisan of another party, this factor would be counted as a 
negative pressure.  If a Liberal partisan were to vote Liberal, however, partisanship 
would be a positive factor for him or her.22  Values for each stage of the model are 
determined in this fashion for each respondent and are combined to determine conflict 
and intensity scores.  Because these measures include so many factors, control variables 
are not included in the analyses below. 
In order to evaluate H1, TOVD is regressed onto several types of indicators of 
consistency, intensity and direction.  Attitudinal consistency or conflict generally is 
studied through measures of ambivalence, although some measures of ambivalence also 
take other dimensions into account.  One of the most commonly studied forms of 
ambivalence, “subjective ambivalence,” is measured by asking respondents to comment 
directly upon how conflicted they feel towards an attitude object (Tourangeau et al., 
1989; Preister and Petty, 1996).  After asking which party respondents voted for, the 
CES asks interviewees to reveal if their feelings towards that party are all positive, 
                                                 
20 This is based upon a single question about satisfaction with the government’s performance. 
21 The flip side of this argument is that factors which are unimportant to an individual may be included in 
the calculation of ambivalence.  However, using the multi-stage recursive model as a framework avoids 
the arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of variables. 
22 Only the supporters of the four major parties (the Conservatives, Liberals, NDP and Bloc Quebecois) 
are considered here, as information from some of the stages of the model are party specific (i.e. leader 
ratings), and such information is not available on minor parties. 
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mostly positive, or mixed.23  This measure directly taps into attitudinal conflict and is 
used here to determine subjective ambivalence scores for each respondent.  As this 
measure is based upon one CES question, rather than a series of factors included in the 
multi-stage recursive model, a weighted version of subjective ambivalence cannot be 
calculated. 
Subjective ambivalence taps into attitudinal conflict, but provides no 
information on the intensity or direction of summary attitudes.  It only provides insight 
into the presence or absence of attitudes which conflict with an individual’s vote choice.  
This measure is also an unreliable indicator of the direction of summary evaluations.  
While individuals who say that their opinions of the party voted for are either all 
positive or mostly positive can be said to have summary evaluations in the direction of 
the party voted for, no such conclusion can be drawn about the group of voters who say 
that they have “mixed” feelings (this includes over 40% of respondents) - these voters 
could have summary attitudes in either the positive or negative direction.   
All other summary attitudinal measures considered here are calculated on the 
basis of information from all seven stages of the multi-stage recursive model.  The 
intensity variable is based upon the summation of positive and negative attitudes, and is 
scaled to a range of 0 to 1.  In an approach similar to that taken by the Columbia school 
in their evaluations of cross-pressures, and by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008), direction is 
determined by subtracting the sum of negative attitudes (those which would lead 
respondents to vote against the party that they do) from the sum of positive attitudes.  
                                                 
23 This question is asked in both the pre- and post-election questionnaires, but is only asked to decided 
voters in the pre-election survey.  Post-election data thus are used here for this variable.  In contrast, pre-
election data are used for all other variables (in order to get a more accurate sense of the tension voters 
are feeling prior to casting their ballots). 
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Those individuals who have a positive value from this calculation are assigned a value 
of 1, and those with negative values are assigned a value of -1.24  Both weighted and 
unweighted versions of each variable are calculated and compared to TOVD. 
The other independent variables considered below tap into more than one 
attitudinal dimension.  The first such variable is a measure of “objective ambivalence” 
(Preister and Petty, 1996).  In contrast to subjective ambivalence, objective ambivalence 
values are based upon responses to multiple survey questions about feelings towards an 
attitude object.  This information is then combined to determine how ambivalent an 
individual is towards an attitude object, without asking them directly about 
ambivalence.  Griffin has developed a widely adopted formula (shown in Equation 2-1) 
for the calculation of objective ambivalence, based upon two conditions which are said 
to be necessary and sufficient for a sense of ambivalence to exist (Thompson et al., 
1995).25  First, conflicting attitudes must be of moderate intensity.  If one does not hold 
strong opinions with respect to some political factor, it is unlikely that the factor will 
matter significantly to one’s vote decision.  This requirement is captured in the first 
term of the formula.  Second, the conflicting attitudes must be of similar magnitude, or 
intensity.  If one factor is of significantly greater intensity than the other, an individual 
is unlikely to experience a strong sense of ambivalence.  Consistency is captured in the 
second term of the equation.  Thus whereas subjective ambivalence taps into conflict 
                                                 
24 The few cases where the positive and negative attitudes are equal to one another are assigned a value of 
0. 
25 Other formulas have been suggested as measures of ambivalence (i.e. Kaplan, 1972, and Katz and 
Hass, 1988).  See Thompson et al. (1995) for an overview of existing measures and an explanation as to 
why Equation 2-1 is the most commonly employed formula for objective ambivalence. 
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only, objective ambivalence is based upon both attitudinal conflict and intensity.26  
Griffin’s formula is as follows: 
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Where P and N represent the positive and negative attitudes relevant to a vote for a 
particular party (sigma notation is used to show that information from the seven stages 
of the multi-stage recursive model is included in the calculation of P and N).  P and N 
are coded here to a scale from 0 to 1. 
Equation 2-1 overlooks, however, the important difference between 
unambivalent individuals who vote for the party they might be expected to based upon 
the direction of summary attitudes, and those who vote against that party.  While these 
two types of voters are clearly very different from one another, the direction of 
summary evaluations is not factored into this measure.  Respondents who are strongly 
predisposed to voting against the party that they eventually do would be assigned the 
same objective ambivalence score as those who are strongly predisposed to voting for 
that party.   
 Another measure that taps into multiple attitudinal dimensions was introduced 
by Fournier (2005) in his study of individuals who change their vote preferences 
between pre- and post-election CES questionnaires.  “Actual ambivalence” is based 
upon the difference between the proportions of consistent and inconsistent attitudes.  
While Fournier only includes the six strongest correlates of vote choice for each party in 
                                                 
26 Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlation between subjective and objective measures of ambivalence is 
not usually very strong (Martinez et al.2005, Thompson et al. 1995).   
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his calculations, variables from all seven stages of the multi-stage recursive model are 
included here.27  Although this measure taps into attitudinal conflict and direction, it 
provides no information on the intensity of attitudes (since actual ambivalence values 
are based upon differences in proportions, or shares of total relevant attitudes, rather 
than the absolute magnitude of attitudes).  Equation 2-2 shows the formula for 
Fournier’s actual ambivalence. 
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   Equation 2-2 
 
The first term of the equation serves as the baseline for actual ambivalence 
values.  That is, individuals are assigned an actual ambivalence score of 1 if the 
strengths of positive and negative considerations are equal to one another.  The second 
term taps into the direction and consistency of attitudes.  Individuals with stronger 
positive than negative attitudes will have an actual ambivalence value of less than one, 
and those with more negative than positive attitudes will have a value of greater than 
one.28  Individuals who have large differences between ∑P and ∑N (or those with 
relatively consistent attitudes) will have actual ambivalence values farther away from 1 
(the baseline) than will those with relatively inconsistent attitudes.  This term includes a 
denominator based upon the sum of positive and negative attitudes (since the formula 
                                                 
27 A measure of actual ambivalence based upon only six factors does display a statistically significant 
relationship with TOVD (results not shown), but has less explanatory power than the model based upon 
more factors (based upon psuedo-R2 values).   
28 In his work, Fournier truncates his scale so that individuals who have more negative than positive 
attitudes are assigned a maximum actual ambivalence value of 1.  This applies to 17.1% of cases here 
(161 of 939).  Simply assigning these individuals a value of 1, however, masks a great deal of 
information.  Accordingly, the measure of actual ambivalence used here is not truncated in this manner.  
While the truncated measure does have a statistically significant relationship with TOVD, it produces a 
lower pseudo-R2 value (results not shown) than the non-truncated version. 
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With the exception of subjective ambivalence, each indicator is calculated in 
two ways:  unweighted and weighted.  Unweighted measures factor all stages of the 
multi-stage recursive model equally in the calculation of summary measures.  That is, 
all stages are assumed to have the same level of impact upon summary attitudinal 
measures.  Weighted measures are calculated using the same formulae as their 
unweighted counterparts, but factors from the multi-stage recursive model are assigned 
weight values based upon the strength of the relationship that these variables have with 
vote choice.  Only those factors with a statistically significant relationship with vote 
choice are included in calculations.  Weights vary from party to party and are calculated 
on the basis of the strength of the relationship between party support and each type of 
factor included in the multi-stage recursive model.  The greater impact a variable has 
upon the likelihood of voting for a party, the greater impact that variable is assumed to 
have upon TOVD.  Appendix 2-I contains a detailed description of how weights are 
assigned to the stages of the multi-stage recursive model, and, where applicable, to 
variables within each stage, and Appendix 2-II contains descriptive statistics for the 
weighted and unweighted versions of each explanatory variable.  H3 receives support if 
weighted measures are better able to account for TOVD than are their unweighted 
counterparts. 
 
2.3 - RESULTS 
 To compare the explanatory power of the measures of attitudinal consistency, 
intensity and direction, TOVD is regressed onto each variable in a series of bivariate 
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multinomial logistic regressions,29 the results of which are displayed in Table 2-2.  If 
H1 is accurate, the coefficients for the intensity and direction measures should be 
negative, and all others should be positive.   
TABLE 2-2:  BIVARIATE MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS WITH 
TOVD AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE – 2008 DATA 
Variable   
Campaign vs. 
Pre-
Campaign 
Election-day 
vs. Pre-
Campaign 
Election-day 
vs. Campaign Pseudo-R
2 
Subjective Ambivalence 
  0.66(.12)c 1.78(.24)c 1.14(.25)c 
0.0472 
Constant -0.68(.08)c -2.59(.21)c -1.91(.21)c 
Intensity 
Unweighted -3.30(.59) c -5.07(.87)c -1.77(.86)b 
0.0283 
Constant 1.47(.34 c -1.18(.47)b -0.29(.46) 
Weighted -5.61(.59) c -8.34(.93)c -2.73(.90)c 
0.0921 
Constant 1.82(.24) c 1.51(.33)c -0.31(.31) 
Direction 
Unweighted -0.73(.09)c -1.30(.13)c -0.58(.12)c 
0.0686 
Constant 0.09(.10) -1.01(.13)c -1.12(.12)c 
Weighted -0.71(.10)c -1.45(.13)c -0.73(.12)c 
0.0816 
Constant 0.05(.10) -1.04(.13)c -1.09(.12) 
Griffin’s Ambivalence 
Unweighted 3.30(.39)c 4.70(.61)c 1.40(.61)b 
0.0607 
Constant -0.14(.08)a -1.36(.11)c -1.23(.11)c 
Weighted 6.30(.64) c 9.32(.99)c 3.02(.95)c 
0.0961 
Constant 0.30(.10) c -0.76(.13) c -1.06(.12)c 
Actual Ambivalence 
Unweighted 1.54(.16) c 2.70(.23)c 1.16(.20)c 
0.1148 
Constant -1.15(.11) c -3.39(.22)c -2.24(.23)c 
Weighted 1.58(.17)c 2.67(.22)c 1.09(.17)c 
0.1259 
Constant -1.02(.09)c -3.12(.20)c -2.09(.20)c 
Revised Griffin's 
Ambivalence 
Unweighted 2.88(.28)c 4.77 (.40)c 1.89(.35)c 
0.1145 
Constant -0.35(.07)c -1.94(.14)c -1.58(.14)c 
Weighted 4.69(.45)c 7.13 (.58)c 2.44(.46)c 
0.1325 
Constant -.07(.08) -1.48(.13)c -1.41(.13)c 
Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). 
a:  Coefficient significant at 90% level, b: Coefficient significant at the 95% level, c: Coefficient significant at the 
99% confidence level. 
N = 965 for subjective ambivalence, and 939 for all other variables. 
 
                                                 
29 Sampling weights have not been applied here, as there is no reason to expect the relationship between 
these variables and TOVD to be influenced by any of the variables factored into sampling weights.  
Results change very little when a sampling weight is applied, and all substantive conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
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The results in Table 2-2 suggest that we can be confident that there are 
relationships, in the expected direction, between TOVD and each explanatory 
variable.30  H1 receives strong support from these results.  All coefficients, comparing 
all TOVD periods, are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or greater.  
Pre-campaign deciders tend to have more consistent and intense attitudes than do later 
deciders, and they are more likely to have summary evaluations in the direction of the 
party voted for.  Figure 2-1 illustrates these patterns graphically, showing the predicted 
probability distributions of TOVD for subjective ambivalence and each of the weighted 
measures contained in Table 2-2.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The Columbia school’s contention that sociodemographic cross-pressures leads to a delay in TOVD is 
compatible with 2008 CES data.  While measures of consistency, intensity and direction based upon 
sociodemographic factors alone do have statistically significant relationships to TOVD (results not 
shown), the pseudo-R2 values produced by these bivariate regressions are much lower than those 
observed in Table 2-2.  Nevertheless, the fact that these relationships are statistically significant helps 
provide support for the decision to include sociodemographic characteristics in the calculation of 
attitudinal variables in this study. 
31 The weighted and unweighted versions of these variables display similar probability distributions. 
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FIGURE 2-1:  PREDICTED PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS BY EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLE – WEIGHTED RESULTS 
  
 
  
Not surprisingly, the probability of having a pre-campaign TOVD is greatest at 
the minimum values for the ambivalence measures, and at the maximum values for 
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intensity and direction.32  The opposite is true of an election-day TOVD, which is most 
likely at the maximum value of the ambivalence measures and the minimum value for 
intensity and direction.33  While the pre-campaign-period and election-day lines are all 
monotonic, this usually is not the case with the campaign-period lines.  The probability 
of being a campaign-period decider peaks, and then recedes (in all graphs except for the 
subjective ambivalence and direction variables), as the probability of an election-day 
TOVD increases.  This finding makes intuitive sense — there is a point at which a 
campaign-period TOVD becomes more likely than a pre-campaign TOVD, but an 
election-day TOVD eventually becomes more likely than a campaign-period TOVD.  
This shows that the relationship between these explanatory factors and TOVD holds 
when comparing campaign-period to election-day deciders and pre-campaign to 
campaign-period deciders.  All of these attitudinal measures thus exhibit the expected 
relationship with TOVD. 
 The results above suggest not only that TOVD is related to these variables, but 
also that TOVD is profoundly affected by these measures of attitudinal consistency, 
intensity and direction.  For example, individuals with the minimum value for revised 
Griffin’s ambivalence have an estimated 90.0% chance of having a pre-campaign period 
TOVD, a 10.2% chance of having a campaign-period TOVD, and a mere 0.8% chance 
of having an election-day TOVD.  At the maximum value of this variable, however, the 
probability of a pre-campaign period TOVD decreases to 0.4%, while the chances of a 
                                                 
32 Due to the large number of factors included in the calculation of direction, there are no cases where 
positive and negative attitude scores equal one another (meaning that there are no direction scores of 0).  
This factor thus acts as a binary variable, with values of -1 and 1. 
33 Only in the actual ambivalence and revised Griffin’s ambivalence graphs is the probability of an 
election-day TOVD greater than that of a campaign period TOVD.  Very few voters, however, have a 
values for these variables within the ranges where this occurs (greater than roughly +0.9 for actual 
ambivalence, or above +0.6 for BoP). 
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campaign-period and election-day TOVD increase to 29.3% and 70.3% respectively.  
Not only does H1 receive support from these results, therefore, but the impact of the 
attitudinal dimensions considered here upon TOVD have been shown to be substantial. 
While all of the variables considered in Table 2-2 have the anticipated 
relationship with TOVD, some factors account for TOVD patterns much better than 
others.  Since all models contain the same number of explanatory variables (1), 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 values (reported in Table 2-2) can be used to compare the 
explanatory power of these variables.34  While this measure does not convey precisely 
the same information as R2 values produced by OLS models,35 it does provide insight 
into how well a model explains variability in the dependent variable, and when 
comparing two models using the same data, McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is higher for the 
model with greater explanatory power (UCLA Academic Technology services, online).   
In general, the measures which tap into only one attitudinal dimension have 
weaker explanatory power than those which tap into multiple dimensions.  Subjective 
ambivalence, which measures consistency alone, has a relatively low R2 value (0.0472).  
While this measure can be quickly obtained through a single election study question, it 
performs relatively poorly if the goal is to explain TOVD patterns.36  While the 
                                                 
34 When comparing models with different numbers of explanatory variables, measures such as the Akaike 
(1974) information criterion (AIC) must be used.  This measure accounts for the number of variables in a 
model and is designed specifically to allow for comparison between models based upon the same dataset.  
However, all models here have one explanatory variable, thus McFadden’s pseudo-R2, which is similarly 
based upon log likelihood values, is sufficient here. 
35 Rather than expressing the proportion of variation of the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables, McFadden’s pseudo R2 is a measure of the improvement in the prediction of the 
outcome variable by a model including the independent variables, as compared to a model without any 
explanatory variables.  These values are useful when comparing models based upon the same dataset (as 
is the case here).   
36 The argument might be made that, since the subjective measure of ambivalence is reported directly by 
survey respondents, it allows individuals to consider only those factors important to their personal vote 
decision, and thus is the most valid measure of ambivalence.  However, it is conceivable that cognitive 
dissonance triggered by the act of voting causes individuals to report a lower value for ambivalence that 
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unweighted measure of intensity has the lowest R2 value (0.0283) in Table 2-2, 
weighting this variable significantly improves its explanatory power (R2=0.0921).  The 
last variable to tap into only one attitudinal dimension, the direction variable, produces 
R2 values which are higher than subjective ambivalence, and while the weighted version 
of this variable (R2 = 0.0816) does have a higher R2 score than the unweighted version, 
this value remains lower than that produced by the weighted versions of the measures 
which tap into multiple dimensions.  Among these variables, the weighted measure of 
Griffin’s ambivalence (R2=0.0961) performs slightly better than any of the 
unidimensional variables, and actual ambivalence reveals a relatively high R2 value 
(0.1259) when weighted.  The measure that taps into three attitudinal dimensions, 
however, is best able to explain TOVD patterns.  The explanatory power of Griffin’s 
ambivalence increases markedly when the formula is altered to take direction into 
account; R2 = 0.1325 for the weighted version of revised Griffin’s ambivalence.  Table 
2-2 thus provides fairly solid support for H2.  The multidimensional variables have 
higher R2 values than do the unidimensional variables, and the revised measure of 
Griffin’s ambivalence produces the highest R2 value in the Table.  The more attitudinal 
dimensions the explanatory variables considered above are based upon, the better they 
are able to account for TOVD patterns. 
The power of the independent variables considered here can be put into context 
by considering the explanatory power of other variables known to have a relationship 
with TOVD.  This process reveals that the measures of consistency, intensity and 
direction considered here are relatively powerful predictors of TOVD.  Bivariate 
                                                                                                                                               
they may have experienced before the vote decision was made.  This variable thus might have less 
validity than more objective measures of ambivalence. 
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regressions of political attention, gender, interest in the election, interest in politics in 
general and political knowledge (all of which are expected to have a relationship with 
TOVD, Fournier et al., 2001) and TOVD produce pseudo-R2 values of 0.0068, 0.0180, 
0.0100, 0.0097 and 0.0012 respectively.37  Even when these variables are combined in a 
single, multivariate regression model with TOVD, the R2 value improves to a mere 
0.0173.38  This value is lower than that produced by any single variable considered in 
Table 2-2, suggesting that the attitudinal measures considered here are relatively 
powerful.  The one variable known to be related to TOVD with explanatory power able 
to rival these variables is the strength of partisanship, which produces a pseudo-R2 of 
0.0605.  Still, this value is lower than the R2 scores for 9 of the 11 variables considered 
in Table-2-2, and all of the weighted measures.39  Thus, not only do the independent 
variables considered in Table 2-2 reveal statistically significant relationships in the 
anticipated direction, but these variables have been shown to have relatively great 
explanatory power. 
In addition to showing that the measures considered in Table 2-2 exhibit 
statistically significant relationships with TOVD, and revealing which measures of 
conflict, intensity and direction are better able to account for TOVD patterns, Table 2-2 
provides strong support for the practice of creating party specific weights for variables 
                                                 
37 The CES questions used to calculate these measures are listed in Appendix 2-III. 
38 As noted in footnote #34, when comparing models with different numbers of explanatory variables, 
measures such as AIC (which takes the number of independent variables into account) are normally used.  
The concern with such comparisons is that the mere inclusion of additional independent variables will 
tend to automatically increase likelihood and pseudo-R2 values.  AIC need not be considered here, 
however, as the R2 value for the model containing attention, gender, interest and knowledge is so much 
lower than the bivariate models in Table 2-2.  
39 The measures of consistency, intensity and direction considered here (with the exception of subjective 
ambivalence) take partisanship into account, and the fact that they tend to have greater explanatory power 
than a measure of partisanship alone provides some justification for the decision here to consider the 
entire array of factors included in the multi-stage recursive model. 
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and stages of the multi-stage recursive model, and thus H3.  The R2 value more than 
triples when the intensity variable is weighted, and sizable increases are observed for all 
other variables.  This pattern illustrates the importance of recognizing that some factors 
have more of an impact upon summary evaluations than do others, and provides some 
validation of the method of weighting variables and stages of the multi-stage recursive 
model outlined in Appendix2-I. 
 
2.4 - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This article has evaluated several separate, yet related, research questions.  First, 
relationships between TOVD and a number of measures of attitudinal consistency, 
intensity and direction have been established.  Second, the data suggest that attitudinal 
measures which tap into multiple attitudinal dimensions are better able to explain 
TOVD than are measures which are based upon only one dimension.  Finally, it has 
been shown that recognizing that some factors are more important to vote decisions 
than are others, and weighting these factors accordingly when calculating summary 
attitudinal measures, improves the ability of such measures to account for TOVD 
patterns.  This article’s three expectations are consistent with results. 
The article’s primary expectation, that TOVD is related to measures of 
attitudinal consistency, intensity and direction, has received firm support.  All of the 
attitudinal measures considered here, whether they tap into one or more of these 
dimensions, have been found to have statistically significant relationships with TOVD.  
Attitudes also have been shown to have a significant impact upon TOVD; individuals 
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with low values for these variables have very different TOVD patterns than do those 
with high values. 
The introduction of a new measure of ambivalence, and the decision to focus 
upon the entire range of variables included in the multi-stage recursive model, represent 
significant improvements over existing studies of ambivalence.  Griffin et al.’s 
objective ambivalence is unable to differentiate between individuals who have positive 
and negative summary evaluations towards the party voted for, and Fournier’s actual 
ambivalence does not take into account the intensity of attitudes.  In contrast, the 
revised version of Griffin’s formula provides insight into the consistency, intensity and 
direction of attitudes.  Additionally, by considering information from the seven stages 
of the multi-stage recursive model, the variables considered here provide more nuanced 
summary attitudinal measures than those based upon fewer factors.  While further work 
is required to examine the worth of these two methodological advances in other settings, 
the results of this study are promising. 
The article’s findings suggest a number of questions worth future consideration.  
First, the models in Table 2-2 group voters of all parties together (although the variables 
and weights included in the calculation of these factors differ according to party).  
Future work can examine whether, and the extent to which, party choice moderates the 
relationship between TOVD and these attitudinal measures.  For instance, is it the case 
that the victorious party is more successful than its opponents at attracting voters with 
inconsistent or weak attitudes, or those voters with negative summary evaluations 
towards the party voted for?  Additionally, the introduction of the multi-stage recursive 
model as a framework upon which to base the calculation of attitudinal variables makes 
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it possible to focus upon short- and long-term factors separately, and it is conceivable 
that these two types of variables may have different impacts upon TOVD.  Attitudinal 
measures based upon long-term factors like sociodemographic characteristics, 
underlying values and beliefs and partisanship may have a different relationship with 
TOVD than measures based upon shorter-term factors like economic evaluations, 
issues, leadership evaluations and opinions of government performance.  For example, 
late deciding voters might conceivably be swayed by campaign events and focus upon 
some of these shorter-term factors, to the exclusion of long-term factors.  If short-term 
and long-term attitudes are inconsistent with one another, however, such an individual 
may be considered here to be relatively conflicted.  If his or her decision were based 
upon short-term factors alone, this person may not actually be experiencing a sense of 
internal conflict.  The relative importance of short- and long-term factors to measures of 
consistency, intensity and direction can be evaluated to further elucidate the impact of 
these attitudinal measures upon TOVD.   
An additional avenue for future research springs from the question of the 
relative impact of each of the three attitudinal dimensions considered here upon TOVD.  
Given the nature of the survey question used to evaluate subjective ambivalence (and 
thus attitudinal consistency), and given that these three attitudinal dimensions are 
generally correlated with one another, it is difficult to base any conclusions about the 
relative impact of these three attitudinal dimensions upon the unidimensional variables 
in Table 2-2.  However, the results from the multi-dimensional variables suggest that 
the direction of summary evaluations may have a greater impact upon TOVD than does 
attitudinal intensity.  Actual ambivalence, which taps into consistency and direction, 
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performs markedly better than Griffin’s original ambivalence variable, which is based 
upon consistency and intensity.  Since consistency is factored into both variables, this 
could suggest that direction may be more important to TOVD than intensity.  That the 
revised version of Griffin’s ambivalence performs much better than the original, but 
only slightly better than actual ambivalence (which already considers direction), 
provides additional evidence of the relative importance of direction.  While further 
work is required to explore this possibility in greater detail, these results are suggestive, 
and validates the decision taken here to alter Griffin’s formula. 
Political actors may benefit considerably from an exploration of these and 
similar questions.  Being able to identify voters with inconsistent or weak attitudes, and 
those who are most likely to vote against the bulk of their attitudes would no doubt be 
of interest to those hoping to influence the outcome of an election.  Understanding the 
types of persuasive messages that these voters respond to could be the key to winning 
the support of undecided voters, stealing votes from opponents and winning elections. 
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3 - COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES:  THE CASE OF CANADA 
 
A substantial share of the literature in the field of voting behaviour is devoted to 
exploring the impact of political attitudes upon behaviour (see Gidengil, 1992; Blais et 
al., 2002; Gidengil et al., 2009).  That is, in attempting to explain vote choice, political 
attitudes generally are seen as explanatory variables.  While psychologists have 
suggested that causation may run in the opposite direction, or that behaviour can shape 
attitudes (Bandura, 1989), with few exceptions (see Anderson et al., 2004 for one 
example) political scientists have made relatively little effort to explore this possibility.   
If variables such as party evaluations are to be considered when attempting to 
explain vote choice, it seems appropriate that we should strive to develop an 
understanding of factors that influence these attitudes.  If the act of voting, one’s vote 
choice, election outcomes, or other relevant political factors can influence evaluations 
of parties, the exact nature of the relationships among these variables is worth 
examining.  Such knowledge has implications that are relevant for research based upon 
existing data, as well as for survey design.  In other words, I argue that vote choice 
should not be seen only as a dependent variable, and that the effects of the act of voting 
upon political attitudes should be recognized and studied.  If, for example, party 
evaluations are influenced by one’s behaviour, researchers should be aware of this when 
using such variables to explain behaviour. 
Informed by the lessons of cognitive dissonance theory, this article explores the 
impact of cognitive, affective and behavioural factors upon changes in attitudes towards 
parties.  The fundamental premise of dissonance theory is that individuals are motivated 
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to seek consistency among their cognitions40  (Worchel et al., 2000).  First proposed by 
Festinger (1957), the theory suggests that when pertinent cognitions are inconsistent (or 
dissonant) with one another, a sense of psychological discomfort can arise.  One way of 
reducing this discomfort is to alter cognitions (only some of which are malleable) so 
that they become consistent (or consonant) with one another.41  Employing pre- and 
post-election Canadian Election Study (CES) data from 1988, 2004 and 2006, this 
article explores the circumstances under which dissonance motivates individuals to 
change their attitudes towards parties.  In doing so, this study provides insight into the 
complex relationship between behaviour, knowledge and beliefs, as well as the dynamic 
nature of political attitudes.  
 
3.1 - POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
Existing studies have shown that cognitive dissonance theory offers insight into 
a variety of social phenomenon, including religious behaviour (Festinger et al.; 1956), 
economics (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997), worker 
productivity (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962), protection from STDs (Aronson et al., 
1991) and smoking (Feather, 1962).  Interest in this theory developed relatively recently 
among political scientists interested in the study of elections and voting behaviour.  
Regan and Kilduff (1988) interviewed voters entering and leaving polling locations 
during the 1984 American presidential election and found that voting raised 
assessments of the likelihood of victory for the favoured candidate (the authors 
attributed this finding to cognitive dissonance).  Anderson et al. (2004) have explored 
                                                 
40 Cognitions are defined here are thoughts, pieces of knowledge or beliefs. 
41 Other approaches include making some cognitions unimportant or adding cognitions to bring harmony. 
65 
 
65 
 
the impact of vote choice upon post-election economic evaluations, while Beasley and 
Joslyn (2001) and Mullainathan and Washington (2009) have examined the impact that 
behaviour can have upon evaluations of American presidential candidates.  Elinder 
(2009) has performed a similar study using Swedish data, and Bølstad et al. (2010) have 
examined the impact of voting strategically upon post-election attitudes in Britain.  
Building upon these works, this article focuses on the role that cognitive dissonance 
plays in shaping attitudes towards political parties in Canada.  More specifically, it 
explores the role that discomfort caused by dissonance plays in shifting attitudes 
regarding political parties between pre- and post-election study questionnaires.   
Attitudes are defined here as one’s perceived favourability or unfavourability 
towards a specific target (Zanna and Rempel, 1988).  They can be influenced by 
cognitive (knowledge or beliefs), affective (feelings or emotional reactions) and/or 
behavioural (previous actions or responses) factors (Worchel et al., 2000).  When asked 
to assign a rating to parties, individuals draw upon some combination of these 
cognitions to develop a response.42   
Party evaluations are ideal measures of attitudes for a study of cognitive 
dissonance and politics.  Regardless of whether voters are partisans or not, attitudes 
towards parties are known to have a strong relationship with vote choice (Rose and 
McAllister, 1990; Blais et al., 2002).  Since elections force people to choose one 
alternative and simultaneously reject all others (provided that an individual votes), they 
provide a good natural experiment through which attitudes before election-day can be 
compared to those afterward to evaluate the impact that committing to a specific vote 
choice has upon attitudes.  These attitudes are easily measured through surveys, and 
                                                 
42 Affective and behavioural factors that one is aware of are considered cognitions. 
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since CES respondents are asked about each party individually, these measures provide 
a method whereby feelings towards parties can be compared.  Moreover, party feeling 
thermometer questions allow for a significant amount of variation (the CES scale has 
101 points), meaning that questions are relatively sensitive to attitude changes.   
CES respondents are asked to rate parties once prior to the election, and again 
afterwards.  The difference between the score given to the party voted for and that of 
the rejected alternatives can be calculated for each of the two sets of questionnaires.  
This difference is termed here the “evaluative distance” (ED) between alternatives, and 
it is calculated for each individual point in time.  Changes in evaluative distance (∆ED), 
which are indicative of changes in the relative ratings for parties, can then be calculated 
by comparing pre- and post-election evaluative distances.  Evaluative distances can, and 
often do, change between questionnaires, and the goal of this article is to evaluate the 
extent to which dissonance theory is compatible with observed changes in ED.   
Elections are seen here as a stimulus for such change, provided that an 
individual votes.  After voting, knowledge of one’s behaviour becomes a cognition, 
which, combined with existing potentially conflicting cognitions (several of which are 
explored below), can lead to what is termed post-decisional dissonance (Worchel et al., 
2000).  In order to alleviate any discomfort caused by this dissonance, individuals are 
expected to shift their evaluations of parties so that they are compatible with inalterable 
cognitions (i.e. facts of which one is consciously aware).  This can occur by increasing 
one’s evaluation of the chosen alternative, decreasing the evaluation of the rejected 
alternatives, or both.  Either way, the difference between the ratings of the alternatives 
increases.  This process is termed the “spreading of alternatives” by Festinger (1964), 
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and can occur even if an individual has a relatively strong initial preference for the party 
voted for.  On the other hand, those individuals who do not vote have no such need to 
alter their attitudes to correspond with their behaviour; they have avoided any potential 
dissonance that may arise from the act of voting.  The relationship between attitudes 
and behaviour is thus reciprocal.  Pre-election attitudes are factored into vote choice, 
and potentially even the choice of whether or not to vote, but these choices can 
influence post-election attitudes in return.   
This article explores the influence of a variety of cognitive, affective and 
behavioural factors which, when triggered by an election and the act of voting, might 
have an impact upon attitude change.  These factors, most of which have not previously 
been considered in studies of dissonance and political attitudes, include the importance 
that voters place upon their vote decision, partisan attachment, the effects of any 
unpleasant effort expended during the political process, and the point in time (relative to 
election-day) at which a vote choice became final.  Additionally, election outcomes, or 
more specifically, whether one votes for a winning or losing party, are expected to have 
an impact upon ∆ED.  Dissonance theory suggests that, when triggered by the act of 
voting, each of these factors has the potential to influence attitudes towards parties. 
This study adds to the existing literature in several additional ways.  First, aside 
from Bølstad et al.’s (2010) study (which focuses exclusively upon strategic voters), 
there has yet to be an investigation of this nature in a multi-party setting with a single 
member plurality electoral system.  This distinction is important, as party or electoral 
systems and the way in which individuals relate to parties may affect the manner in 
which the attitudes of citizens change.  With respect to the party system, Canadians 
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have more viable electoral options than do Americans, and partisan attachment is 
relatively weak and unstable in Canada (Leduc et al., 1984).  If ratings of parties 
fluctuate accordingly this provides good reason to expect that dissonance effects will be 
observable in this setting.   
The electoral system may also influence patterns of attitude change.  Canadians 
cast a ballot for candidates at the riding level, but these candidates represent parties at 
the national level.43  It is thus possible for an individual to vote for the party that wins 
nationally and a candidate who loses at the local level (or vice-versa).  Using Canadian 
data thus allows for an exploration of the relative impact of local and national level 
results upon attitude change.   
The electoral system also allows for variations in the magnitude of electoral 
victories.  This feature potentially is very important; whereas American presidential 
elections produce a clear winner (in that presidential power is not shared between 
parties), Canada’s single member plurality system allows for degrees of victory.  The 
party with the most seats may or may not win a majority of seats in the House of 
Commons (which would allow it to govern without compromising with other parties), 
and the extent of an electoral victory may influence the manner in which attitudes 
towards parties change.  Additionally, even if a party does not win the largest share of 
seats or votes in a multi-party system, the election potentially may still be seen as a 
success by the party’s supporters (NDP results from the 2011 Federal election provide 
an example of such a situation).  Conversely, a party that wins the most seats may be 
perceived as a loser if, for example, it loses its majority in the House of Commons.  
                                                 
43 The exceptions here are independent candidates and candidates from regional parties such as the Bloc 
Quebecois. 
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Such variation is worth examining.  Accordingly, this article considers an election 
where the victorious party won a majority of seats in the House of Commons (the 1988 
Federal election) and two where no party was able to do so (the 2004 and 2006 
elections).   
 
3.2 - SOURCES OF DISSONANCE 
Cognitive dissonance research often focuses upon the impact that behaviour can 
have upon attitude change (this research is often referred to as the “free choice 
paradigm” in dissonance literature; see Brehm, 1956; Shultz and Lepper, 1996; and 
Stone, 1999).  Once behaviour has occurred, knowledge of the behaviour becomes a 
cognition.  In order to reduce dissonance from a behavioural commitment, individuals 
who hold attitudes which are incompatible with such behaviour shift those attitudes so 
that this is no longer the case.  The negative aspects of the chosen alternative and the 
positive aspects of the rejected alternatives become dissonant with that decision.  The 
free-choice paradigm has been used to explain post-decisional attitude change following 
many types of decisions.  This includes research into attitude change after collective 
decisions made by small groups of individuals (Zanna & Sande, 1987), the devaluing of 
the attractiveness of alternative partners among individuals in committed relationships 
(Johnson & Rusbult, 1989) and with respect to different forms of participation in 
research experiments (Stone, 1999).  To reduce dissonance, individuals are expected to 
alter their impressions of the alternatives, providing more positive (or less negative) 
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evaluations of the chosen alternative, more negative (or less positive) evaluations of the 
rejected alternatives, or both (Festinger, 1964).44 
The act of voting is thus expected to lead to an increase in the evaluative 
distance between the party voted for and the rejected alternatives.  This could translate 
into an increase in the rating for the chosen alternative after the election and a decrease 
in the rejected alternatives.  However, since it is changes in evaluative distance which 
are the focus here, this requirement could also be met if all party ratings were to 
increase (provided that the chosen party’s score increases more than those of the 
alternatives) or decrease (provided that the chosen party’s score decreases less than 
those of the alternatives).  To test the expectation that the act of voting influences 
evaluations of parties, ∆ED values of voters are compared to those of non-voters.45  
Those who do not vote do not experience post-decisional dissonance, thus changes in 
ED should be negative for such individuals, relative to that of voters.  The article’s first 
hypothesis thus is as follows: 
H1:  Voters will exhibit a higher ∆ED than will non-voters. 
 
In addition to exploring the impact that the act of voting has upon attitude 
change, this article examines a number of other factors that dissonance theory predicts 
should lead to differences in ∆ED among voters.  The influence of these cognitive, 
                                                 
44 Bem (1967) argues that the impact of behaviour on beliefs may not be caused by cognitive dissonance, 
but by individuals inferring their opinions from their actions (Bem’s theory is referred to as self-
perception theory).  More recently, however, self-perception theory has waned as an explanation for 
dissonance phenomena as evidence has amassed that dissonance does indeed cause an unpleasant state of 
arousal (Zanna and Cooper, 1974; Hogg and Cooper, 2003). 
45 It is well established that some non-voters lie to interviewers and state that they did indeed vote (Silver 
et al., 1986).  While there may be instances of this occurring in the cases under examination here, the 
existence of such individuals would serve to bias results against H1 (such individuals would be classified 
as voters, but would not be subject to the same pressure to increase ED that voters are).  Given these 
conditions, the data may provide an underestimation of the relationship posited by H1.  Accordingly, 
misreporting of this type is not considered problematic here. 
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affective and behavioural factors is triggered by the act of voting and can lead to 
significant changes in ED.  Specifically, the importance one places upon that decision, 
the amount of unpleasant effort invested in the political process, partisan attachment, 
the point in time relative to election day that one finalizes a vote decision, and the 
outcome of elections are expected to influence changes in attitudes towards parties.   
Some of these factors (such as partisan attachment) presumably are factored into 
pre-election party evaluations, vote choice and post-election evaluations, while others 
have no obvious connection with either party ratings or vote choice (such as the 
importance that individuals place upon a vote decision).  Dissonance theory predicts, 
however, that each one of these variables has the potential to lead to changes in 
attitudes towards parties after an election has taken place.  Findings from existing 
dissonance research are thus used to inform our understanding of changes in the 
political attitudes of voters. 
To begin with, it is anticipated that changes in ∆ED will be influenced by the 
level of importance voters assign to an election outcome.  The more importance an 
individual assigns to a decision, the greater the potential for dissonance is after the 
decision is made.  Writes Festinger: “The magnitude of post-decision dissonance is an 
increasing function of the general importance of the decision” (Festinger, 1957: 262).  If 
an outcome is unimportant to an individual there is no need for cognitions to be 
consonant with one another, as unimportant cognitions are irrelevant and cannot cause 
discomfort.  However, if an individual believes a decision to be of importance, the 
potential for discomfort is high, and an individual feels more pressure to shift his or her 
attitudes so that they are compatible with one another.  If, for example, an individual 
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does not believe that the outcome of an election matters since all of the parties are 
basically the same, he or she is not expected to feel a great deal of pressure to ensure 
consistency among cognitions.  On the other hand, if the outcome does matter to a 
voter, dissonance will be high and attitudes are expected to shift as a result.   
The next expectation relates to the notion of partisan attachment.  As described 
by Campbell et al. (1954), partisanship is “the sense of personal attachment the 
individual feels towards the [party] of [one’s] choice” (89) and is traditionally thought 
to be affective in nature.  That is, it relates to feelings or emotional reactions towards 
political parties.  Fiorina (1981) has challenged this view, however, arguing that 
partisan attachment stems from a rational evaluation or a “running tally” of evaluations 
of past party performances.  Regardless of whether partisanship is affective or cognitive 
in nature, individuals with a partisan attachment are expected to have an increase in ED 
after voting for their most preferred party.  At the time of the post-election interview, 
knowledge that one is a partisan (and the fact that one has stated as much to an election 
study interviewer) becomes a cognition that feeds into the process whereby party scores 
are determined.  Partisanship contributes to a spreading of alternatives, as one must 
justify not only voting for a particular party, but also the long-standing attachment to 
that party.  Thus, while partisans might be expected to have a high pre-election ED, the 
act of voting puts pressure on such individuals to increase ED even further after the 
election (provided that they have not already reached the measure’s maximum value, or 
ceiling). 
The remaining hypotheses are based upon relevant political behaviours, the first 
of which stems from an argument commonly made in the dissonance literature:  that 
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dissonance is aroused when a person engages in an unpleasant activity in order to obtain 
some outcome that is desirable (Worchel et al., 2000; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 2001).  
The assumption here is that individuals do not like to exert undue effort or to suffer, and 
as they invest unpleasant effort, the more important the outcome becomes and the 
greater dissonance becomes after the outcome is known; there is a need to justify sunk 
costs.  Dissonance can be aroused when subjects suspect that they have exerted effort 
for little purpose (Olson & Stone, 2004).  This idea stems from the work of Aronson 
and Mills (1959), who administered initiations of varying degrees of unpleasantness to 
individuals who wanted to become members of a group.  The authors found that the 
more unpleasant the initiation, the more desirable group membership became.  More 
recent research has confirmed that effort does indeed cause participants to alter attitudes 
(see Cooper, 1980; Axsom & Cooper, 1985).  In terms of politics, the more unpleasant 
participation in the political process is, the more desirable individuals see the victory of 
the party they vote for, and the greater the dissonance they feel if their pre-election 
attitudes are at all inconsistent with this desire. 
The next behavioral hypothesis is based upon the point in time, relative to 
election day, at which an individual finalizes his or her vote choice.  We know from the 
small amount of existing research on the topic of time-of-voting decision (TOVD) that 
many voters know long before an election which party or candidate they will support, 
while others take much longer to arrive at a final decision (Berelson et al., 1954; 
Campbell et al., 1960; Fournier et al., 2001).  While relatively little is known about the 
effects of TOVD, the expectation here is that those individuals who have early TOVD 
will have a higher ∆ED than will individuals who make up their minds relatively late.  
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As with partisanship, knowledge that one decided long ago who to vote for becomes a 
cognition that is factored into post-election party ratings.  While early deciders are 
likely to have a relatively large pre-election ED, they are expected to have a greater 
increase in ED than are late deciders, when all other factors are held constant.  This 
article thus makes a novel contribution to the literature on TOVD. 
Finally, the outcome of an election, and more specifically, the level of success 
achieved by one’s preferred party, is expected to influence ∆ED.  As with behaviour, 
one cannot alter the outcome of an election ex post facto.  Exposure to information has 
strong motivational properties (Brehm and Cohen, 1962), and Festinger (1957) notes 
that expressions of disagreement by others can cause dissonance when combined with 
existing cognitions (such as knowledge of one’s voting behaviour).  Unlike the 
hypotheses discussed above, however, the expectation here is that voting for a losing 
party will lead to a relative decrease in ED.  Supporters of losing parties are expected to 
decrease evaluative distance as they realize that they have supported a party that has not 
received the approval of the rest of the electorate (Granberg and Nanneman, 1986).  If 
one’s self-concept is somehow harmed by the knowledge that one supported a losing 
party this may lead to dissonance (Aronson, 1968).  Attitudes can also shift if subjects 
feel a sense of embarrassment about their actions (such as supporting a losing party) in 
order to ‘save face’ in front of the interviewer (Abelson, 1983).  In effect, these voters 
are jumping onto a post-election bandwagon.  Beasley and Joslyn (2001) refer to this as 
outcome-based dissonance, and dissonance of this nature is resolved by rating parties 
more similarly to one another (or decreasing evaluative distance).  Findings consistent 
with the “loser effect” theory have been observed in the American context (see Stricker 
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1964; Bass and Thomas, 1980; Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Granberg and Nanneman 
1986), but they have yet to be properly explored in a Parliamentary system with more 
than two parties.   
In summary, dissonance is expected to influence voters in the following ways: 
H2: As the importance assigned to the vote decision increases, ∆ED increases. 
H3: Partisans will have a higher ∆ED than will non-partisans. 
H4: Those individuals who expend unpleasant effort during the political process 
will have higher ∆ED than will those who do not. 
H5: Individuals with an early TOVD will have a higher ∆ED than will those 
 who decide during the campaign. 
H6: Voting for a losing party leads to a relative decrease in ∆ED. 
 
3.3 - DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis below proceeds in two stages.  The first examines the impact of 
voting on ∆ED by comparing voters to non-voters (this variable is operationalized using 
a single post-election vote recall question46).  The expectation is that the former group 
will exhibit a greater increase in evaluative distance (H1).  Hypotheses 2 through 6 are 
then tested by focusing upon voters alone.  All hypotheses are evaluated using data 
from the 1988, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies.47  Party evaluation scores are 
determined through identical questions from the pre- and post-election segments of the 
                                                 
46 While the percentage of CES respondents who report not voting is much smaller than actual turnout 
rates from these elections would predict, there remain enough such individuals to yield statistically 
significant results when this group is compared to voters. 
If individuals are indeed influenced by the outcome of an election, they may feel pressure to report their 
vote choice inaccurately (if, for instance, they voted for a losing party), to state that they did not vote 
when they actually did (again, if the party they voted for lost the election), or that they did vote when they 
did not (if they see not voting as socially undesirable).  The assumption necessarily made here, however, 
is that interviewees responded truthfully to the CES questions required for the analysis below. 
47 The reason for limiting this article to these elections warrants a brief discussion.  The CES did not have 
a pre-election component until 1988, so elections held prior to that time cannot be used to explore attitude 
change.  The 2008 CES only contains data on post-election party evaluations for a small fraction (roughly 
one quarter) of participants, and the 2011 data are not yet available.  Finally, elections from 1993 to 2000 
are excluded as they were contested by five major parties (the Canadian Alliance and Progressive 
Conservative Parties merged just prior to the 2004 election).  From 2004 onwards, the old (three party) 
party system returned outside of Quebec, meaning that the results from 1988 can be compared to those 
from outside that province in 2004 and 2006.  See footnote #61 for further discussion on the exclusion of 
data from Quebec. 
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CES, where respondents are asked to rate each party on a 101-point scale.  The 
difference between the ratings of the party an individual votes for and the average rating 
of the parties not voted for are calculated for the pre-election responses, and then 
compared to post-election responses in order to calculate ∆ED.48   
 There is some concern that endogeneity may pose a problem in the first portion 
of the analysis.  In their examination of US presidential elections, Beasley and Joslyn 
(2001) conclude that the act of voting does indeed have the effect described above.  The 
authors argue that dissonance reduction helps to explain changes in evaluations of 
presidential candidates between pre- and post-election waves of the American National 
Election Study.  In response to Beasley and Joslyn, however, Mullainathan and 
Washington (2007) argue that change in evaluative distance is endogenous to the choice 
of whether to vote or not.  They posit that evaluations of parties can contribute to one’s 
decision of whether to vote or not — a strong like or dislike of a candidate can 
conceivably provide motivation to vote.49  In essence, the assumption made by 
Mullainathan and Washington is that the people are less likely to vote if the pre-election 
spread between alternatives is small.  Since pre-election ED is factored into ∆ED, 
causality cannot be assumed to be unidirectional.  Is it that people do not vote because 
                                                 
48 This formula for this calculation is as follows: 
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For instance, if a Conservative voter gives a pre-election rating of 70 to that party, and the average scores 
for the opposition parties are 30, the initial evaluative distance is 40 points.  If in the post-election 
questionnaire the Conservative rating increases to 75 and the opposition rating decreases to 25, ∆ED is 
+10, or (75-35)-(70-40). 
49 Endogeneity of vote/non-vote decision and other variables has been received ample attention since the 
publication of Beasley and Joslyn’s article.  For instance, Gerber et al., 2003, and Fowler et al., 2008, 
have explored the impact of voting in previous elections, and the effect of genetics, respectively, upon 
voter turnout.  It thus should be recognized that the decision of whether to vote or not can be influenced 
by factors present long before an election.  However, the goal here is not to explain why individuals vote 
or abstain.  Rather, the point is to evaluate the impact of the act of voting upon ED.  Accordingly, while it 
is recognized here that factors other than initial ED can influence the vote/non-vote decision, 
consideration of endogeneity is limited to the relationship between the vote/non-vote decision and ED. 
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they do not see significant differences between parties, or could one’s attitudes towards 
various parties be relatively similar because one is a politically uninterested and 
disengaged non-voter?50 
Instead of focusing upon voter turnout, Mullainathan and Washington employ a 
substitute variable which is independent of voter preferences.  They compare changes in 
the political attitudes of individuals above and below the voting age, assuming that the 
political attitudes of those too young to vote will change differently over time than will 
those of individuals who are of voting age.  They eventually conclude that cognitive 
dissonance and the act of voting do indeed have an impact upon attitudes.   
In this process, however, the authors simply assume endogeneity, rather than 
supporting their claim empirically.  Making a substitution for the vote/non-vote variable 
is necessary if one is confident that the endogeneity is indeed a significant concern.  
Endogeneity can be examined statistically through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression, whereby instrumental variables are substituted for the potentially 
endogenous variable using simultaneous equations.  2SLS can be used to estimate the 
coefficient of a potentially endogenous regressor (which OLS cannot do), and to 
explore if the regressor is indeed endogenous.  If endogeneity is found to be an issue, 
2SLS results can be used to argue that the endogenous variable does (or does not) have 
a causal impact upon the dependent variable.  Otherwise, 2SLS estimates are 
unnecessary as OLS estimates are considered consistent. 
                                                 
50 It should be noted that there are a significant number of individuals with a small pre-election evaluative 
distance who do vote, and many of those with a relatively high initial ED who do not, so causality aside, 
the relationship between these factors is far from perfect.   
The mean value for pre-election ED for all individuals in 1988 was 27.9.  Nonvoting rates were higher 
among those with an initial ED below the mean (9.2%) than they were among those with an initial ED 
above that value (6.4%).  The corresponding values for 2004 are 32.5, 11.7% and 4.8%, and for 2006 they 
are 35.9, 7.3% and 4.2%. 
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Technically speaking, endogeneity is problematic in an OLS model if the 
explanatory variable is correlated with the error term.  If endogeneity is present, OLS 
results cannot be used to suggest that an independent variable is having a causal impact 
upon a dependent variable.  An instrumental variable can be used to solve this problem, 
provided that it is correlated with the explanatory variable of concern, but not with the 
dependent variable (and thus the error term).  This approach reduces inconsistency and 
bias in equation estimates that can be caused by endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2009).  The 
instrumental variable employed here is a measure of whether survey respondents 
believe that citizens have a duty to vote (Blais, 2000, found that a sense of duty 
increases the likelihood of voting).  As the “duty” variable is unavailable in the 1988 
CES, 2SLS is conducted for the 2004 and 2006 elections only.51   
After running 2SLS regressions, post-estimation commands can be used to 
explore the strength and validity of the instrumental variables and the endogeneity of 
the original explanatory variable.  If endogeneity is not found to be a problem, Beasley 
and Joslyn’s method can be saved, and Mullainathan and Washington’s concern is 
somewhat52 allayed.  However, 2SLS can be used whether or not endogeneity is present 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  The substitution of instrumental variables inflates the standard 
error of estimates (relative to OLS results), but if both 2SLS and OLS results produce 
statistically significant findings, one can be fairly confident that there is indeed a 
relationship between the dependent variable and the potentially endogenous variable.  
Endogeneity is evaluated below, and the relationship between voting and changes in 
evaluative distance is examined using both OLS and 2SLS regression. 
                                                 
51 The duty variable is not correlated with the dependent variable here (∆ED).  Regressing ∆ED onto duty 
produces p-values of 0.335 and 0.619 respectively for the 2004 and 2006 data. 
52 This caveat is included to account for the probabilistic nature of the statistical methods used here. 
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The variables used to test H2-H6 are operationalized using CES questions 
(Appendix 3-I lists all CES questions used here) and official election results.  H2, which 
predicts that the more important a decision is to an individual, the greater the potential 
for dissonance, is operationalized in two slightly different ways, based upon the 
availability of CES questions.  For 2004 and 2006, this is accomplished through a 
question on whether individuals agree or disagree with the statement that “all parties are 
basically the same; there isn’t really a choice.”  If an individual believes that all parties 
are the same, his or her decision should not be important, since it should not matter who 
wins the election. However, if the person disagrees with this statement, one’s decision is 
important.53  This question is not asked in 1988, so a series of questions were used as a 
substitute for this variable.  The issue of free trade dominated most of the 1988 
campaign (Frizzell et al., 1989).  CES respondents from that year were asked how 
strongly they supported or opposed free trade, and which election issue they personally 
felt to be most important.  Over 80% of respondents claimed that free trade was the 
most important issue.  Among this group, the degree to which one supported or opposed 
free trade is used as a measure of the importance being placed upon the election by that 
individual.54  Each major party took a maximalist position on the issue in 1988 (the PC 
party was in favour of free trade, while the Liberals and NDP opposed it).  Those 
individuals who considered free trade to be the most important election issue, but who 
did not have strong feelings towards the subject (either in favour or opposed to it) are 
                                                 
53 Note that in 2004 this question is found in the post-election questionnaire, and thus responses may be 
influenced by election results and the voting behaviour of individual respondents. This is not an issue in 
2006, however, where the question is located in the pre-election questionnaire. This difference is perhaps 
reflected in the fact that the p-value for this variable is lower in the 2006 model than it is in the 2004 (in 
the results below). 
54 The fewer than 20% of respondents who did not see free trade as the most important issue in the post-
election questionnaire were excluded from the analysis below. 
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coded here as assigning relatively little importance to the election.55  The second non-
behavioural hypothesis (H3), the measure of partisanship, is derived through a single 
pre-election CES question explicitly pertaining to partisanship, and is coded as a 
dummy variable comparing loyal partisans to other voters.56 
The remaining expectations stem from the impact that one’s behaviour has upon 
∆ED.  The measure of unpleasant effort, used to test H4, differs due to variations in the 
availability of CES data.  In 2004, CES respondents were asked how much difficulty 
they anticipated in getting to the polling station on election day.  The more difficult it is 
to get to the polls, the greater dissonance is expected to be.  This question is absent in 
2006, but for this election respondents were asked if they have donated to a political 
party in the last year.  Those individuals who responded positively to this question are 
considered here to have expended unpleasant effort, and thus dissonance and attitude 
change are expected to be high for them.  This hypothesis is not tested for 1988, as that 
version of the CES does not include a question about the difficulty of getting to a 
polling station, and only asks a small subset of interviewees about political donations.57  
                                                 
55 It might be argued that both importance and initial ED (considered below) are tapping into pre-election 
ambivalence and that they may be highly correlated with one another.  However, a comparison of these 
variables to one another reveals a correlation of only 0.07 in 1988, 0.12 in 2004 and 0.23 in 2006.  
Multicollinearity is also not an issue, and the maximum variance inflation factor for either of these 
variables for any election is only 1.34 (for initial ED in 2006) – values above 10 are generally interpreted 
as a sign of high multicollinearity.  Accordingly, the assumption here is that these variables are tapping 
into different phenomena.  Initial ED is accepted as a measure of how difficult it is for one to make the 
vote decision, while the ‘all parties are the same’ variable is a valid measure of the importance an 
individual assigns to the election (perhaps as an indicator of political cynicism, assuming that cynics are 
less likely to believe the outcome of an election actually ‘matters’). 
56 Disloyal partisans are grouped as non-partisans here.  Such voters have no need to justify their long-
standing attachment to a particular party if they did not vote for it. 
57 In 1988 the ‘donate’ question is asked as a follow up only to those individuals who say that they have 
been contacted in the last year by a party looking for donations — less than 20% of respondents had been.  
This excludes the possibility, however, that people may make donations without first being contacted by 
parties.  Such individuals are not identified in the 1988 data.  Focusing only upon those individuals who 
were contacted by political parties, there is a statistically significant relationship between donating for a 
party and an increase in ∆ED.  However, the loss of over 80% of the dataset meant that standard errors 
were inflated significantly for all other explanatory variables.  One alternative measure of this concept 
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To test H5, the TOVD variable, voters are classified as either campaign period or pre-
campaign period deciders.58 This information is obtained through a single post-election 
CES question, and is validated using McGregor’s (working paper) partially-restrictive 
method. 
Finally, H6, the ‘losing party’ hypothesis, is tested using vote choice dummy 
variables.  To capture variation in election results three federal elections that produced a 
variety of outcomes are considered here.  In 1988 the PC party won its second 
consecutive majority government, albeit with a reduced number of seats in the House of 
Commons.  In 2004 the reigning Liberal Party lost its majority, and was only able to 
form a minority government.  In 2006 the Conservatives formed the government, but 
they also failed to win a majority of seats.  In addition to testing the impact of voting for 
the party that loses at the national level, a riding-level variable is also included.  Both 
national and local level variables are thus incorporated in the models below.59   
Three political parties are considered in the following analysis:  the Liberals, 
Conservatives (or Progressive Conservatives in 1988) and the NDP.  Rather than 
considering only two parties in the calculation of ED (as Elinder, 2009, does in his 
examination of Sweden’s multiparty system)60 and as necessarily is the case in existing 
                                                                                                                                               
considered here was volunteering for a party.  This was eventually rejected, however, out of concerns of 
multicollinearity with the “partisan” variable, as well as the fact that volunteering for a party may not 
necessarily be seen as “unpleasant” by participants.  Accordingly, the ‘effort’ variable was omitted for 
1988. 
58 An alternative approach is to subdivide the “campaign” deciding group into election-day and pre-
election-day deciders.  While election-day deciders do have a negative ∆ED in comparison to earlier 
campaign deciders, the relatively low number of election-day deciders means that observed differences 
between these two groups are not statistically significant.  Accordingly, these voters are grouped together 
as campaign period deciders. 
59 Government of Canada results were used to determine riding level outcomes: see www.parl.gc.ca — 
History of Federal Ridings since 1867. 
60 The Swedish case is complicated because, while the country has many parties (eight are currently 
represented in the Riksdag), these parties have for some time operated as two coalitions and have 
campaigned as such (the only ones currently excluded from this arrangement are the nationalist Swedish 
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American studies, the average scores of the two parties not voted for are compared to 
the rating of the party one voted for (so party evaluations from all three parties are 
considered).61  Focusing only upon the second-most-favoured party in a multi-party 
setting could omit important information about attitude change towards the least-
favoured party.  Moreover, dissonance theory predicts that attitudes towards the two 
parties not voted for should be influenced in the same manner (i.e. they should both 
decrease together).  In a discussion of decisions involving more than two alternatives, 
Festinger writes that it “adds very little complexity to the analysis of the dissonances 
which exists after the decision is made” (1957, 36).  This matter, as it turns out, is moot, 
as when the analysis below is conducted considering only the first and second most 
preferred parties (i.e. the third party’s ratings are ignored), the eventual conclusions are 
the same.   
It must also be noted that, while dissonance theory predicts that evaluative 
distances should generally increase after one has voted, there are some cases where, 
between the pre-election questionnaire and election-day, individuals change their mind 
about their vote choice—such voters are termed “inconsistent” here.  These individuals 
state a preference in the pre-election questionnaire62 but then report voting for a 
                                                                                                                                               
Democrats, or Sverigedemokraterna).  There are undoubtedly many cases where an individual’s second-
favourite party would be in the same coalition as one’s most favoured party.  It is thus not surprising that 
Elinder found no evidence of the effect of cognitive dissonance on political attitudes in that country. 
61 As Quebec’s party system differed from that of the rest of Canada in 2004 and 2006 (the Bloc 
Quebecois, which only ran candidates in that province, won a majority of seats in Quebec in both 
elections), only data from outside of Quebec are considered for these years.  The presence of the 
additional party makes data from that province incomparable to that of other provinces.  For the sake of 
simplicity, those who voted for the Green Party or other minor parties are also excluded. 
62 Initial vote preferences are identified through multiple questions on vote intentions.  Individuals are 
first asked who they think they will vote for.  If they do not list a party in response to this question they 
are asked if there is a party they are leaning towards.  Those individuals who do not list a party in 
response to this question are omitted from the analyses below.  If these voters had been included, this 
likely could have biased results heavily in favour of H1.  Individuals who make up their minds between 
the pre-election interview and election-day may be influenced by some event during the campaign that 
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different party when questioned after the election.  Beasley and Joslyn (2001) omit 
inconsistent voters from their study, claiming that such individuals cannot be used to 
study changes in the strength of one’s most preferred option vis-à-vis the alternatives if 
one’s most preferred option changes.  Among such individuals, according to data from 
the elections examined here, party ratings generally change significantly, and ∆ED is 
almost always negative.  While dissonance theory suggests that the act of voting should 
have an impact upon evaluative distance for such inconsistent individuals, it does not 
have any means of explaining why individuals change their minds between 
questionnaires—there could be many reasons for such a switch.  While it is not denied 
here that a campaign has the potential to influence all voters, among inconsistent voters 
we can be certain that something happened between their pre-election interview and 
election day that caused them to change their minds.  The exclusion of inconsistent 
voters decreases the possibility that campaign effects can account for observed attitude 
changes (note that campaign effects are considered in a control variable below).  
Accordingly, the second part of the analysis below focuses exclusively upon consistent 
voters — those individuals who eventually vote for the party that they favour in the pre-
election questionnaire.   
Even among such voters, however, it is possible that the campaign period may 
have an impact upon attitudes, and thus upon ∆ED measurements.  The pre-election 
CES questionnaire employs a rolling cross-section design (a small number of 
respondents are interviewed each day during the campaign), meaning that the length of 
time between the pre-campaign interview and election-day can differ substantially 
                                                                                                                                               
causes them to make their decision, and in turn potentially shift their evaluations of parties.  Including 
such voters would make it more difficult to isolate the effects of voting.  However, these voters are 
worthy of future study. 
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among respondents.  In an effort to take campaign-period effects into account, a 
“debate” variable is added as a control to the analysis below.63  Since leaders’ debates 
are known to have an impact upon political opinions in Canada (Blais and Boyer, 1996; 
Blais et al., 2003), individuals are categorized on the basis of whether they were 
interviewed before or after the debates.64  The idea here is to control for the effects of 
this potentially significant campaign event in order to further isolate the impact of the 
act of voting.65 
For several reasons, initial evaluative distance also is included here as a control 
variable.  Due to ceiling and floor effects, individuals who have a large initial ED have 
less room for evaluative distances to increase after voting.  At the most extreme 
instance, a voter may have an initial evaluative distance of 100, meaning that it is 
impossible for evaluative distance to increase after the election.  Comparing this 
individual to someone with a small initial evaluative distance is meaningless unless this 
factor is controlled for.  Moreover, including pre-election evaluative distance serves to 
control for regression towards the mean.  Probability theory suggests that stochastic 
processes should cause some individuals with large evaluative distances to develop less 
                                                 
63 The English and French debates are held on separate dates.  Individuals are categorized as ‘after debate 
respondents’ if their pre-election questionnaire was administered after the second debate. The debates 
were held on Oct. 24 (French) and Oct. 25 (English) in 1988, June 14 (French) and June 15 (English) in 
2004 and Dec. 15 (English) and Dec. 16 (French) in 2006.  
64 An alternative to this approach would have been to include a control variable that indicates the number 
of days between a respondent’s pre-election interview and election-day, under the assumption that the 
longer this period is, the greater the potential for campaign effects to influence ∆ED.  There are no 
noteworthy changes to the results below when this alternative control is substituted for the “debate” 
variable. 
65 Average ∆ED was higher for those individuals interviewed prior to the debates for all three elections.  
However, only in one election (2006) was this difference statistically significant, and even then this was 
only true at the 90% confidence level. The potential impact of differences in the date of the pre-election 
interview upon ∆ED was also tested for each election through simple models containing an interaction of 
the vote variable and the debate variable (results not shown).  The coefficients for this variable were 
statistically insignificant for each election, which suggests that the relationship between voting and ∆ED 
is not influenced by pre-election interview date. 
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extreme evaluative distances after an election (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Campbell and 
Kenny, 1999).  Controlling for pre-election ED accounts for this phenomenon.   
Dissonance theory itself also predicts that initial evaluative distance should be 
related to ∆ED.  Festinger argues that difficult decisions should arouse more dissonance 
than should easy ones (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999).  If an 
individual holds a similar opinion towards the options before him or her, the pressure to 
reduce dissonance should be significant after a decision is made.  For example, if an 
individual were to give all parties a positive rating, the positive ratings of the parties 
that person does not vote for become dissonant with his or her voting behaviour.  There 
thus is greater motivation to reduce dissonance after a difficult decision than after an 
easy one.  In other words, if an individual is conflicted, or ambivalent prior to making a 
choice (this ambivalence may even be considered a cognition), after that decision is 
made the individual is expected to reduce dissonance by changing his or her attitudes to 
make them compatible with the decision.  This type of ambivalence is termed a “native 
inconsistency” by McGregor et al. (1999).  Rather than being induced by a researcher, 
or influenced by the act of voting, these cognitive inconsistencies occur naturally, and 
they can have a significant impact upon attitude change after a stimulus such as an 
election.  However, as it is impossible to disentangle the impact of dissonance from that 
of probabilistic regression towards the mean and ceiling and floor effects, initial 
evaluative distance is included here as a control only. 
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3.4 - RESULTS 
The first goal of this article is to establish a relationship between the act of 
voting and attitude change in a multi-party single member plurality system.  Table 3-1 
contains three OLS models for each election under study, with ∆ED as the dependent 
variable.  This variable has a potential range from -200 to +200, but these exterior 
values are never approached in practice (relevant descriptive statistics are listed in 
Appendix 3-II).  For each election Model 1 shows results with consistent and 
inconsistent voters grouped together (the base here is “voter”), while Model 2 
differentiates between these two types of voters (the base thus becomes “consistent” 
voters).  Model 3 contains 2SLS results.  The “debate” variable and initial evaluative 
distance are included as controls in all models.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Data are not weighted, as they need not be representative of the population in order to explore the 
relationship between voting and attitude change.  When data are weighted, however, the results differ 
only slightly and the study’s conclusions remain unchanged. 
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TABLE 3-1: VOTING VS. ∆ED 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1988 
Non-voter -4.47(1.63)c -8.17(1.52)c 
N/A 
Inconsistent voter   -20.92(1.18)c 
Debate 0.68(.89) -0.56 (0.83) 
Initial ED -0.46(.02) -0.53(.02)c 
Constant 8.36(0.87)c 14.47(.87)c 
N 1879 1879 
R-Squared .2225 .3346 
2004 
Non-voter -6.11(1.93)c -9.49(1.84)c -17.20(9.96)a 
Inconsistent voter   -20.46(1.58)c -21.44(1.98)c 
Debate -0.01(1.14) -1.04(1.09) -1.16(1.09) 
Initial ED -0.31(.02)c -0.37(.02)c -0.39(0.03)c 
Constant 11.09(.99)c 16.01(1.00)c 17.33(1.88)c 
N 1385 1385 1382 
R-Squared .1085 .2045 .1978 
2006 
Non-voter -6.51(1.96)c -8.76(1.91)c -15.16(7.71)b 
Inconsistent voter   -15.46(1.46)c -15.99(1.59)c 
Debate -1.12(.99) -1.82(.96)a -1.70(.96)a 
Initial ED -.33(.02)c -0.38(.02)c -0.39(.02)c 
Constant 8.21(1.11)c 12.36(1.14)c 12.97(1.45)c 
N 1701 1701 1690 
R-Squared .1329 .1862 .1823 
Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). a: β significant at p <.10, b: β significant 
at p < .05, c: β significant at p <.01 
 
 
The results in Table 3-1 provide solid support for H1.  In all models, the 
coefficient for the non-voter variable is negative and statistically significant, meaning 
that those individuals who do not vote tend to have a negative change in ED relative to 
that of voters (in the case of Model 1) and consistent voters (in the case of Models 2 and 
3).67  The magnitude of the non-voter coefficient increases when consistent and 
                                                 
67 While dissonance introduced by the act of voting is expected to exert an upward pressure upon ∆ED, 
H1 can still hold in instances where ratings of the party voted for decrease, if ratings of the rejected 
alternative decrease, or where ∆ED tends to be negative for voters.  Dissonance is only one of many 
factors that may influence party ratings, so it cannot be assumed that ratings of the party voted for will 
necessarily increase and ratings of the rejected alternatives will decrease after an individual has voted.  
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inconsistent voters are treated separately.  The fact that the non-voter coefficients in 
Model 1 are statistically significant, and in the anticipated direction, provides strong 
evidence of the relationship between voting and ∆ED, as the inclusion of inconsistent 
voters serves to bias these coefficients upwards.  Unsurprisingly, inconsistent variables 
for Model 2, for all years, have negative coefficients of a large magnitude. 
2SLS results (Model 3) are also congruent with this H1.  2SLS regressions 
should be interpreted in the same manner as the OLS models (the effects of the 
instrumental variable are shown through the “non-voter” results in Table 3-1).  In both 
2004 and 2006 the non-voter coefficient remains negative, as expected, reinforcing the 
claim that the act of voting does indeed lead to an increase in ∆ED, and postestimation 
diagnostics suggest that the “duty” variable is a valid substitute for abstention.68  
However, the level of statistical significance of the non-voter coefficients is lower in the 
2SLS results than in the comparable OLS models (model 2).  The level of statistical 
significance decreased from the 99% level in both versions of model 2 to 90% and 95% 
in model 3 for 2004 and 2006 respectively.  As mentioned above, one drawback of 
2SLS is that it produces estimates that are less efficient than those produced by OLS 
(unless the instrumental variables perfectly explain the potentially endogenous variable) 
(Murray, 2006).  As a result, the standard errors for the non-vote variable are relatively 
                                                                                                                                               
There may be instances (such as a particularly nasty campaign, for example) where attitudes towards 
parties in general (including the party voted for) decrease or increase after an election.  Negative changes 
in ED for voters also are not incompatible with dissonance theory.  As long as ratings of the party voted 
for decrease less than those of the rejected alternatives, and ∆ED is negative for inconsistent voters 
relative to consistent voters, H1 can be accepted.  Similar logic applies to the other hypotheses explored 
here.  For example, while dissonance theory predicts that ED should decrease for supporters of losing 
parties, this expectation would still be compatible with the observation that ED increases for such voters, 
provided that this increase is less than that experience by individuals who voted for the winning party. 
Simply put, H1 receives support if the “non-voter” coefficients in Table 1 are negative. 
68 F-statistic values from the first stage of the 2SLS (which are indicative of the strength of the 
relationship between the potentially endogenous variable and the instrument) are 111.9 and 49.3 for the 
2004 and 2006 data respectively.  Values above 10 generally are considered sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis that an instrument is a weak substitute (Stock et al., 2002). 
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high in the 2SLS models.  Despite the loss of confidence, the probability of results from 
these two elections suggesting a relationship between abstaining and changes in 
evaluative distance, when such a relationship does not exist, is less than 0.5%.69  
Accordingly, as is the case with the OLS models, the 2SLS results support the 
expectation that the act of voting causes an increase in ED.70  The act of voting does 
indeed appear to have the anticipated positive impact upon ∆ED.   
Now that the relationship between ∆ED and the act of voting has received 
significant support, the remaining hypotheses can be examined.  If this relationship had 
not been confirmed, it would be very difficult to argue that these other factors can 
influence attitudes when triggered by the act of voting.  H2-H6 are tested through a 
model for each election, where once again the dependent variable is ∆ED.71  Due to the 
manner in which the data are coded, the coefficients for the theoretical variables are 
expected to be positive, with the exceptions of the vote choice variables for the losing 
parties at the national and local level (the winning party serves as the national level vote 
choice base).  OLS results are shown in Table 3-2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 A more precise estimate of the chances of a relationship not actually existing here is 0.41% (determined 
by multiplying the p-values for the non-voter variable from the two elections).  
70 As noted above, 2SLS is only necessary when a researcher is confident that endogeneity is indeed an 
issue.  A Hausman test of exogeneity was conducted to evaluate whether endogeneity is indeed a problem 
here.  The test evaluates the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimators, and if the difference is found 
to be statistically significant, OLS results are to be considered inconsistent, and 2SLS results are to be 
used.  The null hypothesis of the test is that potentially endogenous variable is exogenous, thus while the 
test cannot confirm endogeneity, it can reject exogeneity.  The test produces p-values of 0.40 and 0.43 for 
2004 and 2006 respectively.  Accordingly, endogeneity has not been proven to be a statistical problem 
here.  For those unconvinced by the results of this test, however, 2SLS provide strong evidence that the 
act of voting does indeed lead to an increase in evaluative distance. 
71 Initial ED is coded on a scale from -100 to 100, while all other variables range from 0 to 1.  
Partisanship, TOVD, vote choice and the ‘debate’ variables are dummies, while the ‘importance’ variable 
is ordinal.  The effort variable is ordinal in 2004, and binary in 2006. 
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TABLE 3-2: CORRELATES OF ∆ED 
    1988 2004 2006 
Cognitive Importance of Vote 9.34 (1.72) c 3.17 (2.16)* 4.00 (1.53) c 
Affective Partisanship 3.50 (1.18) c 7.18 (1.61) c 3.33 (1.19) c 
Behavioural 
Unpleasant Effort   7.91 (3.68) b 5.10 (1.52) c 
Pre-campaign TOVD 4.08 (1.11) c 2.51 (1.44) a 3.78 (1.13) c 
Supported Losing Local Candidate -3.19 (1.06) c 0.19 (1.39) -0.03 (1.00) 
Liberal Voter -5.71 (1.23) c base -7.90 (1.11) c 
(Progressive) Conservative Voter base 3.12 (1.47) b base 
NDP Voter -2.82 (1.39) b 1.38 (1.97) -3.12 (1.36) b 
Controls 
Debate (After) 0.82 (1.07) -0.25 (1.43) -1.70 (1.03) 
Initial ED -0.57 (0.03) c -0.38 (0.03) c -0.47 (0.01) c 
 Constant 7.62 (1.79)
 c 5.00 (2.38) b 10.38 (1.73) c 
 N 1028 702 1311 
  R-Squared 0.3384 0.1724 0.2198 
Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses).  
a: β significant at p <.10, b: β significant at p < .05, c: β significant at p <.01, *: p = 0.14 
 
 
While regression coefficients provide an indication of the potential that each 
explanatory variable has to influence attitude change (ceteris paribus, a large coefficient 
indicates a large potential), they do not express exactly how much of an impact each 
variable is actually having.  In other words, they cannot convey how different the 
outcome would be had each variable not mattered.  The actual impact of each variable 
upon population wide ∆ED trends is a function not only of the coefficient size, but also 
the share of the population that exhibits the characteristics considered in Table 3-2.  
Even if a variable has the potential to have a large impact upon ∆ED, if few individuals 
exhibit this characteristic, it may be relatively unimportant in explaining an aggregate 
level outcome.  The actual impact of each explanatory variable is determined here using 
post-estimation, setting each respective explanatory variable to its minimum value, 
while holding all other variables at their present values, and then comparing predicted to 
actual average values of ∆ED.  This difference reflects the manner in which ∆ED would 
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differ if each individual variable had not mattered to respondents, and thus is indicative 
of the actual impact that these variables are having upon attitude change.72  Figure 3-1 
expresses the magnitude (through the length of each bar) and direction of the influence 
(bars to the right of the centre line indicate that ∆ED is higher than it would have been 
had a factor been irrelevant) for each variable.  For example, a bar that goes to a value 
of X means that average actual ∆ED values are X points higher than it would have been 
if that variable had been irrelevant.  The results for the party choice variables should be 
interpreted as the difference between the average ∆ED values predicted if no one in the 
sample had voted for that party and the actual average ∆ED value.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Predicted values are shifted to control for the mean predicted value for ∆ED for each election, thus 
making the results of the three elections comparable (aggregate ∆ED values vary slightly from election to 
election). 
73 The impact of party vote choice variables are determined by setting values of each respective party to 
zero, as well as changing values for the other two parties to reflect the relative proportion of the vote 
share received by these two parties. 
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FIGURE 3-1:  IMPACT OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES UPON ∆ED 
 
 
 
Hypotheses 2-6 receive varying levels of support from the above results.  The 
importance of one’s vote decision (H2) has a statistically significant impact upon ∆ED, 
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in the expected direction, in 1988 and 2006.  In fact, this variable has the greatest 
impact upon changes in evaluative distance of any variables considered in Figure 3-1.74 
Perhaps surprisingly, this variable falls just short of statistical significance in 2004 
(p=0.14).  This may be in part because, unlike in 1988 and 2006, the question used to 
operationalize this variable is located in the post-election segment of the CES, and 
responses may have somehow been influenced by the election.  One way to reduce 
dissonance is to downplay the relative importance of some cognitions, and an election 
result that conflicts with one’s preferences may cause some individuals to downplay the 
importance of the decision, or the election itself. 
The lone affective variable considered here, Partisanship (H3), displays a 
positive and highly significant relationship with ∆ED in all elections.  A sense of 
personal attachment towards a party leads to an undeniable increase in ∆ED once one 
votes for that party.  This variable also had a relatively large impact upon population 
level ∆ED, especially in 2004. 
The data also reveal that those individuals who exerted unpleasant effort during 
the political process had a higher ∆ED than those who did not (H4).  This applies in 
2004, where this variable is based upon how difficult it is for an individual to get to his 
or her polling station, and in 2006, where it is based upon making financial donations to 
a party.  Such individuals are motivated to increase ED after voting in order to justify 
their effort.  Despite the fact that the OLS coefficients for this variable are relatively 
high, however, this factor has very little actual impact upon ∆ED — the bars for this 
                                                 
74 Care should be taken when comparing the impact of this factor from one election to the next, as this 
variable is operationalized differently in 1988 than it is in 2004 and 2006. 
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variable in Figure 3-1 both have a magnitude of less than 1 unit (reflecting the fact that 
few respondents expended unpleasant effort of this type in these years).   
H5, which posits that an early TOVD should be associated with a positive ∆ED, 
also receives support from the above results.  All other things equal, an early TOVD is 
associated with a positive ∆ED, for all three elections.  Those individuals who have 
long known who they would vote for need to reconcile the knowledge of their early 
TOVD with their attitudes towards parties.  The act of voting serves to reinforce the 
preferences of early deciders. 
In contrast to these positive findings, the expectation that supporters of losing 
parties should experience a relative decrease in ED (H6) receives only mixed support 
from the data.  With respect to the local level, only in 1988 did voting for a party that 
lost in one’s riding have an independent impact upon ∆ED.  This variable had no 
discernable influence in either 2004 or 2006.  The fact that these results conflict so 
strongly with one another (p = 0.003 in 1988, but the coefficient for this variable is 
positive in 2004, and, while in the anticipated direction in 2006, p is only 0.974) is 
somewhat surprising, as dissonance theory provides no reason to expect such large 
differences in the influence of riding level results from year to year.  Although future 
work is required to properly explore this finding, these results could suggest that the 
importance of local politics may have declined relative to that of the national level 
between 1988 and 2004.75 
National level data are similarly mixed with respect to H6.  The results in Figure 
3-1 suggest that, in all three elections, Liberal voters dragged down the population 
                                                 
75 The interaction of the national and local ‘loser’ terms (representing those individuals who voted for a 
party that lost both locally and nationally) produced statistically insignificant results for all three 
elections. 
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average value for ∆ED, while Conservative voters drove this variable up.  Predicted 
∆ED values for each party are displayed in Table 3-3 (values are centred around the 
mean value of ∆ED for each year).76 
TABLE 3-3:  PREDICTED IMPACT OF PARTY CHOICE UPON ∆ED 
  1988 2004 2006 
Liberal Voter -3.51 -1.63 -4.76 
(Progressive) Conservative Voter 2.19 1.49 3.14 
NDP Voter -0.62 -0.25 0.02 
 
Conservative voters have the highest average ∆ED of the three parties in all 
three elections, despite the fact that this party placed second in 2004.  Liberal voters, on 
the other hand, experienced a relative decrease in ∆ED after all three elections, even 
though the party won a plurality of seats in 2004.  The predicted ∆ED of NDP 
supporters differed very little from the population average in any election.77  Though 
unexpected, Liberal and Conservative results from 2004 should not necessarily 
invalidate H6.  Being reduced from a majority to a minority in the House of Commons 
may have caused some voters to view the outcome of the election as a loss for the 
Liberals (who had held a majority of seats in the House of Commons since 1993), and 
even perhaps as a win for the Conservatives.  It is conceivable that one’s perception of 
how well one’s preferred party has performed may be influenced by past results.  If so, 
the Conservative increases and Liberal decreases observed in 2004 are not that 
surprising.  Liberal voters may have been disappointed by the election results, while 
Conservative voters may have been relatively satisfied.  Future work can be conducted 
                                                 
76 As above, these values are determined through post-estimation, manipulating the vote choice variable 
and keeping all other values unchanged. 
77 With the exception of Liberal and NDP voters in 2004, differences in ∆ED by party were statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level or greater. 
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to explore whether this result is reproduced in similar situations (for example, the 2011 
election may be worth examining, as although the NDP did not win the election, the 
party achieved its best-ever result). 
 
3.5 - CONCLUSION  
Despite the partial failure of H6, dissonance theory remains largely congruent 
with observed changes in attitudes towards parties.  The act of voting does indeed 
appear to cause a shift in attitudes, thus confirming the findings of Beasley and Joslyn 
(2001) in the Canadian context.  Additionally, the other cognitive, affective and 
behavioural factors explored here have all been found to have statistically significant 
relationships with attitude change.  The importance one assigns to a vote decision, 
partisan attachment, expending unpleasant effort, TOVD and the outcome of an election 
vis-à-vis one’s vote choice all have an impact upon attitude change.  
Additionally, the impact of voting-induced dissonance upon attitudes has been 
shown to be sizeable.  According to the 2006 model in Table 3-2, for instance, an 
individual who considers the election to be important, is a partisan, exerts unpleasant 
effort, and is an early-deciding Conservative voter is expected to have a change in ED 
of +7.5 points.  In contrast, one who believes one’s decision to be unimportant, is non-
partisan, exerts no unpleasant effort, has a late TOVD and votes Liberal has ∆ED of      
-16.6.78  These results represent a swing of 24.1 points, and the 1988 and 2004 elections 
                                                 
78 Negative values for ∆ED can be the result of voting for a losing party (H6), but it should be stressed 
that there are other factors, not explored here, which could also lead to negative changes in ∆ED.  The 
models above include variables related to dissonance theory, but they cannot perfectly explain ∆ED (the 
R-Squared values from Table 3-2 range from 0.17 to 0.34).  The goal here is not to explain population 
level ∆ED patterns; rather it is to compare individuals who exhibit the factors explored by H2-H6 to those 
who do not.  These comparisons produce results which are generally compatible with dissonance theory.  
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produce similar findings.  Individuals who exhibit the cognitive, affective and 
behavioural characteristics which dissonance theory predicts should lead to an increase 
in ∆ED (when triggered by the act of voting) have very different patterns of attitude 
change than do individuals who do not. 
While the finding that political attitudes can be influenced by one’s behaviour, 
election results, and other political attitudes perhaps is not surprising, it is important to 
develop an understanding of how exactly these factors interact with one another.  This 
article has used dissonance theory to explore the causal relationships between some of 
these factors.  In doing so, it has offered insight into the mechanism by which 
cognitions, when triggered by an election, can influence one’s attitudes towards parties.  
Nevertheless, while dissonance theory goes a long way in explaining changes in 
political attitudes, more research is required to develop a fuller understanding of other 
causal mechanisms linking political attitudes to behaviour, as well as with other 
cognitive and affective factors.   
Finally, the results above suggest strongly that, when attempting to explain vote 
choice, researchers must be conscious of the impact that an election can have upon 
subjective measures such as attitudes towards parties.  While pre-election party 
evaluations can be used to explain vote choice, vote choice can, in turn, be used to 
explain post-election party evaluations.  Responses to subjective survey questions may 
differ substantially depending upon whether they are measured prior to or after an 
election, and endogeneity will almost certainly be a concern when post-election data are 
                                                                                                                                               
Future work can investigate what types of individual-level factors make some voters more resistant or 
susceptible to dissonance. 
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employed.79  As an illustration, explaining vote choice using a logistic regression model 
for each party reveals significant differences in pseudo-R2 values when models that use 
pre-election party ratings as independent variables are compared to those that employ 
post-election ratings (party evaluations are the only explanatory variables considered in 
this example).  Using 2006 data, when Conservative vote choice is the dependent 
variable the R2 value is 0.58 when pre-election party ratings are the explanatory 
variables, but this value increases to 0.64 when post-election data are employed.  
Liberal (0.40 versus 0.43) and NDP (0.33 versus 0.37) results display a similar 
pattern.80  These differences suggest that the use of post-election data can introduce 
serious bias into vote choice models.  Thus, the final lesson to be taken from this article 
is that great care must be taken when using data collected after an election has taken 
place; whenever possible, subjective data should be gathered prior to election day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Anderson et al. (2004) have already confirmed this with economic evaluations — future work is 
needed to see if this applies to other factors as well, such as policy preferences, and whether and how the 
effects of cognitive dissonance can be controlled for.  
80 All coefficients in all models are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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4 - VOTER SINCERITY AND THE TIME-OF-VOTING-
DECISION 
 
 
Traditional explanations of time-of-vote-decision (TOVD) patterns have 
assumed that campaign deciders are relatively uninterested and inattentive to political 
information (Lazarsfeld et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960).  This assumption has been 
challenged in recent years, however, with many scholars arguing that some campaign-
period deciders are as attentive as, or even more attentive than, those individuals who 
know long before a campaign begins who they are going to vote for (Chaffee and Choe 
1980; Whitney and Goldman, 1985; Dalton, 2006).  Indeed, there is increasing evidence 
that campaigns and sometimes specific campaign events play an important role in the 
outcome of elections (Holbrook, 1995; Johnston et al. 1992; Blais et al. 2003; Fournier 
et al., 2004).  Some (though certainly not all) late deciders thus appear to be factoring 
information gathered during the campaign period into their vote decisions.  
But what type of information is important to late deciders?  Existing work on 
TOVD tends to assume that individuals who postpone their vote decisions are interested 
in information specifically about parties, politicians and policies (see Lazarsfeld et al., 
1948; Campbell et al. 1960).  This information is factored into their vote calculus and 
helps to determine which party is one’s most preferred.  A few scholars, however, have 
explored the relationship between an individual’s perception of the relative competitive 
positions of parties (i.e. how much of a chance each party has of winning) and TOVD.  
Kirkpatrick (1972) has found that some American voters delay their vote decisions 
when they prefer one candidate but expect another to win.  This finding is compatible 
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with cross-pressure theory (see Lazarsfeld et al., 1948, 1954), which posits that the 
existence of conflicting determinants of behaviour can lead to avoidance of decision-
making and fluctuation of opinion, as well as cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1946), 
which argues that incompatible affects and cognitions can produce psychological 
tensions that lead to a delay in TOVD.  In their study of the Dutch electorate, Irwin and 
Holsteyn (2008) have argued against overlooking the possibility that some late deciders 
are waiting to collect information not on parties, politicians or leaders, but on how other 
voters are likely to behave.  These voters make their decisions not only upon the basis 
of individual preferences, but upon their competitive expectations.  These expectations 
are important because they can cause an individual to vote for a party that is not his or 
her genuine first preference (if one’s goal is to affect an election’s outcome) (Duverger, 
1963).   
This article’s primary objective is to explore the TOVD patterns of insincere 
voters (those voters who vote for a party which is not their most preferred).  It is argued 
here that competitive expectations, as determined through exposure to information 
during the course of a campaign, can cause individuals to abandon their preferred party.  
As information on the competitive prospects of parties is widely available and 
frequently updated during the course of an election campaign (Andersen, 2000), it 
stands to reason that individuals who base their vote decisions upon such factors will 
make their vote decisions during that period.  In contrast, voters who do not factor 
competitive considerations into their vote decisions will not be influenced by polling 
results, or any other source of information about the competitive positions of parties that 
they may be exposed to during the campaign period.  Accordingly, the fundamental 
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expectation here is that insincere voters will tend to make their vote decisions later than 
will sincere voters. 
Research on insincere voters, however, is largely limited to the study of strategic 
(or tactical) voters (see Black, 1978; Blais and Nadeau, 1996; Blais et al., 2001).  
Usually overlooked is another type of insincere voter:  the protest voter.  Protest voters, 
as defined here, express their political dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive 
non-traditional party that is not their genuine first preference.  That these individuals are 
relatively neglected by academics is surprising, given that citizens in most industrialized 
countries are becoming increasingly cynical about their governments and political 
systems, less deferential to authority and more willing to express their dissatisfaction 
through protest (Nevitte, 1996; Norris, 2011).  Moreover, among the small volume of 
literature that is devoted to the subject, it has been recognized that protest voting could 
help to account for the rise and persistence of minor parties in single member plurality 
settings (Kang, 2004), thus helping to account for this failure of Duverger’s (1963) law.  
Accordingly, the secondary objective of this article is to outline a new method of 
identifying protest voters using Canadian Election Study (CES) Data. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on campaign effects.  While 
scholars from the original Columbia and Michigan schools contended that campaigns 
have little impact upon election outcomes (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954, 
Campbell et al., 1960), if competitive considerations are shown to have an impact upon 
TOVD, this would provide compelling evidence that, for a particular subset of the 
population, the campaign is having a significant impact.  Examining the relationship 
between vote sincerity and TOVD may also provide insight into potential campaign 
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strategies.  If insincere voters are indeed making their vote choices during the campaign 
period, parties may wish to make appeals specifically to these individuals.  Parties that 
hope to attract strategic votes may wish to make particular rivals seem uncompetitive, 
and perhaps counter-intuitively, those hoping to attract protest votes may wish to make 
their own prospects for victory appear bleak.  Knowledge of the TOVD patterns of 
specific types of individuals could be of significant practical value to political actors. 
 
4.1 - TOVD AND CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 
An important factor to consider when explaining TOVD patterns is the influence 
of campaign effects.  Exposure to campaign-period events and information can help 
undecided voters to form a preference, or cause some voters who may have previously 
decided to change their minds.  Even among those voters who claim to have finalized 
their vote decisions prior to the start of a campaign, we cannot be certain that the 
campaign period has had no effect.  Preferences can be weakened or reinforced during 
the course of a campaign, even if one’s vote choice remains the same.  Since both vote 
choice and changes in vote choice are discontinuous variables, however, we cannot be 
certain whether the campaign matters for such voters in these respects.  Regardless, the 
potential for campaign events to influence attitudes is undeniable. 
Scholars have traditionally held the view, however, that campaigns have only 
minimal effects upon voters.  Early voting studies (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et 
al., 1954, Campbell et al. 1960) concluded that campaigns are rarely able to overcome 
prejudices and knowledge that voters might have at the start of the campaign period.  
More recent work, however, has challenged this position.  Jacobson (1983) and Bartels 
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(1987) have argued that campaigns are of significant importance in American 
congressional races and presidential primaries.  Canadian authors (see Johnston et al., 
1992; Blais et al., 2003) have echoed this finding, concluding that, under certain 
circumstances and for certain voters, campaign events can have a significant impact 
upon vote choices. 
The ‘minimal effects’ position is also inconsistent with even a basic analysis of 
CES data.  Whereas Lazarsfeld et al. found that only 8% of voters in the 1940 
presidential election switched their vote preference from one candidate to another 
during the campaign, the corresponding values for the 2006 and 2008 Canadian 
elections (those considered here) are at least 13.7% and 13.2% respectively.81  Given 
that the difference in vote shares between the first and second parties in both of these 
elections was roughly 6%, these values are not insignificant.  While the fact that so 
many voters change their minds during the course of the campaign does not necessarily 
prove that they are responding to the campaign, these values do suggest that the 
potential for campaign effects is substantial, even among voters who have a preference 
at the start of a campaign. 
Recent work on the relationship between campaign effects and TOVD also 
conflicts with the ‘minimal effects’ thesis.  Fournier et al. (2004) show that campaign 
period media coverage and leader debates have a measurable impact upon the opinions 
of campaign deciders, and argue that campaigns do indeed affect the stability of vote 
                                                 
81These values are calculated by comparing pre-election vote intention to post-election vote recall, and 
represent the lowest possible values for the percentage of voters who change their minds during the 
course of the campaign.  Because the CES employs a rolling cross-section design, and many respondents 
are interviewed quite late in the campaign, some of the respondents who list the same party for both 
interviews may have actually changed their mind during the campaign, but prior to their interview.  
Accordingly, these values are conservative estimates only. 
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choices during a campaign.  Moreover, TOVD data are often used as evidence of the 
presence of campaign effects (Whitney and Goldman, 1985; Bowen, 1994; Gopoian and 
Hadjiharalambous, 1994).  Accordingly, the ‘minimal effects’ position is firmly rejected 
here; campaign events can, and do, have a relationship with TOVD. 
This article expands upon existing work on the relationship between campaign 
effects and TOVD by exploring the extent to which an individual’s impression of the 
competitive positions of parties influences the time at which vote preferences are 
finalized.  Competitive expectations have been shown to be influenced by objective 
contextual information and personal preferences (Blais and Bodet, 2006), and one type 
of objective contextual information which voters are commonly exposed to through the 
media is polling information.  Polls are conducted regularly prior to the start of 
campaigns, and pre-campaign polls can inform the competitive perceptions of voters 
(Fey, 1997).  However, the media have a strong motivation to conduct polls more 
frequently during a campaign (Patterson, 1980), and they can tend to focus on ‘horse-
race journalism’ as opposed to more substantive issues during this period (Andersen, 
2000).82  Campaigns thus provide voters with an excellent opportunity to update their 
expectations with respect to each party’s chances of success (Blais et al., 2006; 
Johnston and Vowles, 2006).  Additionally, the link between polls and opinion has been 
established experimentally (Ceci and Kain 1982; Nadeau et al. 1993; Forsythe et al. 
1993) and using election study data (Blais et al. 2006).  Those voters who form or 
change their vote choice in light of campaign period poll results are, by definition, 
                                                 
82CES data suggest that most people are exposed to polls during the campaign.  59% of pre-election 
respondents in the 2006 dataset claimed to have seen a poll in the last week (the question was not asked 
in 2008).  This number would likely be higher if the question had asked about the entire campaign period, 
rather than only the last week. 
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considered relatively late deciders.83 Thus the expectation here is that voters who factor 
competitive expectations into their decisions are more likely than those who do not to 
have a late TOVD. 
The challenge with testing this contention, however, is in identifying those 
specific voters who factor competitive considerations into their decisions.  This article 
does so by focusing on two specific types of individuals:  strategic and protest voters.  
Both types of voters, as operationalized here, factor competitive circumstances into 
their voting decisions, although to different effects.  The former casts a ballot for a party 
that is competitive, while the latter votes for an uncompetitive party.  Since competitive 
circumstances have the potential to be dynamic, it makes sense for individuals who 
wish to take this factor into account to wait until the election is near before making their 
choices.  In contrast, those individuals who do not base their vote decisions upon how 
much of a chance each party has of winning have no such need to delay their TOVD. 
 
4.2 - VOTER SINCERITY 
Under particular circumstances, the competitive dynamics of an election can 
prompt an individual to vote for a party other than that which is his or her most 
preferred.  Such a vote is commonly termed ‘insincere.’  The most studied form of 
insincere voting, at least in countries with single member plurality electoral systems, is 
strategic (or tactical) voting.  A strategic vote is a vote for a party or candidate that is 
not one’s favourite, cast in the hope of affecting the outcome of an election (Blais et al., 
                                                 
83While polls are an obvious source of such information, they are not the only one.  It is not necessary for 
voters to be politically attentive or to be exposed to poll results first hand to develop an opinion about the 
viability of each party. 
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2001).  Specifically, the goal of a strategic voter is to prevent a party that is disliked 
from winning.  The strategic voter recognizes that his or her most preferred party has 
little or no chance of victory, and supports the party that has the best chance of defeating 
his or her least preferred competitive option.84  The literature on this subject is well 
established in Canada (see Black, 1978; Blais and Nadeau, 1996; Blais et al., 2001; 
Blais et al., 2005; and Merolla and Stephenson, 2007 for some noteworthy examples). 
Voters not classified as strategic are often assumed to be ‘sincere’ (Blais et al., 
2001, Blais et al., 2005; Felsenthal and Brichta, 1985; Ballester and Rey-Biel, 2008).  If 
an individual is not voting strategically, it is assumed that he or she is casting a ballot in 
support of the party that, for whatever reason, is that person’s genuine first preference.  
This assumption, however, overlooks the possibility that there are voters who may be 
both non-strategic and insincere.  Failing to recognize such voters adds undesirable 
noise or bias to any study of sincere voters.  It is thus argued here that at least85 one 
other group of non-strategic voters should be differentiated from sincere voters:  protest 
voters.   
Protest voters have received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature, 
and the conceptual and operational definitions of the term are much less well-
established and consistent than they are for strategic voters.  Bowler and Lanoue (1992), 
who examine strategic and protest voting for the NDP in the 1984 Canadian Federal 
Election, describe protest voters as citizens who are expressing dissatisfaction with 
                                                 
84In a three party system the third ranked party is, by definition, the genuinely least preferred option.  
However, when more parties are present the party that the strategic voter hopes to see lose may not be the 
most disliked.  It may simply be more disliked than the most favoured and one other party (the party 
voted for). 
85It is possible that the same assumption is being made incorrectly here as well (except with the inclusion 
of protest voters as an additional type of non-sincere voters).  It is entirely possible that some other type 
of voter, not discussed here, should also be considered insincere. 
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“current economic and/or political circumstances” (491).  Besides voting for the NDP, 
and believing the NDP to be uncompetitive in the local riding, to these authors a protest 
voter must either believe that the government has had a negative effect on his or her 
own life or be generally dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbent 
government. These last two factors, however, focus only upon attitudes towards the 
incumbent party.  Since the most obvious vote option for an individual unhappy with 
the governing party is to vote for the opponent that has the best chance of defeating that 
party, however, the link between dissatisfaction with the governing party in particular 
and a protest vote seems somewhat tenuous.  Being dissatisfied with the governing 
party in particular should not alone mean that one is a protest voter. 
As Heath et al. (1985) describe the concept, a protest vote is not a reaction to 
dissatisfaction with the governing party alone.  Rather, protest voters cast their ballots 
in response to perceived failures by the “natural” (or traditional) parties (113).  Van der 
Brug et al. (2000) go even further and posit that protest voters have a cynical attitude 
towards politics in general and are dissatisfied with the political system as a whole.  To 
these authors, protest voters are repulsed from traditional parties, rather than necessarily 
being attracted to the non-traditional party that they vote for.   
Most scholars agree that the goal of protest voters is to send a signal of 
dissatisfaction to either a particular party, or the traditional parties in general, rather than 
to influence the outcome of an election.  Kselman and Niou (2011) posit that protest 
votes can be meant as a signal of dissatisfaction towards one’s most preferred party in 
order to see downstream changes within the party, while Carter and Guerette (1984) 
describe protest voting as a type of “expressive voting.”  The theory of expressive 
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voting, developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1984), states that voters not only have a 
preference for realizing one outcome over another, but they also have preferences for 
expressing support for one outcome over another—these two goals do not always result 
in a vote for the same party or candidate.  For example, while one may want Party X to 
win an election, Party Y may be supportive of some policy that the person favours.  In 
order to express support for that particular policy, the person votes for Party Y.  
Alternatively, a candidate from Party X may have experienced some recent scandal, and 
while the voter still wants Party X to win, he or she may vote for Party Y in order to 
express disapproval of the scandal.86  To Carter and Guerette (1984), protest voters do 
not actually want the party they vote for to win.  Rather, their motivation for voting the 
way they do is to express some form of political dissatisfaction; their votes are used to 
make a political statement.  Regardless of the intended target of this statement, however, 
the goal of protest voters is not to influence an election’s outcome.87 
Like strategic voters, therefore, protest voters vote for a party other than that 
which is their most preferred.  Unlike strategic voters, however, protest voters are not 
motivated by the desire to see the party they vote for emerge victorious.  They are not 
voting for a party because they like it; rather, they vote for that party to express some 
form of dissatisfaction.  Because protest voters do not actually wish to influence an 
                                                 
86Brennan and Buchanan (1984) go so far as to state that, since the chances of a single vote determining 
the outcome of an election are so small, it is unreasonable for voters to cast preferential rather than 
expressive votes.  In other words, the goal of all voters should be to send a message through their vote, 
rather than attempt to influence the outcome of an election.  While the mere existence of sincere voters 
proves that many voters reject this approach, it is accepted here that there will be at least some voters who 
will cast an expressive, rather than a preferential, vote. 
87Another form of protest is simply abstaining from voting — this option ensures with absolute certainty 
that one’s vote will not influence an election’s outcome.  See Kang (2004) for a detailed account of why 
individuals may choose either to abstain or cast a protest vote.  Spoiling one’s ballot can also be 
interpreted as a protest vote (according to Elections Canada, 0.6 and 0.7% of ballots were spoiled in the 
2006 and 2008 elections respectively).  The 2006 and 2008 versions of the CES do not, however, have a 
“spoiled ballot” option for the vote choice question. 
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election’s outcome, they will only support parties which are uncompetitive (Bowler and 
Lanoue, 1992 only consider votes for the NDP to be protest votes if the party was not 
competitive at the district level).  The goal of protest voters thus is to send a message to 
a traditional party or parties, not to see a non-traditional party win power. 
A protest voter thus is defined here88 as a politically dissatisfied individual who 
votes for an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not his or her most preferred 
option.89  The requirement that protest voters be politically dissatisfied stems from 
Health et al. (1985) and Van der Brug’s (2000)’s assertion that protest voters are 
unhappy with traditional parties or politics more generally, and the condition that these 
voters support an uncompetitive and non-traditional party is borrowed from Bowler and 
Lanoue (1992).  The fact that protest voters vote for a party other than that which is 
their most preferred makes them insincere voters. 
For both strategic and protest voters, therefore, specific (albeit different) 
competitive scenarios are a necessary condition for casting an insincere ballot.  
Strategic voters would not need to vote strategically if they believed their most 
preferred party was competitive, and protest voters would not risk voting for a non-
traditional party if they believed that the target of their vote had a chance of victory.90  
                                                 
88 As mentioned above, there is no consistency in the literature with respect to the way in which a ‘protest 
vote’ is operationalized.  This definition represents a new approach, and the conclusions of this article 
should be interpreted with this in mind. 
89 Somewhat ironically, whereas strategic voting is predicted by Duverger’s (1963) law (which states that, 
under a single member plurality electoral system, supporters of small parties will not “waste” their votes 
by voting for their most preferred party if it has little chance of winning), protest voting is perhaps the 
strongest contradiction to this theory.  These voters are not only voting for a party that is not their 
favourite, they are doing so precisely because that party has no chance of winning.  Nevertheless, casting 
either a strategic or protest vote is an instrumentally rational act; both types of voters decide upon the 
goal that they wish to achieve, and calculate the best method to achieve it. 
90 Subjective rather than objective measures of competitiveness are used here.  Whereas Bowler and 
Lanoue (1992) base their determinations of competitiveness upon (objective) election results, it is argued 
here that it is the subjective perception of voters that will cause them to vote insincerely.  In other words, 
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For insincere voters, perceptions of competitive circumstances can have a significant 
impact upon individual, if not aggregate level voting patterns. 
This is not to say, however, that sincere voters do not factor competitive 
considerations into vote decisions.  Indeed, many people who vote for their most 
preferred party, when that party is competitive, may not do so if the party were not in a 
position to win.  As such, there almost certainly are a number of voters classified here as 
‘sincere’ who might be strategic voters under different circumstances.91  If individuals 
who take competitive expectations into account do indeed tend to have a late TOVD, 
then the same might also be expected of these potentially insincere voters.  While it is 
impossible to identify such individuals without either experimentation or more detailed 
survey data, this problem is not fatal to this study.  If those voters who factor 
competitive considerations into their decisions do indeed have a delayed TOVD, the 
categorization of these individuals as sincere would simply bias estimates for the 
‘sincere’ group towards a later TOVD.  Bias of this type serves to enhance the validity 
of any observed differences in the TOVD patterns of sincere and insincere voters.  This 
article turns now to a more detailed discussion of the identification of strategic and 
protest voters. 
 
4.3 - DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Individuals are classified here as either strategic, protest or sincere voters; 
strategic and protest voters are identified, and all other respondents are assumed to be 
                                                                                                                                               
some voters may actually cast strategic votes for uncompetitive parties, or protest votes for competitive 
ones. 
91There is no such concern with protest voters.  Provided that a voter believes that at least one candidate 
who does not represent a traditional party is uncompetitive in his or her riding, that person has a potential 
outlet for a protest vote. 
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sincere voters.  These three categories are mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive.  Strategic voters are classified following the “direct” method laid out by 
Blais et al. (2005) while protest voters are identified using the definition outlined above.  
Data from the 2006 and 2008 Canadian federal elections are considered individually 
(due to slight differences in question format) before being combined into a single 
dataset in order to increase sample size.  The CES questions used in the analysis are 
listed in Appendix 4-I. 
To be a strategic voter an individual must meet a series of criteria.  First, 
strategic voters must report voting for a party that is not their favourite (this is 
determined though a single post-election question92).  Respondents who claim not to 
have voted for their most preferred party are asked a follow up question about which 
party is their favourite.  An individual is only classified as strategic if he or she assigns a 
higher party or leader rating to the favourite party93 than the party voted for, or if he or 
she claims to have a particular fondness for the local candidate representing the 
                                                 
92 The question is “Was [the party voted for] the party you liked the most?”  Some existing estimates of 
strategic voting rates in Canada do not take this question into consideration.  Instead they rely upon party 
feeling thermometers to determine a voter’s ranked preferences (see Blais and Nadeau, 1996 for an 
example).  However, the link between this question and feeling thermometer responses arguably is quite 
weak.  Among those individuals who voted for a party that was not their favourite, 27.7% gave a higher 
feeling thermometer rating to the party voted for than to any other party.  Conversely, among those 
individuals who claim to have voted for their favourite party, 9.7% gave a lower thermometer rating to 
the party voted for than for at least one other party.  This illustrates just how sensitive the process of 
identifying strategic voters is to variations in method. 
93 The 2006 CES does not include questions about rating the Green Party or leader (information on the 
local candidate is available).  Those who claim to prefer the Green Party to the party voted for are 
assumed to be telling the truth and are not removed from the pool of strategic voters at this stage in the 
process.  This has the potential to inflate slightly the estimated rate of strategic voting in 2006.  However, 
no individuals classified as strategic voters voted for the Greens in this year, and less than 14% of 
respondents who claim not to have voted for their most preferred party stated that the Greens were 
actually their favourite.  Accordingly, the impact of these missing questions is minimal. 
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favourite party94 (this is to ensure that the ‘favourite’ party is most preferred in at least 
one of these senses).95  Competitive expectations also play an important part in the 
identification of strategic voters.  To be classified as a strategic voter, the party one 
votes for must have a better chance of winning at the local level96 than the favoured 
party,97 and some other party must have a chance of winning98 (the assumption here is 
that this other party is the one that the voter does not want to win the election). 
 The method of identifying protest voters used here differs in important ways 
from the approach of Bowler and Lanoue (1992).  To those authors, protest voters must 
either hold the government responsible for any deterioration in personal economic 
circumstances99 or be strongly dissatisfied with the performance of the current 
                                                 
94 Respondents who vote for a party other than the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP, Bloc or Greens are 
removed as these are the only parties where questions about parties, leaders and local candidates are 
asked. 
95 Klingemann and Wessels (2002) delineate three types of sincere voting: sincere party voting (where the 
party is the voter’s most preferred), sincere candidate voting (where the candidate is the most preferred) 
and sincere policy voting (where the voter supports the policies of a party).  The method adopted here is 
based upon that of Blais et al. (2005), which only takes parties, leaders and candidates into account.  The 
inclusion of additional factors such as policy preferences would make the operational definition of a 
strategic voter less restrictive, as individuals would be classified as strategic simply for having as few as 
one factor which aligns with the party reported as one’s favourite.  In theory, if enough factors are 
considered in this manner, all of those individuals who report not voting for their favourite party could be 
classified as strategic.  As such, this analysis is limited to parties, leaders and local candidates. 
96Blais et al. (2001) have shown that it is perceptions of competitiveness at the local, rather than national 
level that influence strategic voters. 
97The questions used to gauge competitive perceptions differ slightly for the two elections.  In 2008 
individuals are only able to list two parties as competitive, while in 2006 individuals are given the chance 
to identify as many as three parties that may have a chance of winning in their riding.  In 2006 the 
favourite party is not considered competitive if it is not listed as the first or second most competitive 
party. 
98Individuals who believe that only one party has a chance of victory cannot be strategic voters.  A 
strategic vote is motivated by the intention of affecting the outcome of an election (Blais et al., 2001), and 
if an individual believes that only one party has a chance of victory, by definition, this person cannot 
believe that his or her vote will affect the outcome.  An important part of strategic voting is the desire to 
avoid wasting one’s vote for a party or candidate that has no chance of winning (Alvarez and Nagler, 
2000). 
99In making the case that a deterioration of one’s personal economic conditions may cause one to become 
a protest voter Bowler and Lanoue reference Munroe and Erikson (1986), arguing that this piece 
“demonstrate(s) that economic concerns can have profound effects on NDP support” (Bowler and 
Lanoue, 1992, 491).  However, while Monroe and Erikson do argue that the NDP is seen by many as an 
economic alternative to the Liberal and Conservative Parties, the authors “find no evidence that 
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government.  However, this approach only taps into sentiment towards the governing 
party.  Protest voters, as defined here, are politically disaffected — they are unsatisfied 
with Canadian democracy and its politicians and political parties in general, not only 
the governing party.100  This distinction is important; protest voters here are dissatisfied 
with the greater political system rather than just a single party.  Accordingly, and 
following Bowler and Lanoue, a protest vote must be cast for a non-traditional party.  
Individuals who are dissatisfied and who wish to send some sort of message of protest 
through their vote are not likely to do so by voting for the Liberal or Conservative 
Parties.  Protest voters must therefore vote either for the NDP, the Bloc Quebecois or 
the Green Party.101 
As with strategic voters, protest voters cast a ballot for a party that is not their 
most preferred.102  The party voted for cannot receive the highest score with respect to 
                                                                                                                                               
deteriorating economic conditions prompt Canadians to withdraw their support from the major political 
parties” (Monroe and Erikson, 1986, 616).  Accordingly, the assumption that a worsening of personal 
economic circumstances could lead to protest votes for the NDP, as opposed to votes for the opposition 
traditional party, is perhaps unwarranted. 
100Dissatisfaction scores are based upon an index which considers questions about one’s level of 
satisfaction with democracy, feelings towards parties in general, the extent to which one believes that all 
parties are the same, and the trustworthiness of politicians.  A score above the midway point of the index 
(0.5) is required for one to be considered dissatisfied — 54% of individuals have a score of greater than 
0.5.  An alternative to this approach would have been to focus upon the most dissatisfied half, or perhaps 
third of the population, in order to identify the most dissatisfied individuals make this measure more 
restrictive.   
101Protest voters want to show their discontent with the political elite by voting for a party that is a 
relative outcast in the political arena.  The Green Party had never won a seat in the House of Commons 
leading up to these elections, and thus are the perfect target for protest votes.  While the NDP had a 
sizable presence in the House of Commons, few CES respondents saw them as national contenders, and 
prior to the 2011 election the party had never placed higher than third in vote or seat share.  The Bloc 
Quebecois only runs candidates inside Quebec and thus cannot form a majority government.  Other minor 
parties may also be the recipients of protest voters.  Such votes are not considered here, however, as the 
CES does not contain leader or party feeling thermometer questions for all minor parties. 
102Unlike when classifying strategic voters, the “was the party voted for your favourite” question is not 
used when indentifying protest voters.  A dissatisfied voter might conceivably interpret this question very 
differently than a strategic voter.  The former would likely interpret this question in a manner that does 
not necessarily require a positive attraction towards a party.  Indeed, someone dissatisfied with political 
parties in general (one of the measures used to create the dissatisfaction index) may respond to this 
question by listing the party that he or she dislikes the least.  This distinction is important.  Whereas 
strategic voters would cast a ballot for their most preferred party if that party was competitive, the 
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party or leadership evaluations, and the voter must not have a preference for the local 
candidate of the party voted for (this check is included to ensure that the party voted for 
is not most preferred in any of these senses).  This fits with the requirement that protest 
voters do not actually want the party that they vote for to win; they vote not to have a 
decisive impact upon the election but to send a message of protest.  Accordingly, in 
contrast to their strategic counterparts, protest voters believe that the party they vote for 
has no chance of winning (for both strategic and protest voters, the focus is upon riding-
level rather than national-level competitive expectations). 
The relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD, the study’s dependent 
variable, is evaluating using multinomial logistic regression.  Voters are classified as 
either election-day deciders, campaign deciders (excluding election-day) or pre-
campaign deciders.  This information is determined through a single post-election CES 
question (individuals are asked when they decided how they were going to vote) and is 
validated according to McGregor’s (working paper) partially restrictive approach. 
In addition to vote sincerity, several control variables are considered.  Gender, 
age, partisanship, levels of political interest and attention to politics are known to have a 
relationship to TOVD (Kenski, 2007; Fournier et al., 2001; Chaffee and Choe, 1980; 
Campbell et al., 1960).  Voter ambivalence (or cross-pressures) (Berelson et al. 1954, 
McGregor working paper) has also shown to lead to a delay in TOVD.  These variables 
are included as controls below.103 
                                                                                                                                               
attraction of a protest voter’s genuine first preference is not strong enough to cause that person to vote for 
that party even if that party were competitive.  Accordingly, party and leader feeling thermometers, as 
well as evaluations of the local candidates are used to determine if the party voted for is an individual’s 
genuine first preference in any of these respects. 
103 Other variables were considered as controls, but eventually ruled out.  For example, Lucas and Adams 
(1978) note that late deciders are less likely to discuss politics with others than are early deciders.  
However, this is rejected here as a cause of TOVD, as this relationship is likely spurious, and is related 
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 One final test of the relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD is conducted 
here before it can be safely concluded that there is a genuine relationship between these 
factors.  The operational definitions of strategic and protest votes are based upon a 
number of disparate factors, and it is conceivable that any observed relationship 
between vote sincerity and TOVD may be a result of some spurious factor included in 
these definitions.  Two additional variables are thus considered to take this possibility 
into account.104  First, if competitive expectations do indeed prompt insincere voters to 
delay their TOVD in order to collect more information on the competitiveness of each 
party, this factor should be controlled for.  Since strategic voters vote for competitive 
parties and protest voters vote for uncompetitive ones, any pattern with respect to this 
variable could bias results significantly.  Accordingly, individuals are classified on the 
basis whether or not they believe the party voted for is competitive at the local level (a 
third option for this variable is not knowing if the party is competitive).  Second, the 
specific party that one votes for may also conceivably have an impact upon the 
observed relationship between TOVD and vote sincerity.  The Liberal Party received 
almost twice as many strategic votes as any other party and protest votes, by definition, 
can only be cast for the NDP, Bloc and Green Party.  Bandwagon, underdog, or other 
campaign effects may lead to differences in the TOVD patterns of parties.  Vote choice 
is thus included below as an independent variable.105 
                                                                                                                                               
strongly to measures of interest.  Education was also considered, but the impact of this variable has been 
described as very small in Canada (Fournier et al., 2004), so it is excluded from the analysis below. 
104Since these factors form part of the operational definitions of strategic and protest voters, including 
them introduces some minor multicollinearity to the model below.  While this inflates the standard errors 
of the strategic and protest voting coefficient estimates, even high multicollinearity leaves estimates 
unbiased (Fox, 1991).   
105While there is not necessarily a theoretical reason to expect dissatisfied voters (which all protest voters 
are) to have an early or late TOVD, it turns out that such voters do tend to have a later TOVD than the 
sample as a whole.  However, even when a dissatisfaction variable is included in the model below the 
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4.4 - RESULTS 
According to the methods of identifying strategic and protest voters outlined 
above, 5.92% and 4.09% of voters cast a strategic ballot in 2006 and 2008 respectively.  
Rates of protest voting were 1.51% in 2006 and 1.59% in 2008.106  Data from these two 
elections have been pooled to evaluate the relationship between vote sincerity and 
TOVD.  Since the 2006 and 2008 datasets are part of a panel study, some respondents 
participated in the CES for both elections.  Only data from 2008 are considered for such 
individuals.107 
Multinomial logistic regression results, with TOVD as the dependent variable, 
are shown in Table 4-1.  The strategic and protest vote coefficients are expected to be 
positive in all cases (a sincere vote is the base category).  Results are shown for a basic 
model, containing only vote sincerity and the control variables discussed above, and a 
larger model, including competitive expectations and party choice.108  All variables are 
                                                                                                                                               
relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD remains in the same direction, with the same level of 
statistical significance. 
106While not of direct relevance to this article, it is interesting to note the net impact of insincere voting on 
the vote shares of the major parties.  This can be calculated according to the following formula: 
Impact = (strategic votes gained + protest votes gained) – (strategic votes lost + protest votes lost).   
In 2008 the Liberals were the biggest beneficiary of insincere voting (gaining 1.25% of the overall vote 
share), followed by the Bloc (0.69%) and the Conservatives (0.54%).  The NDP and Green Party 
suffered, losing 1.30% and 1.11% respectively.  The NDP was only able to recover 29% of the votes it 
lost to strategic voting through protest votes.  The corresponding value for the Greens, however, is much 
higher, at over 67%. 
107Strategic and protest voters, respectively, make up 6.8% and 1.3% of the pooled dataset.  The process 
of identifying protest voters eliminates more cases than does that used to identify strategic voters (more 
CES questions are required in the former process and cases with even a single empty response are 
omitted), so the percentage of strategic voters is slightly inflated, and the percentage of protest voters is 
deflated here in comparison to the values listed above. However, since the aim here is to evaluate the 
relationship between TOVD and voter sincerity, the sample need not necessarily be representative of the 
population. 
108Multicollinearity is not a major concern in the larger model.  The highest variance inflation factor score 
of any variable is only 1.47 (for the “competitive” variable).  Even with these additional variables are 
added, a joint f-test for strategic and protest voters returns a p-value of less than 0.01, indicating that these 
variables are making a significant contribution to explaining variation in the dependent variable. 
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coded as dummies to simplify the interpretation of the results.109 
TABLE 4-1:  CORRELATES OF TOVD 
    Campaign vs. Pre-Campaign 
Election-day vs. Pre-
Campaign 
Election-day vs. 
Campaign 
Strategic 
Vote Base =    
sincere vote 
.77(.24)c .68(.25)c 1.24(.31)c 1.21(.32)c .47(.29) .53(.30)a 
Protest 
Vote 1.85(.66)
c 1.38(.68)b 2.08(.74)c 1.32(.77)a .23(.53) -.06(.57) 
Gender Female = 1 .29(.12)b .24(.12)b .29(.19) .25(.19) .01(.19) .01(.19) 
Age 
 
-.35(.12)c -.32(.12)b -.51(.19)c -.46(.19)b -.17(.19) -.14(.20) 
Partisan 
 
-.94(.17)c -.91(.17)c -1.25(.23)c -1.21(.24)c -.31(.22) -.29(.22) 
Interest 
 
-.04(.19) .01(.20) -.50(.26)b -.42(.26) -.46(.26)a -.43(.27) 
Attention 
 
.73(.24)c .76(.25)c -.19(.29) -.17(.29) -.92(.31)c -.93(.31)c 
Ambivalence .48(.12)c .49(.12)c 1.01(.26)c 1.03(.20)c .52(.20)c .54(.21)c 
Competitive Base = 
Uncompetitive  
  -.01(.18)   -.41(.27)a   -.41(.27) 
Unknown   -.40(.39)   -.75(.61)   -.25(.63) 
Liberal 
Vote 
Base = 
Conservative 
Vote 
 
.58(.15)c 
 
.79(.25)c 
 
.21(.26) 
NDP Vote 
 
1.00(.17)c 
 
1.11(.28)c 
 
.11(.28) 
Bloc Vote 
 
.37(.23)a 
 
.64(.39)a 
 
.27(.41) 
Green Vote 
 
1.06(.28)c 
 
1.09(.41)c 
 
.03(.40) 
Constant  -.55(0.3)
c -1.07(.36)c -.65(0.39)c -1.02(.56)c -.10(.40) .05(.49) 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.0658 0.0887 
    
N   1480 1480         
Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). 
a: β significant at p <.10, b: β significant at p < .05, c: β significant at p <.01 
 
 The results in Table 4-1 support the expectation that insincere voters will tend to 
have a later TOVD than their sincere counterparts.110  When comparing campaign to 
pre-campaign (the first two columns in the table), and election-day to pre-campaign 
TOVD (the third and fourth columns), the coefficients representing protest and strategic 
                                                 
109The age variable compares individuals who are 50 or older at the time of the election to those under 50.  
For the interest and attention variables a score of 1 is assigned to those individuals who respond with 
values of 5 or greater (on a scale of 0-10) for the respective interest and attention survey questions.  
Individuals are considered ambivalent if they claim that they have “mixed” feelings towards their most 
preferred party, while those who have “all positive” or “mostly positive” feelings towards that party are 
assigned a score of 0 for this variable. 
110 Data are not weighted, as this analysis is based upon a combination of data from multiple elections.  
New weight values would need to be created, based upon data from both elections, in order to apply 
weights properly here. 
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voters are positive, suggesting that such individuals are more likely to make their 
decisions after the campaign begins than are sincere voters.  These relationships exist 
even after taking into account competitive expectations and party choice (i.e. even when 
estimates are potentially less efficient these relationships remain statistically 
significant).  The coefficients for these variables when comparing election day to the 
campaign period (the final two columns in the table) are of a smaller magnitude than 
those comparing the other TOVD periods, and three of four fail to be of statistical 
significance, even at the generous 90% confidence level.  Thus it cannot safely be 
concluded that there are differences between sincere and insincere voters with respect to 
these two TOVD periods. On balance, however, the results provide compelling evidence 
of a relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD.  Insincere voters are much more 
likely than their sincere counterparts to have a campaign period or election-day TOVD. 
In addition to presenting raw regression results, the predicted probability of 
having a pre-campaign, campaign and election-day TOVD was estimated for each value 
for each variable in Table 4-1.  These probabilities are calculated through 
postestimation, by manipulating values of each variable individually.  For each line in 
Figure 4-1, the variable under examination was set to its maximum value,111 while all 
other variables are left at their current value.  These results are presented graphically in 
Figure 4-1, and provide an intuitive method to quickly compare the potential influence 
of each factor considered here upon TOVD.112 
                                                 
111 Corresponding variables are set to zero.  For example, when evaluating sincere voters, the strategic 
and protest variables are set to 0. 
112The word “potential” must be included here, as the actual impact of each variable depends upon how 
values for each variable are distributed among the population.  Even if an attitude has a significant 
potential to influence TOVD, if few individuals exhibit the attribute, it has relatively little impact upon 
TOVD patterns. 
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FIGURE 4-1:  PREDICTED DISTRIBUTION OF TOVD 
 
 
The above results illustrate a conspicuous difference between sincere and 
insincere voters.  More than half (57.8%) of sincere voters are expected to have a pre-
campaign TOVD.  In contrast, rates of pre-campaign deciding for strategic and protest 
voters are 40.0% and 28.4% respectively.  Protest voters are the least likely of any 
variable considered in Figure 4-1 to have an early TOVD, and among these other factors 
only non-partisans (37.8%) have higher rates of pre-campaign deciding than do strategic 
voters.  Insincere voters are also much more likely than their sincere counterparts to 
have a late TOVD.  Fewer than 9% of sincere voters are predicted to make up their 
minds on election-day.  Strategic voters have the highest rate of election-day TOVD of 
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those factors considered here (18.0%), followed by non-partisans (at 15.7%) and then 
protest voters (at 13.8%). The extent of the relationship between vote sincerity and 
TOVD thus appears clear:  insincere voters are much more likely to have a late TOVD 
than are their sincere counterparts.   
The control variables act largely as expected.  Gender, age and partisanship all 
have the anticipated relationship with TOVD, although the coefficients comparing 
election-day to the campaign period are insignificant for these variables.  There is no 
significant difference in the interest level of campaign and pre-campaign deciders, but 
election-day deciders are more uninterested than either campaign or pre-campaign 
deciders.  Campaign-period deciders tend to be more attentive than both pre-campaign 
deciders and election-day deciders, though there is no discernable difference between 
election-day and pre-campaign deciders in this respect.  Finally, ambivalence is strongly 
related to a late TOVD — this variable is statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level in all cases.  Of these control variables, partisanship and ambivalence display the 
greatest differences in TOVD in Figure 4-1, suggesting that these factors have the 
greatest potential to influence the time at which individuals make their vote decisions. 
 While strategic and protest voters are expected to factor competitive 
expectations into their vote decisions (thus causing a delay in TOVD), the above results 
say little about the effect that competitive perceptions have upon TOVD for the 
population as a whole.  The TOVD patterns of individuals who vote for competitive 
parties do not differ significantly from either those individuals who vote for 
uncompetitive parties or those who are unaware of the competitive circumstances of the 
party they vote for.  It was noted earlier that sincere voters may or may not take 
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competitive expectations into account when making their decisions, so this finding is 
not surprising.  Further work is needed to determine under what circumstances 
competitive expectations are factored into the decision making calculus of sincere 
voters.  Disaggregating sincere voters in some way may produce statistically significant 
results for this variable. 
Finally, the party choice results reveal an interesting pattern.  Conservative 
voters (the base in Table 4-1 and the party that won both the 2006 and 2008 elections) 
are more likely than supporters of any other party to have a pre-campaign TOVD — the 
difference when comparing the campaign and pre-campaign period is statistically 
significant for all parties.  Conversely, supporters of the Green Party and the NDP are 
least likely to make up their minds before the campaign begins (while there is no 
statistically significant difference between these two parties in this regard, they do differ 
at the 95% confidence level from all other parties).  This finding may reflect the fact 
that these parties are the greatest beneficiary of protest votes.  The fact that Liberal 
voters are less likely to have a pre-campaign TOVD than Conservative voters (the only 
two parties who cannot be the beneficiary of protest votes) may be partially because the 
Liberals received almost twice as many strategic votes as the Conservatives (44% 
versus 23% of the strategic votes cast). 
 
4.5 - CONCLUSION 
 This article has shed light upon two understudied topics: protest voting and the 
relationship between vote sincerity, competitive expectations and the time at which vote 
decisions are finalized.  Largely overlooked, protest voters have been found to make up 
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a noteworthy segment of the Canadian population - over 1.5% in both elections 
considered here.  The above results also reveal noteworthy differences between the 
TOVD patterns of sincere and insincere voters.  These findings thus provide insight into 
the extent to which campaign effects may be able to persuade voters to act in a manner 
which belies their genuine preferences.  The results also suggest that protest voters 
warrant further academic attention, and that studies of voter sincerity should avoid 
simply categorizing non-strategic voters as sincere by default.  At least in this instance, 
protest voters have been shown to behave very differently than sincere voters. 
 While the relationship between vote sincerity and TOVD has been clearly 
established, further work is required to map out this relationship in greater detail.  It 
stands to reason that those individuals who factor competitive circumstances into their 
vote decisions may delay their decisions.  Nevertheless, more research is required to 
explore the relationship between changes in competitive evaluations and changes in 
vote preferences.  A time series analysis of this nature could explore with more 
precision the causal relationship between competitive evaluations and vote sincerity.  It 
could also help to distinguish those sincere voters who are potential strategic voters 
from those who would not defect even if their most preferred party were uncompetitive.   
In addition to the observation that voter sincerity is indeed correlated with a late 
TOVD, an examination of patterns of preference formation and stability can offer 
insight into the effects of campaigns upon insincere voters.  CES respondents are asked 
during the campaign period which party they plan to vote for, or if they have yet to 
make their decision.  Only 15.2% of sincere voters reported being undecided at this 
point, while the corresponding value for insincere voters is 42.6%.  Among those who 
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did express a vote intention in the pre-election questionnaire, 9.6% of sincere voters 
reported voting for a different party when interviewed after the election.  This value is 
34.0% for insincere voters.113  Thus not only are insincere voters less likely to have a 
preference when first interviewed, but they are also much more likely to change their 
preferences during the campaign. 
These patterns suggest that insincere voters may be particularly susceptible to 
campaign effects.  Changes in competitive circumstances, appeals from politicians with 
respect to strategic voting and campaign period events that might cause voters to 
become politically dissatisfied (perhaps negative advertising or some sort of scandal) 
have the potential to significantly influence TOVD patterns, rates of insincere voting 
and thus aggregate level election results.  While future research is required to determine 
the extent to which this potential is actually met, this article’s findings suggest that the 
study of the relationship between campaign effects and vote sincerity deserves more 
scholarly attention than it currently receives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113For both comparisons differences are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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5 - “CORRECT” VOTING AND THE COMPARATIVE 
MANIFESTOS PROJECT 
 
 
 
Although voter turnout rates in most industrialized nations are trending 
downwards, and citizens are increasingly turning to alternative forms of political 
participation (Nevitte, 1996; Norris, 1999), the process of deciding who will govern 
through the act of voting remains of significant import.  Elections provide one of the 
few opportunities voters have to exert some influence over the governing of their 
societies, but are they taking full advantage of this opportunity?  Political scientists have 
long suspected that voters fail to meet the standards that democratic theory asks of them 
(see Berelson, 1952, Campbell et al., 1960).  Citizens are expected not only to 
participate, but also to be interested in and attentive to politics.  Yet interest and 
attention are insufficient.  These attributes do not necessarily translate into a 
knowledgeable electorate, which many, such as Rousseau (see Wraight 2008) and Mill 
(1862), see as vital to the health of a democracy.  Without knowledge, the ability of 
individuals to identify the candidate which best reflects their views and interests is 
severely diminished. 
If voters are unable to identify this candidate, a major argument in favour of 
democracy is undercut.  Plato’s “guardianship,” a theoretical competitor to democracy, 
supposes that ordinary people are unable to recognize and defend their own interests, 
and every voter that casts a ballot for a candidate or party without understanding the 
outcomes associated with his or her decision lends support to this position.  If a large 
share of the electorate behaves in this manner, the well-being and even the legitimacy of 
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a democracy could be damaged.  If voters are unable to identify the party that best 
reflects their own opinions, the party elected to govern and the composition of 
legislatures are unlikely to accurately reflect the wishes of the electorate.  Put another 
way, democracy suffers when individuals vote “incorrectly.”   
This article introduces a new method of evaluating the ability of individuals to 
vote for the political party with policy positions closest to their own — to vote 
“correctly.”  Knowledge is not the key variable here.  Rather, the question is whether 
individuals are capable of identifying and voting for the party that best reflects their 
own self-reported preferences and interests.  Following Lau and Redlawsk (1997), a 
“correct vote” is defined as the vote choice individuals would make under conditions of 
perfect information.  In other words, a vote is “correct” if it is cast for the party which a 
voter should vote for, based upon a fully-informed comparison of his or her policy 
positions and those of the parties contesting an election.   
In contrast to most of the established literature on correct voting, this article 
focuses exclusively upon a comparison of the issue positions of individuals and those of 
political candidates.  Existing methods of measuring correct voting rates often consider 
variables such as one’s party identification or opinions of the incumbent party (See Lau 
and Redlawsk 1997, 2006, Lau et al. 2008a, Lau et al. 2008b).  While evaluations of 
parties and politicians may influence vote choice, and parties and politicians are 
important parts of the political process, it is the outputs of that process - policy 
outcomes - that have a direct, tangible impact upon the citizenry.  Furthermore, just as it 
is possible for individuals to vote incorrectly, it is possible for individuals to have an 
inaccurate understanding of government performance or to identify with the party that 
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does not represent their best interests (see Frank, 2004).  Individual policy preferences, 
estimated using Canadian Election Study (CES) data, are compared to the positions of 
parties, derived from data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), in seven 
dimensions of political competition.  For illustrative purposes, this new method is 
applied to the 2004 Canadian federal election.  While the study’s data are exclusively 
Canadian, this new method is applicable to other settings. 
The article then examines the impact of the campaign period upon correct voting 
rates.  Individuals have the opportunity to learn about party policy positions during the 
campaign, but whether they use this opportunity to make a ‘better’ vote choice has yet 
to be determined.  If the campaign period helps the electorate to vote correctly, and 
correct voting is seen as desirable, the campaign can be said to have a positive impact 
upon the legitimacy and quality of a democracy.  The amount of attention that 
respondents report having paid to the campaign is employed as a proxy for campaign 
knowledge (which includes knowledge of party promises), and the time-of-vote-
decision (TOVD) is introduced as a moderating variable to explore in detail the 
relationship between attentiveness and correct voting.  As the method of 
operationalizing a correct vote introduced here is based upon policy, if attention to the 
campaign is found to improve one’s ability to vote correctly, this approach would 
receive some validation. 
   
5.1 - CORRECT VOTING 
While one might understandably be hesitant to use terms such as “correct” or 
“incorrect” when evaluating the quality of vote choices, there is no doubt that correct 
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voting is seen by many as desirable.114  There are any number of reasons why 
individuals choose to vote the way that they do, and few people leaving a voting booth 
would claim to have made an “incorrect” decision.  Indeed, in one sense of the term, 
anyone who puts a checkmark next to the name of the person that he or she intended to 
vote for has voted “correctly.”  Yet the definition of a correct vote adopted here does 
suggest that some vote choices are simply better than others.115  If one accepts the 
assertion that the ability of citizens to identify the party that best reflects their views is 
an important measure of the quality of a democracy, as Lau and Redlawsk (1997) 
suggest, then a vote choice can have either positive or negative implications for a 
democracy’s legitimacy.  Similarly, if one accepts that the delegation of authority from 
voters to politicians is successful when the welfare of the voter is enhanced (as 
determined subjectively by voters themselves) (Lupia and McCubbins 1998), and the 
idea that democracy succeeds when the actions of government reflect the wishes of the 
citizenry (Dahl, 1967), then the entire electoral process is validated when citizens make 
correct decisions. 
Lau and Redlawsk (1997) were the first to explore the concept, and did so 
through experimentation with fictional elections and analysis of National Election Study 
(NES) data.  In the latter case the authors introduced a “normative naïve” approach to 
determining if individual votes are cast correctly.  The approach is naïve because it 
takes each individual respondent’s value preferences (as determined through survey 
                                                 
114 This study of correct voting is based upon the assumptions of rational choice theory.  It assumes that 
voters will attempt to make decisions in order to maximize their personal utility, and that a single vote 
choice will allow them to do so. 
115 The analysis and conclusions below are based upon this necessarily normative claim, as well as the 
epistemological assumption that it is possible to assess correct voting in an empirical manner using 
survey and manifesto project data. 
137 
 
137 
 
data) into account and normative because the policy positions of candidates are 
determined subjectively by ‘experts’ (this is discussed in greater detail below).  Correct 
voting rates were eventually estimated at roughly 75% for presidential elections from 
1972 to 1988.  More recent work has explored the impact of social networks on correct 
voting (see Sokhey and McClurg forthcoming, Ryan 2011), correct voting and direct 
democracy (Hobolt 2007, Nai 2010) and factors that have an influence over one’s 
likelihood of voting correctly (Lau et al. 2008a, Walgrave et al. 2009). 
The only work to explore the concept of correct voting in Canada is a 
comparative study by Lau et al. (2008b).  The authors use data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems to evaluate correct voting in 32 countries.  Due to data 
limitations, the authors rely upon party feeling thermometers, self-placement on a left-
right scale and retrospective economic evaluations when determining whether votes are 
correct (in other words, policy opinions are not considered).  They eventually arrive at a 
correct voting rate of over 70% for the 2004 federal election.  Also worth mention is the 
“Vote Compass” project, which, while sponsored by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (2011), was designed and managed by a group of academics.  The Vote 
Compass asks participants their opinions on a variety of policy issues and was designed 
to show users one’s location in a two dimensional ideological space vis-à-vis each of the 
major political parties (party positions were estimated by the academics overseeing the 
project).  Since the eventual vote choices of respondents are unknown, however, Vote 
Compass data cannot be used to explore correct voting rates.116  This article represents, 
therefore, the first study of correct voting exclusive to Canada. 
                                                 
116 While the Vote Compass does give respondents an opportunity to answer a question on vote intention, 
it is unable to account for individuals who are undecided at the time of taking the survey, or who change 
their minds before election day. 
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Employing Canadian data to illustrate this new method of evaluating correct 
voting is appropriate for several reasons.  To begin with, it expands the correct voting 
literature in a non-American context.  Lau and Redlawsk (1997, 2006, 2008a) have 
primarily focused upon the US, with its two party presidential system.  In contrast, 
Canada has a multi-party parliamentary system, and a significant regional party in the 
form of the Bloc Quebecois.  A detailed exploration of Canadian data thus provides 
insight into how correct voting may be evaluated in other settings with similar electoral 
or party systems.  Focusing upon Canada also illustrates the flexibility of this new 
method of operationalising correct voting, and demonstrates the importance of taking 
country specific factors into account when exploring this concept.  Because of the 
existence of the Bloc (a separatist party which only runs candidates in Quebec), voters 
from outside that province must be evaluated independently from Quebecers, and the 
important issue of Quebec nationalism must be taken into account.  Canadian data thus 
are well suited to this study. 
In addition to being the first work on the subject of correct voting to consider the 
Canadian case in detail, this article is unique in that it focuses exclusively upon policy 
positions.  The fundamental premise of all studies of correct voting is the same 
(objective facts about candidates are compared to the subjective opinions of voters), and 
an important part of such analyses is the determination of which kind of factors should 
be used in this comparison.  Existing work on correct voting considers many factors 
other than policy.  When introducing the concept, Lau and Redlawsk (1997) considered 
the issue positions of parties and individuals, but they also factored in respondents’ 
party identification, ratings of the incumbent government’s performance and candidate 
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social group linkages.117  and, with minor modifications, this approach has been largely 
adopted in later work on the topic (see Lau and Redlawsk 2006, Lau et al. 2008a).   
It is argued here, however, that correct voting should be evaluated on the basis 
of a comparison of the policy positions of individuals to those of parties.  The 
arguments noted above from Plato (that voters should understand the potential 
outcomes associated with their vote decision), Dahl (that the actions of government 
should reflect the wishes of the citizenry) and Lupia and McCubbins (that a democracy 
benefits when the welfare of the voter is enhanced) all imply that vote decisions should 
be made on the basis of the impact that government decisions, or policies, have upon 
the citizenry.  Evaluations of incumbent performance only provide information on the 
(past) policy stances of one party, and focusing upon evaluations of leaders and social 
group linkages provides dubious insight into the policy outcomes that would result from 
the election of various parties or politicians.  Being part of, or identifying with a group 
associated with a particular party, for example, does not mean that one’s interests are 
best served by supporting that party. 
Moreover, if one recognizes that it is possible to vote incorrectly, it must also be 
acknowledged that it is possible to identify incorrectly with a party or to develop an 
incorrect understanding of the performance of an incumbent government.  Simply 
having an attachment to a party, for instance, does not imply that the party shares a 
person’s values and beliefs (see Frank, 2004).  While we know that heuristics like party 
identification have the potential to help individuals make good vote choices (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998), it is also possible that such sources of information may omit facts or 
                                                 
117 Election Study respondents were asked how close they feel to social groups with close links to 
candidates.  For instance, in 1972, the groups associated with Nixon were businessmen, southerners and 
conservatives, while those associated with McGovern were liberals, the poor and blacks. 
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provide untruths, potentially leading voters astray.  “Low information rationality” 
(Popkin, 1991), or relying heavily upon such cues, may thus sometimes lead one to vote 
incorrectly.  Additionally, since party identification, evaluations of government 
performance and sociodemographic characteristics (or group status) are known to have 
a strong relationship with vote choice (see Blais et al. 2002), including them in the 
calculation of correct voting rates has the effect of biasing estimates upwards.118  
Accordingly, correct voting rates are calculated here using policy stances alone. 
Developing an accurate measure of party policy positions, however, is the most 
challenging component of any study of correct voting.  Just as heuristics have the 
potential to lead one to vote incorrectly, subjectively determined estimates of party 
positions are susceptible to filtration or distortion.  In their 1997 article, Lau and 
Redlawsk’s estimates of party positions are determined by political science professors 
and graduate students and an elected official, and in a later version of their work (2006), 
they use the responses of election study subjects themselves to assign policy positions 
to presidential candidates (unlike the CES, the American National Election Study asks 
respondents to estimate the positions of candidates with respect to a variety of issues).  
The responses of ‘experts,’ or those above the median with respect to political 
knowledge questions, were used to estimate candidate positions.  Another approach to 
estimating party policy positions is provided by Benoit and Laver (2006), who base 
their estimates of party policy positions upon surveys administered to “experts” (in this 
case, recognised political experts such as political science professors).  As with Lau and 
                                                 
118 A similar argument can be made about the factors considered by Lau et al.’s (2008b) comparative 
paper (party feeling thermometers, self-placement on a left-right scale and retrospective economic 
evaluations). 
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Redlawsk’s work, however, Benoit and Laver’s estimates are determined 
subjectively.119 
The concern with such approaches is that even the most knowledgeable survey 
respondents or political experts may provide inaccurate estimates.  These individuals 
are simply relaying their impressions of party positions, which are subject to internal 
biases or widespread misconceptions, among other things.  Even if Benoit and Laver’s 
experts are more reliable than Lau and Redlawsk’s (2006) National Election Study 
experts, their estimates are similarly based upon subjective evaluations of party policies. 
Recognizing this data limitation,120 Walgrave et al. (2009) adopt a new method 
of estimating party positions in their examination of correct voting in Flemish Belgium.  
The authors argue that the actual positions of parties can only be obtained from the 
parties themselves.  To that end they conduct interviews with politicians, asking about 
positions on a wide range of issues.  They then ask voters the same questions, and are 
thus able to calculate correct voting rates quite neatly. 
In line with Walgrave et al., an attempt has been made here to employ a more 
objective measure of party policy positions.  As primary sources of information, official 
party manifestos are one source for such a measure.  They provide unfiltered and 
undistorted insight into the campaign-period positions of parties on a variety of issues, 
as well as the importance that parties place upon each respective issue.  Manifestos are 
the tools that parties themselves use to clearly lay out their policy positions, and even if 
campaign promises are not eventually kept, politicians can be held accountable for 
                                                 
119 For a thorough comparison of these two methods of estimating party positions see Volkens (2007).   
120 Lau et al. (2008) also recognize this limitation, and call upon other researchers to devise an objective 
measure of party positions that does not rely upon survey respondents.   
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published promises, and they thus have an incentive to adhere to proposed policies 
(Laver and Hunt, 1992).   
Accordingly, party policy positions are estimated here using data from the 
Comparative Manifestos Project – this is the first study of correct voting to use this 
dataset.121  The CMP analyses official party manifestos using quantitative content 
analysis,122 assigning a score for each party for 56 pre-defined categories spanning 
seven policy domains.123  By combining category scores it is possible to determine party 
positions with respect to a variety of policy dimensions (this process is described in 
more detail below) (Klingemann et al., 2006).  Party positions for these dimensions can 
then be compared to the positions of individuals, which are based upon CES data, to 
determine if individuals have voted correctly.124 
                                                 
121 The CMP has a publicly available dataset that includes information from over 3300 manifestos and 55 
countries, in some cases going as far back as 1945. 
122 CMP coders undergo extensive training to maximize inter-coder consistency, or reliability.  This 
training “set[s] and enforce[s] central standards on coders” by laying out a set of rules to help coders 
decide how to properly categorize quasi-sentences (Volkens 2001, 94).  Trainees are required to code a 
series of previously coded texts, and their results are compared to previously established results.  
123 Each manifesto is broken up into a series of mutually exclusive “quasi-sentences,” which are coded to 
correspond to one of the 56 categories.  Quasi-sentences may be an entire sentence, but they can also be 
part of a sentence.  If a sentence expresses more than one idea it is divided into quasi-sentences.  The 
score for each category is normalized (by dividing by the total number of quasi-sentences) to control for 
manifesto length.  The policy domains are external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups.   
124 Another potential source of party policy estimates worth mentioning stems from the work of Benoit 
and Laver (2006).  The authors use surveys which ask “experts” (in this case the term does not apply to 
election study respondents, but rather to recognized experts in the field, such as political science 
professors) to provide subjective estimates of party positions.  The data provided by Benoit and Laver are 
of a format that can be manipulated and compared to the positions or individuals in a manner similar to 
the way in which CMP data are used here.  Regrettably, however, the authors conducted their survey of 
Canadian experts shortly before the 2004 merger of the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian 
Alliance.  The data are thus inapplicable to the 2004 election, which was fought shortly after the merger 
(although this dataset could theoretically be applied to earlier elections if so desired).   
Even if such estimates were available, however, there are important reasons why the CMP remains the 
preferred source of data here.  To begin with, while Benoit and Laver (2007) contend that their approach 
is superior to that of the CMP, the fact is that their data relies upon subjective evaluations by experts.  
Even though Benoit and Laver’s experts are likely more reliable than Lau and Redlawsk’s (2006) 
National Election Study experts, the estimates of such individuals are similarly based upon subjective 
interpretation of party policies.  Among other factors, bias, knowledge levels and the sources of 
information used by experts can negatively affect the accuracy of estimates.  Only a primary source of 
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Once individual and party policy positions are determined, the article turns to 
evaluate the impact of the campaign period upon correct voting rates.  It is generally 
accepted that campaigns have an impact upon the choices of Canadian voters (Johnston 
et al., 1992; Jenkins 2002; Blais et al. 2003), and the question asked here is whether the 
campaign has a positive effect upon correct voting rates.  Individuals have the 
opportunity to learn about party policy positions during the campaign, but whether they 
use this opportunity to make a ‘better’ vote choice has yet to be determined.   
Existing work suggests that political knowledge should improve one’s ability to 
vote correctly (Lau et al. 2008a, Lau et al. 2008b, Walgrave et al., 2009).  The 
relationship between knowledge and correct voting has been explored using measures 
of general political knowledge  (Lau et al. 2008a, 2008b).125  Alternatively, education 
has been used as a proxy for knowledge (Walgrave et al. 2009).  Neither of these 
measures, however, provide insight into whether voters are using the campaign period 
to gather information, and thus cannot be used to explore the question of whether 
exposure to information during the campaign period improves one’s chances of voting 
correctly. 
In this study, the amount of attention that respondents report having paid to the 
campaign is employed as a proxy for campaign-specific knowledge (which includes 
knowledge of party promises).  Official party platforms for the 2004 election were 
                                                                                                                                               
information can produce the unbiased estimates desired here.  Additionally, party manifestos provide a 
snapshot of party positions during a campaign, when many voters are still making up their minds.  In 
contrast, Benoit and Laver’s estimates were produced between elections, and are thus of less relevance to 
any particular election (Budge, 2000).  Such an approach fails to account for the possibility that party 
positions may shift from one election to the next.   
For a more thorough comparison of these two methods of estimating party positions see Volkens (2007). 
125 For the 2004 CES a measure of general political knowledge of factors like the name of one’s 
provincial premier or the governor general. 
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released either shortly before, or in the early stages of the campaign,126 so an 
assumption made here is that those individuals who are highly attentive during the 
course of the campaign are more likely than individuals who are relatively inattentive to 
be exposed to and absorb information on party policies.127  A dummy measure of 
attentiveness has been created, and CES respondents are classified as either high or low 
attention.128 
Even if a relationship between attentiveness and correct voting can be 
established, however, the question of whether this relationship is causal is less clear.  
While it stands to reason that attentiveness and knowledge of campaign-period 
information should help one to vote correctly, we know that a high level of knowledge 
is not necessary to make good vote decisions (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 
1991).  We also know that a significant segment of the electorate is composed of 
individuals who make their vote decisions long before the campaign begins (Berelson et 
al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Fournier et al. 2004), meaning that their decisions are 
made before party platforms are released.  If knowledge of election-specific party 
policies is either necessary or sufficient to vote correctly, and if many policy promises 
                                                 
126 The 2004 election campaign ran from May 24 to June 28.  The Bloc released their official platform on 
May 16, the NDP on May 26, the Liberals on June 3 and the Conservatives on June 5.   
127 An alternative to this approach would be to compare knowledge of policy promises to TOVD.  The 
2004 CES contains a battery questions pertaining to knowledge of specific party policy proposals, 
allowing for the creation of a measure of knowledge of party promises.  Respondents were presented with 
a series of policy proposals and then asked which party had put forward the proposal. 
However, while data allow us to measure respondents’ knowledge at the time of the pre-election 
interview, they do not provide an indication of how knowledgeable voters were at the time that vote 
decisions were made.  While the data do reveal a strong relationship between knowledge of party 
proposals and correct voting, because it is impossible to tell how much individuals knew at the point in 
time that they made their decisions, this information cannot be used to support the argument that 
knowledge of policy promises increases one’s ability to vote correctly.   
As it turns out, attention to the campaign is positively correlated with knowledge of party promises, at the 
99% confidence level. 
128 This dummy variable categorizes respondents on the basis of the amount of attention reported paid to 
various forms of media during the campaign.  Those individuals who score above the mean attention 
value for the sample are coded here as high attention. 
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are made during the campaign period, one might reason that these early deciders stand 
to have a relatively low probability of voting correctly.  The literature on TOVD 
suggests, however, that it is exactly these early deciders who are the most 
knowledgeable, interested in politics and attentive during the course of a campaign 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Chaffee and Choe 1980; Fournier et al. 2001.).  It is thus 
worthwhile to disaggregate voters on the basis of TOVD to see if the relationship 
between correct voting and campaign period attentiveness holds for various time 
periods.   
If attention to the campaign does indeed have a positive impact upon correct 
voting, the introduction of TOVD as a moderating variable between these factors 
suggests a series of testable implications.  First, attention to the campaign should not 
influence rates of correct voting among pre-campaign deciders.  Since these individuals 
have already made up their minds, they cannot be influenced by party promises 
announced during the course of a campaign.  The second implication of such a 
relationship is that, among campaign deciders, attention to the campaign should 
improve the ability of campaign deciders to vote correctly.  These voters, by definition, 
have the capacity to be influenced during the campaign period, and the more attention 
they pay to the campaign and the more they know about party proposals, the more likely 
they should be to vote correctly.  Finally, if attention to the campaign does have a 
positive impact upon correct voting rates, late deciders should have higher rates of 
correct voting than should early deciders.  Since many party positions are announced 
and receive media attention during the course of the campaign (as noted above, official 
party platforms for the 2004 election were released either shortly before, or in the early 
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stages of the campaign), voters who use the campaign period to make their vote 
decisions will have access to information that those who are previously decided will 
not.  As such, we might expect campaign-period deciders to have relatively high rates of 
correct voting.  These implications are tested after correct voters are identified 
according to the method outlined in the subsequent section of this article. 
 
5.2 - DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The methodology and results below are based upon the spatial theory of party 
competition. That is, it is assumed that the preferences of parties and individuals can be 
placed upon a continuous scale ranging from left to right (with endpoints of -1 for the 
left and +1 for the right).  Following Downs (1957), the assumption here is that it is 
possible to understand voting behaviour on the basis of the preferences of individuals, 
and the distance between those preferences and the policy stances of the parties on a 
bipolar scale.  If individuals and parties can be located on such a scale, the distance 
between them can be calculated, and the “correct” vote choice can be identified.  In one-
dimensional competition, the most proximate party is the one that should receive an 
individual’s vote.  In other words, an individual will vote for Party X if the distance 
between that individual and party X is less than the distance between that individual and 
any other party.   
While theoretically attractive, the spatial model of party competition can be 
difficult to apply in practice.  Political competition is rarely, if ever, based upon a single 
dimension.  To determine an overall distance between voters and parties in a multi-
dimensional competition all relevant dimensions must be identified, and the distance 
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between parties and voters must be determined in each dimension.  Dimensions can be 
evaluated individually, but it is important that information from each dimension be 
combined to generate an overall distance between an individual and each party. 
Accordingly, the policy positions of individuals and parties with respect to six 
(or seven in the case of Quebec) dimensions are considered here.129  The distances for 
each dimension are combined to arrive at a measure of overall distance as follows: 
  
(5-1)
 
Where y = 7 for Quebec and 6 for ROC.   
While equation (5-1) is able to account for more than one dimension, it remains 
flawed in that it weights each dimension of competition equally.  It overlooks the fact 
that some issues may vary in importance to individuals and parties.  In other words, this 
formula fails to recognize the fact that an individual may assign a relatively high degree 
of importance to some issues, and little to others.  For instance, a voter who believes 
that environmental protection is the most important election issue may choose to 
support the party that he or she is closest to with respect to that dimension, even if that 
party is a great distance from that individual in other dimensions.  Position and salience 
are two distinct components of policy positions (Laver, 2001), and a method of 
calculating distances with respect to multiple policy dimensions must take both 
components into consideration. 
                                                 
129 While the list of policy areas considered here is not exhaustive, it undeniably represents a significant 
proportion of the overall list of policies that parties focus on during an election.  Better data would allow 
for a more extensive examination of policy dimensions, but it likely is impossible to take into account 
every possible factor upon which individuals base their decisions. 
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While the format of CES data makes it impossible to determine the relative 
weight that individuals place upon each dimension,130 it is possible to determine the 
weight that each party places upon each dimension.131  Specifically, CMP data allows 
for the calculation of issue salience (or the importance which a party assigns to a 
particular dimension).132  The share of a manifesto devoted to a various topics is 
reflected in CMP category counts (which can be combined to determine salience scores 
for policy dimensions).  By considering the share of party manifestos devoted to each 
dimension, it is possible to estimate the relative importance that the parties assign to 
those dimensions.  While using party saliencies to calculate the importance of each 
dimension may be less desirable than using individuals’ preferences,133 since the latter 
                                                 
130 The 2004 CES does contain a question about which issue individuals consider to be the most 
important.  However, information on the relative importance that each respondent places upon the 
dimensions considered here is required to properly incorporate individual, rather than party, saliencies. 
131 While there will be significant variation with respect to the importance that individuals place upon 
various issues, the assumption made here is that parties design their manifestos to reflect the weight that 
they believe voters assign to each dimension (or at least the voters that they wish to attract).  In other 
words, if a party wishes to attract voters who believe that environmental policy is important, that party 
will devote a relatively large portion of its manifesto to that topic.   
132 The CMP is designed to reflect the “saliency theory” of voting.  The theory asserts that all party 
platforms endorse the same positions, with only minor exceptions.  Parties differentiate themselves by 
emphasizing issues on which they have the best reputation with voters (Budge et al., 2001).  Seen another 
way, when dealing with “valence issues” (those that virtually all voters are in agreement) parties must try 
to set themselves apart from others (Stokes, 1963).  In line with this theory, Budge (1987) notes that party 
manifestos may gloss over policy areas that opponents are deemed to have an advantage in, and 
emphasize areas that the party feels it has an advantage in (suggesting that parties can “own” an issue).  
However, the estimates of party positions here control for the share of a party’s manifesto devoted to an 
issue, thus taking the notion of issue ownership into account.  Additionally, not every issue is one-sided, 
meaning that not all parties will endorse the same position (see Table 5-III-1 in Appendix 5-III).  For 
instance, protectionist measures may be supported by some parties, and opposed by others.  By 
combining positive and negative CMP variables into a single index for each dimension, however, it is 
possible to have parties located on both sides of an issue, and to thus make the data compatible with the 
spatial theory of party competition. 
133 A concern with using manifestos to determine salience scores is the fact that voters (even those who 
support the same party) differ with respect to the importance they place upon issue or dimension.  This 
individual-level variation cannot be fully accounted for by using manifestos to determine salience scores.  
Since individual-level data of this sort are unavailable, the alternative to this approach is to weight 
dimensions equally.  This ignores the possibility, however, that some issues are clearly more important 
than others during an election.  For example, when asked which election issue is most important (and 
provided with five options), 48.8% of CES respondents answered “health care,” while only 4.3% stated 
that they believed the “environment” to be the most important.  Thus, while the approach to accounting 
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method is not an option, distances between parties and individuals are determined as 
follows: 
  
(5-2)
 
Where salience is calculated for each dimension for each party.134  The party with the 
lowest value from equation (5-2) is considered an individual’s correct vote choice.   
In order to properly compare the policy positions of individuals to those of 
parties, data from the CMP135 and CES136 must be converted to a format whereby they 
are compatible with one another.  In theory, CES questions can be matched up with the 
seven existing CMP policy domains — external relations, freedom and democracy, 
political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social 
groups (each of which is based upon a combination of CMP variables).  However, 
because the data are not created specifically with Canada in mind, there are some 
factors which do not apply in this context (for example, the CMP contains a “Marxist 
analysis” variable which is largely meant to apply to former communist countries — all 
Canadian parties have a value of 0 for this variable).  The CES poses an additional 
complication, as the questions contained in this dataset do not always correspond neatly 
with CMP policy domains.  As a result, the policy dimensions considered here do not 
match exactly with those in the CMP. 
                                                                                                                                               
for dimension salience employed here is imperfect, is it nevertheless preferable to ignoring issue salience 
altogether. 
134 The issues covered here do not account for all of the variables in the CMP, thus the sum of the salience 
values for each party do not add up to 100% (see Table 5-III-1 in Appendix 5-III for salience scores).  
Salience values are calculated by dividing the salience score for a dimension by the sum of all salience 
scores for all of the dimensions considered here (in order to control for the percentage of each manifesto 
devoted to these dimensions). 
135 CMP data are available online at: http://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ 
136 CES data are available online at: http://www.queensu.ca/cora/ces.html 
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To overcome these issues, combinations of CMP variables are used to generate 
seven new policy categories: US-Canada relations/protectionism, militarism (which is 
indicative of positions on military spending and peace), social conservatism (which 
reflects positions on traditional morality, multiculturalism, law and order and feelings 
towards women and minorities), planned vs. market economy (which taps into positions 
on the debate between government intervention and the free market), environmental 
protection,137 state-provided services and social justice (which evaluates positions on 
welfare and education spending, as well as the redistribution of wealth) and, for Quebec 
only, sovereignty.138   
For each policy dimension, scores for party and individual policy positions are 
calculated by combining multiple variables, and normalized to fit on a scale from -1 to 
1, thus making the calculation of the distance between individuals and parties using 
equation (2) possible.  Multiple CES questions are used to calculate the positions of 
individuals for each policy dimension (with the exception of the sovereignty dimension, 
where a single question is considered).  The descriptions of CMP variables provided by 
Klingemann et al. (2006) are matched with corresponding CES questions in order to 
                                                 
137 This policy dimension assumes that environmental protection and economic growth are in tension with 
one another.  While this assumption may not necessarily be true, both CMP and CES data explicitly 
accept it.  The CES contains a question about the importance of the environment relative to job creation, 
and the CMP category “anti-growth” economy is meant to take into account mentions of the relationship 
between economic growth and the environment. 
138 It is common practice for CMP variables to be combined in this fashion to create indices.  Klingeman 
et al. combine 26 CMP variables, from all seven policy domains, into a single left-right variable (2006).  
Similarly, Benoit and Laver (2007) have proposed indices for “state involvement in economy” and 
“social liberal-conservatism” and Lowe et al. (2011) have created similar indices for “free market 
economy,” “environmental protection” and “state-provided services.”  For this study, index design is 
based heavily upon the format of CES data.  As such, while ideas are borrowed from the work of previous 
scholars in this field (i.e. the state-provided services and social justice variable used here is very similar to 
the state-provided services variable proposed by Lowe et al.), most indices used here have been created 
specifically for this article (the one variable borrowed from previous work is Lowe et al.’s environmental 
protection variable).  Policy dimensions are thus selected on the basis of the availability and compatibility 
of CMP and CES data.   
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make the two scales compatible with one another.  In the case of party positions three to 
seven CMP variables are used while for individual positions two to seven CES 
questions are combined for each dimension.   
CMP variable descriptions are evaluated to determine how best to match data 
from the two datasets.  For example, the ‘State Provided Services and Social Justice’ 
dimension is based upon four CES questions and five CMP variables.  The CES 
questions ask respondents if the government should spend more, less or about the same 
on welfare, healthcare and education, respectively, and if more or less should be done to 
reduce the gap between the rich and poor.  The CMP variables for this dimension are 
based upon welfare state expansion and limitation, education expansion and limitation, 
and social justice.  The welfare state CMP variables are based upon mention of 
healthcare, child care, elder care and social housing, and correspond with the CES 
questions on healthcare, welfare and the rich/poor divide.  The education variables are 
based upon mention of a need to expand or limit education expenditures, and 
correspond with the CES education question.  Finally, the social justice variable taps 
into concepts like the need for special protection for the underprivileged, the fair 
distribution of resources and the removal of class barriers.  This variable thus 
corresponds nicely with the CES question on reducing the gap between rich and poor.  
The CMP and CES data included here were thus carefully chosen carefully as to ensure 
compatibility.  The variables used to calculate party139 and individual positions are 
                                                 
139 Overall party positions were calculated by averaging the positions from all dimensions (excluding 
sovereignty).  From left to right (on a scale from -1 to 1), the NDP has a score of -0.53, the Bloc -0.29, 
the Liberals +0.07, and the Conservatives +0.35.  This fits with conventional wisdom that the 
Conservatives are a right-wing party, the Liberals a centrist party, and the NDP and Bloc are social 
democratic, left-wing parties (Johnston, 2008, placed the parties in these same relative positions in his 
Canadian Political Science Association presidential address).  This finding provides some external 
validation of party estimates. 
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listed in Appendices 5-I and 5-II140 respectively.  Appendix 5-III contains a detailed 
description of how CMP and CES data are converted to scores ranging from  -1 to 1, as 
well as descriptive statistics for estimates for each party and individual policy 
dimension. 
 A few other important methodological details should be mentioned.  The 
analysis conducted here considers the 2004 federal election.  The CMP does not yet 
have data on the 2008 election, and the 2006 CES does not contain a mail-back portion 
of the survey (meaning that it has far fewer questions that can be used to determine 
individuals’ positions).  2004 is thus the most recent Canadian election for which data 
are available.  Additionally, due to differences in party systems Quebec is considered 
independently from the rest of Canada (ROC).  Additionally, since the CMP has no 
information on the Green Party or other minor parties, only the Liberals, Conservatives, 
NDP and Bloc are considered, and individuals who did not vote for these major parties 
are excluded from the following analysis.   
Finally, to examine the impact of the campaign period upon correct voting, 
individuals are classified on the basis of attentiveness141 and TOVD.  A dummy variable 
for attentiveness is created to allow for comparison of relatively attentive and 
inattentive individuals.  The validity of TOVD responses is evaluated using McGregor’s 
                                                 
140 Cronbach’s alpha scores, based upon CES data, for the dimensions based upon multiple questions 
range from roughly 0.5 to 0.6 (values of 0.7 or greater generally are considered desirable).  This measure 
is indicative of how highly correlated survey responses for the questions included in each dimension are 
with one another, and can be used as evidence that factors included in indices of this nature tap into some 
common, latent variable.  More important than high alpha scores, however, is that the CES and CMP 
variables being compared to one another are indeed compatible.  A slightly low alpha score is acceptable 
if the survey questions correspond closely to the CMP variables.  The discussion of the “state provide 
services and social justice” dimension above provides an example of matching variables in this manner. 
141 Attentiveness scores are based upon a series of questions on how much attention respondents claim to 
have paid to various forms of media (on a scale from 0-10).  The highest value from these questions is 
used to assign attentiveness scores.  Individuals who have an attentiveness value above the sample’s 
mean are considered highly attentive, and those below the mean are considered inattentive. 
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(working paper) partially restrictive method, and cases with invalid responses are 
removed from the dataset.142 
 
5.3 - CORRECT VOTING RATES 
Before combining political dimensions to identify a single correct vote for each 
individual it is worthwhile to briefly evaluate each dimension of political competition 
individually.  Table 5-1 contains the correct voting results, by dimension, for ROC and 
Quebec respectively.143  Note that since the Liberals, NDP, and Conservatives all have 
the same position in the sovereignty dimension, they are grouped together in that 
segment of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 Contrary to McGregor’s research note, of this dissertation, all five TOVD groups are evaluated here 
(rather than combining the pre-debate, around debate, and after-debate groups into one period).  Since 
only one election is being considered, comparisons to later elections are not made, thus it is unnecessary 
to collapse these TOVD groups (the findings in Figure 5-1 do not change, however, even if these 
categories are collapsed).  However, CES respondents with a TOVD that matches their interview dates 
are retained here (rather than being thrown out, as the fully restrictive approach, outlined in the research 
note, suggests).   
143 Results in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 are based upon unweighted CES data.  However, when national weights 
are applied, while the values in Table 5-1 change slightly, the trends remain the same. 
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TABLE 5-1:  RATES OF CORRECT VOTING BY POLICY DIMENSION 
Policy 
Dimension 
  ROC Quebec 
  LIB CON NDP LIB CON NDP Bloc 
Foreign special 
Relationship/ 
Protectionism 
% who should vote  4.4 59.4 36.2 1.5 13.2 23.4 61.9 
% of those who should that do 15.6 46.5 32.4 75.0 11.4 12.9 53.0 
% of those who do that should 1.9 65.0 57.7 4.1 14.3 47.1 60.8 
Overall rate of Correct voting 40.1 38.5 
Militarism 
% who should vote  5.5 14.7 79.8 2.3 2.5 76.2 19.0 
% of those who should that do 26.8 73.6 23.2 45.5 25.0 6.6 28.6 
% of those who do that should 4.0 25.8 88.9 3.0 6.7 81.5 10.9 
Overall rate of Correct voting 30.8 11.7 
Social 
Conservatism 
% who should vote  50.3 32.5 17.2 14.4 14.8 18.9 51.9 
% of those who should that do 38.7 60.9 39.3 21.1 17.9 16.0 51.8 
% of those who do that should 52.3 15.9 32.9 10.4 25.0 47.1 50.0 
Overall rate of Correct voting 46.0 35.6 
Planned vs. 
Market 
Economy 
% who should vote  53.9 5.6 40.5 56.9 3.4 33.2 6.6 
% of those who should that do 36.9 81.4 30.6 37.2 31.3 8.9 45.2 
% of those who do that should 53.3 11.0 59.4 60.6 11.1 51.9 5.9 
Overall rate of Correct voting 36.9 28.1 
Environmental 
Protection 
% who should vote  66.3 7.3 26.4 63.5 0.0 28.9 7.5 
% of those who should that do 36.1 34.7 28.8 29.6 n/a 11.7 65.0 
% of those who do that should 64.4 5.9 37.9 64.9 n/a 52.9 9.0 
Overall rate of Correct voting 34.0 27.1 
State Provided 
Services and 
Social Justice 
% who should vote  15.1 56.3 28.7 19.3 17.2 37.1 26.4 
% of those who should that do 44.6 52.4 27.0 29.3 7.3 5.6 39.7 
% of those who do that should 18.1 69.8 37.2 16.1 13.3 38.5 21.0 
Overall rate of Correct voting 43.9 19.5 
Sovereignty 
% who should vote  
   
53.5 46.5 
% of those who should that do 
   
82.9 87.4 
% of those who do that should 
   
88.4 81.6 
Overall rate of Correct voting       85.0 
 
 
For each dimension Table 5-1 shows (a) the percentage of individuals that 
should vote for a party, (b) among those that should vote for a party, the percentage that 
actually do, (c) among those who do vote for a party, the percentage that actually 
should, and (d) overall levels of correct voting.  Whereas (b) is indicative of how 
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successful parties are at attracting those voters who should be voting for them, (c) 
reflects how successful parties are at attracting voters who should not support them.  A 
party that receives most of the votes it should, while at the same time getting a large 
share of its votes from individuals who should be supporting other parties, will likely be 
quite successful.  A high value indicates success for parties for (b), while a low value is 
desirable for (c). 
Considering that if voters were to cast their ballots randomly, 33% of people 
could be expected to vote correctly in ROC (since only three major parties are present) 
and 25% in Quebec (with 4 parties), the results for (d) in Table 5-1 are only minimally 
encouraging.  While in almost all cases observed rates of correct voting surpass these 
values (the exception being militarism in Quebec), the results remain far below the 75% 
found by Lau and Redlawsk (1997) for US Presidential elections and the greater than 
70% success rate calculated by Lau et al. (2008b) for the 2004 Canadian Federal 
Election (this second difference is not surprising considering the significant 
methodological differences between that study and the approach used here).   
The overall rates of correct voting may provide some insight into which issues 
individuals see as most important, or perhaps which issues individuals seem to know 
more about.  If a perfectly-informed individual agrees with one party on some issues 
and another party on others, this conflicted individual may choose to base his or her 
vote upon a dimension that is of the greatest importance to him or her.  Similarly, if an 
individual only knows about one issue (perhaps the most high profile issue in a 
campaign), this individual might be expected to vote based upon this dimension.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest correct voting rates are found in Quebec along the 
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sovereignty dimension.  While results from this dimension are not directly comparable 
to other data in Table 5-1 (due to differences in data format), the fact that the Bloc was 
highly successful in attracting those who should vote for them based upon this 
dimension (87.4% of respondents who should have voted Bloc in this dimension did so 
— the highest value in Table 5-1) indicates the importance of this dimension.  
Conversely, correct voting rates are lowest for the militarism dimension.  Again, this 
could suggest either that voters do not assign a high degree of importance to this issue, 
or that they are unknowledgeable with respect to the party positions in this dimension. 
 Based upon single dimensions alone, there are some cases where parties should 
receive very little, or even none of the vote.  For example, the Conservatives should 
have no voters based upon the environmental protection dimension, while the Liberals 
should only attract 0.4% of the vote in the foreign special relationship/protectionism 
dimension.  On the other hand, the Conservatives should be highly successful in the 
state-provided services and social justice dimension, and the Liberals should receive the 
support of a majority of votes based upon the social conservatism, planned vs. market 
economy and environmental protection dimensions.  In very few cases, however, when 
values for (a) surpass 50% do values for (b) also go above 50%.  In other words, when 
parties should seemingly have a “lock” in a dimension, they generally are unable to 
capitalize substantially.  On the other hand, there are a number of cases where values of 
(c) are very low, suggesting that parties which should not be successful in a dimension 
are, in fact, getting the support of voters who should not (at least when one dimension is 
considered) be voting for them.  This could mean that parties are either attracting 
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individuals on the basis of other dimensions, or that voters simply do not have an 
accurate knowledge of party positions. 
To properly determine rates of correct voting, however, all dimensions must be 
considered simultaneously.  Again, elections are rarely, if ever, fought along a single 
dimension (at least for all voters), and different combinations of dimensional distances 
between voters and parties and the salience of each issue theoretically can produce 
overall rates of correct voting that vary substantially from those contained in Table 5-1.  
As such, Table 5-2 shows information on overall rates of correct voting, calculated 
using equation (5-2). 
TABLE 5-2:  OVERALL RATES OF CORRECT VOTING 
  ROC (n = 952) Quebec (n = 256) 
  LIB CON NDP LIB CON NDP Bloc 
% who should vote  22.1 33.9 44.0 12.1 10.2 28.5 49.2 
% of those who should that 
do 41.4 66.9 29.8 54.8 34.6 13.7 88.9 
% of those who do that 
should 24.2 54.3 64.4 23.6 32.1 58.8 80.6 
Overall rate of Correct voting 45.0 57.8 
 
The overall rates of correct voting are 45.0% in ROC and 57.8% in Quebec.144  
The value for Quebec is buoyed by the ability of the Bloc to attract a significant 
percentage of voters that should vote for them (88.9%).  Nationally, the overall correct 
voting rate in 2004 is 47.5%.145  Overall, it is the NDP that suffers the most from its 
inability to attract voters that should be voting for the party.  Only 29.8% and 13.7% of 
individuals that should be supporting the party, in ROC and Quebec respectively, end 
up doing so.  On the other hand, it is the Liberal Party that benefits most from incorrect 
                                                 
144 Correct voting rates are slightly lower when dimensions are not weighted to take salience into account: 
39% in ROC, and 56.6% in Quebec. 
145 This value is calculating using a national sampling weight.  The unweighted value is 47.7%. 
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voting.  In both ROC and Quebec, less than a quarter of individuals that vote for the 
party should be voting Liberal.  For their parts, the Conservatives and Bloc have similar 
values for their respective (b) and (c) scores, indicating that they come out relatively 
even with respect to the balance between not attracting voters they should and attracting 
voters they should not be able to.   
 Among the CES respondents included in this study, party vote shares for the 
2004 election were as follows:  Liberals: 35.8%, Conservatives: 35.3%, NDP: 17.4% 
and the Bloc: 11.5.146  If these same individuals had voted “correctly” the results would 
have been as follows:  Liberals, 20.0%; Conservatives, 28.9%; NDP, 40.7%; and the 
Bloc, 10.0%.  In other words, every party except the NDP benefitted from incorrect 
voting, while the NDP was punished significantly by this phenomenon. 147  The results 
indicate that the median voter seems to be closer to the NDP than election results would 
suggest.148  While it is difficult to say what exactly an acceptable level of correct voting 
is, the fact that a different party would theoretically have won the election had everyone 
                                                 
146 This differs somewhat from the actual election results because the sample here is not representative of 
the population (for instance, Quebec is oversampled in the CES).  Recall also that individuals who 
supported minor parties or candidates are excluded here. 
147 It might be argued that one reason why the NDP are the “correct” vote choice for so many voters is 
because, since the party had no realistic chance of forming government in 2004, it had the privilege of 
being able to largely ignore budget constraints.  For instance, the party could propose spending increases 
and/or tax freezes or cuts without having to worry about actually implementing and being held 
accountable for their decisions.  Such policies are obviously popular among the electorate, even if they 
are not necessarily financially sound.  However, members of the public who might be aware of the fact 
that the NDP is able to ignore budget constraints might reasonably be expected to vote for a different 
party (they would thus be classified as “incorrect” here).  Future work can evaluate whether correct 
voting patterns are influenced by political knowledge of this nature. 
148 The results challenge Benoit and Laver’s (2004) assumption that election results and knowledge of 
party policy stances can be combined to estimate the position of the median voter.  Such an approach is 
based upon the notion of “revealed preferences.”  That is, the assumption here is that individuals, by 
definition, prefer the candidate that they voted for.  Lau and Redlawsk (2006) reject this assumption as a 
“pretty unrealistic description of human behaviour.”  Simply put, individuals do not always make utility-
maximizing decisions.  
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voted correctly is, to say the least, a significant finding.149  The party that “should” have 
formed government in 2004 was instead relegated to fourth place.150   
 
5.4 - CORRECT VOTING AND THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD 
Now that the rate of correct voting has been estimated, this article turns to 
explore the impact that the campaign period has upon correct voting rates.  If correct 
voting is desirable, as is argued here, then the campaign can be said to have a positive 
impact if it improves the ability of the electorate to vote correctly.  That is, if voters are 
able to use the campaign period to gather information about party policies and match 
those policies with their own preferences, the campaign can be said to have a 
constructive effect.  Alternatively, if voters are either unwilling or unable to use the 
campaign period to improve the quality of their vote choices, it could suggest that 
campaigns are having a negative impact upon the level of correct voting.  If so, it might 
be argued that the campaign contributed to the arguably low rate of correct voting 
estimated above. 
The data suggest that attention to the campaign is positively correlated with 
voting correctly.  The cross-tabulation of these variables indicates that attentive voters 
have higher correct voting rates than inattentive voters.  52.6% of attentive voters 
(n=568) voted correctly, while this value is only 43.8% for inattentive voters (n=539)151 
(recall that the overall rate of correct voting is 47.5%).  Results also suggest, however, 
                                                 
149 It is possible, even with low levels of correct voting, to have an election result that mirrors the result 
that should occur if everyone votes correctly.  This would occur if each party gained roughly the same 
number of incorrect votes as it lost.  This does not, however, turn out to be the case here. 
150 Since it has never formed government at the federal level, many voters simply do not see the NDP as a 
viable option, which may in part explain its poor performance.  Nevertheless, it is almost certainly the 
case that many voters who should see themselves as closest to the NDP failed to do so. 
151 A chi-square test shows the difference between these groups to be significant at the 99% level. 
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that late-campaign deciders tend to be less attentive than pre-campaign deciders.  The 
share of pre-campaign deciders who are highly attentive is 55.1%, compared to 47.7% 
for voters who made their vote decisions during the campaign.  The fact that 
attentiveness and correct voting are related to one another, therefore, is insufficient to 
argue that the campaign period has a positive impact upon correct voting rates. 
This impact can be evaluated by employing TOVD as a moderating variable 
between these two factors (the 2004 CES presents respondents with five TOVD options:  
pre-campaign, before the debates, during or just after the debates,152 the last two weeks 
of the campaign and election day153).  Once again, if campaigns do help individuals to 
vote correctly, we would expect to find three patterns.  First, attention to the campaign 
should not influence rates of correct voting among pre-campaign deciders.  Second, 
among campaign deciders, attention to the campaign should increase one’s chances of 
voting correctly.  Finally, if attention to the campaign does have a positive impact upon 
correct voting rates, late deciders should have higher rates of correct voting than should 
early deciders. 
To evaluate these expectations, the attentiveness variable has been interacted 
with TOVD, and regressed onto a binary correct voting variable (correct/incorrect).  
The predicted probability of voting correctly for each TOVD period has been calculated 
for high- and low-attention voters, and the lines of best fit for these values have been 
graphed — these results are shown in Figure 5-1.  Several variables expected to 
                                                 
152 The debates were held on June 14th and 15th.  This TOVD period was coded to cover the 14th to the 
16th (the additional day was included to account for people who decided “just after” the debates). 
153 48.9% of respondents are classified as pre-campaign deciders, 14.0% decided before the debates, 7.2% 
decided during or just after the debates, 19.2% after the debates, while the remaining 10.8% of 
respondents have an election-day TOVD. 
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influence correct voting rates (namely age,154 partisanship155, party choice156, voter 
motivation157 and a Quebec variable158) are included as controls in the model (the 
regression results for this model are shown in Appendix 5-IV).159 
FIGURE 5-1:  TOVD AND CORRECT VOTING BY ATTENTIVENESS 
 
 
                                                 
154 Lau et al. 2008b and Walgrave et al. (2009) find age to be related to correct voting.  The argument is 
that older voters are more experienced and are better able to correctly identify the party which best 
reflects their own preferences. 
155 Lau et al. (2008a) posit that heuristics are positively related to correct voting. 
156 Walgrave et al., 2009, suggest that supporters of the winning party will be more likely to vote 
incorrectly – this is one of the reasons why the party wins. 
157 Lau et al., 2008b, argue that motivated individuals are more likely to vote correctly.  Those individuals 
who disagree with the statement that “All federal parties are basically the same; there isn’t really a 
choice” are considered motivated. 
158 Lau et al., 2008a and Walgrave et al., 2009  suggest that voting correctly should be more difficult if 
more viable parties are contesting the election.  However, Table 5-2 reveals a higher rate of correct voting 
rate in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.  Regardless, this variable is included to account for this 
difference. 
159 When not controlling for these other factors, the patterns observed here remain unchanged. 
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The results in Figure 5-1 are compatible with two of the three expectations 
discussed above.  First, as was expected, there is no statistically significant difference in 
the correct voting rates of attentive and inattentive pre-campaign deciders.  Campaign 
period information is not factored into the decisions of these voters, and any learning 
that these individuals do during the course of the campaign has no impact upon their 
vote choice.  Figure 5-1 is also compatible with the expectation that attentive campaign 
deciders will have higher rates of correct voting than will inattentive campaign-period 
deciders.  Attentive individuals with a TOVD ranging from the debates to election-day 
have a correct voting rate of 45.2%, compared to only 34.8% for inattentive individuals 
with the same TOVD.160  For campaign deciders, therefore, attentiveness does appear to 
improve the likelihood that one will vote correctly. 
The findings in Figure 5-1 conflict, however, with the third expectation listed 
above.  In order to safely conclude that the campaign period has a positive impact upon 
correct voting rates, late campaign-period deciders should be found to be more likely to 
vote correctly than should pre-campaign deciders.  This is, however, the opposite of 
what has been observed here.  Despite the fact that late deciders have additional time to 
absorb campaign information before making their decisions, it is pre-campaign deciders 
who have the highest rates of correct voting.  Overall, pre-campaign deciders also have 
the highest correct voting rate, at 54.9%, followed by pre-debate (44.5%), around 
debate (44.4%), post-debate (40.1%) and election-day (35.3%) deciders.161  This pattern 
                                                 
160 This difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  There is no statistically 
significant difference in the correct voting rates of early-campaign deciders on the basis of attentiveness. 
There is no statistically-significant difference in the correct voting rates of attentive and inattentive pre-
debate deciders.  These individuals have relatively little time to collect campaign information before 
making their decisions, so it is unsurprising that they behave like pre-campaign deciders in this respect.  
161 The sample size is 1055.  With the exception of pre-debate and debate deciders, all differences are 
statistically significant at the 99% level. 
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holds for both the high- and low-attention groups.  High-attention election-day deciders 
have a correct voting rate almost 15 percentage points lower than do high-attention pre-
campaign deciders, while the corresponding value for low-attention voters is over 
22%.162  Thus, while being attentive during the campaign does help undecided voters 
identify their ‘correct’ vote choice, those voters who are decided before the campaign 
begins are the most likely to vote correctly.   
In summary, then, paying attention to the campaign does improve the chances of 
voting correctly for campaign period deciders, while attentiveness has no relationship 
with correct voting for pre-campaign deciders.  However, campaign period deciders 
have been found to have lower levels of correct voting than pre-campaign deciders, and 
this difference holds among high and low attention groups.  It is therefore difficult to 
argue, at least on the basis of this information, that the campaign period has a positive 
impact upon the legitimacy and quality of Canadian democracy, at least as far as correct 
voting rates are concerned. 
 
5.5 - CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to the growing literature on the study of correct voting 
and provides researchers with a new way of operationalizing party policy positions.  
Data from the Comparative Manifestos Project are reliable (since they are based upon 
statements from parties themselves), determined through an objective measurement 
process and publicly available for 55 countries.  In contrast to existing approaches, this 
new method focuses exclusively upon policy when evaluating the ability of voters to 
                                                 
162 These differences are statistically significant at the 95% and 99% level respectively. 
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identify the party that best corresponds with their individual beliefs and preferences.  It 
thus excludes some of the factors considered in previous studies of correct voting that 
can serve to bias estimates of rates of correct voting upwards (such as party 
identification), or which have only a tenuous relationship with government outputs 
(including group association). 
While the data considered here are Canadian, this new approach can be applied 
to other settings and can be tailored to take country-specific policy issues and 
dimensions into account.  Specialization of this nature is desirable, as it allows for the 
creation of country-specific explorations of correct voting patterns.  The inclusion of the 
sovereignty dimension in Canada is an excellent example of why such an approach is 
attractive.  This dimension is vital to political competition in Quebec in particular, and 
helps to explain why rates of correct voting are higher in that province than in ROC.  
On the other hand, because of the importance of this dimension, Quebecers exhibit 
lower rates of correct voting in all other dimensions than do voters in ROC.  This 
method thus allows researchers to consider the relative importance of each dimension of 
political competition. 
This new method should also be applied in future work to help explain correct 
voting patterns.  The rate of correct voting calculated here for the 2004 Canadian 
federal election arguably is low — fewer than half of CES respondents were found to 
have voted for the party that best reflects their individual policy preferences.  The fact 
that Canadian parties have been described as brokerage parties (suggesting that they are 
non-ideological in nature and aim for consensus building) (Brodie and Jensen, 1996), 
may or may not have contributed to this finding.  Nevertheless, CMP data reveal 
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significant differences between the parties in many dimensions (see Appendix 5-III), 
meaning that, in most dimensions, it should not be too difficult for knowledgeable 
voters to distinguish between the parties.  The results suggest that the majority of 
respondents were either unable to identify the party that best represents their views, or 
were for some reason unwilling to vote for the “correct” party (e.g. they may have 
considered the mechanical effects of the electoral system when making their vote 
decisions).  Future research can apply the method introduced here to explain this 
outcome more fully, and to calculate and explain correct voting rates in other settings.   
Evaluation of the relationship between attention to the campaign and correct 
voting has provided some validation of this new method, as attention has been found 
above to be positively correlated with correct voting.  Employing TOVD as a 
moderating variable has provided additional insight into the exact nature of the 
relationship between these factors, and has revealed that attentiveness does have a 
positive impact upon correct voting rates for campaign deciders, and no impact for pre-
campaign deciders.  However, while being attentive during the campaign does increase 
the chances of voting correctly for campaign-period deciders, the fact is that pre-
campaign deciders (who have made up their minds without the benefit of campaign 
period information) have the highest rates of correct voting.  There are a number of 
potential reasons for this.  For instance, it may be that media coverage during the course 
of a campaign focuses primarily upon non-policy matters (examples of non-policy 
based political stories from the recent 2011 Canadian federal election include 
allegations that the Conservative Party acted inappropriately in evicting students from 
party rallies, or that the leader of the NDP visited an illegal massage parlour in the 
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1990s).  Alternatively, those campaign period deciders who claim to be attentive may 
be seeking out information that is not policy-based.  In other words, either the media or 
voters themselves may be focusing on politics, but not on policy, which can be 
problematic if focusing on these other factors causes voters to be persuaded to vote 
incorrectly.  More research is, of course, required to examine these possibilities.  
Another interpretation of the results would be to suggest that campaigns do help 
citizens to vote correctly, provided that voters are attentive, but that it may be 
insufficient to only be attentive during the campaign period.  If one wishes to vote 
correctly it may be important to also pay attention to politics between campaigns.  
While the CES does not contain a question on how attentive voters are between 
elections, general knowledge (as measured through a series of questions which are not 
campaign specific) can be used as a proxy for this factor.  CES data reveal that attentive 
pre-campaign deciders have higher levels of general political knowledge than do 
attentive campaign deciders.163  Thus, while both groups are coded as being attentive 
during the campaign, the group with higher general political knowledge has a higher 
rate of correct voting.  This could suggest that, even without campaign specific 
knowledge, voters who are attentive between campaigns are able to predict which 
parties are most likely to put forward various policy proposals.  The chances that the 
left-wing NDP will propose an increase in military spending, for example, are relatively 
low compared to the chances that the right-wing Conservatives will make the same 
promise (which the Conservatives did in 2004).  These voters thus may not need to wait 
for the release of official party platforms in order to know enough to vote correctly.  If 
                                                 
163 As determined by creating a dummy variable for general knowledge, similar to that created for 
attentiveness.  76.2% of attentive pre-campaign deciders have high general knowledge, while the value is 
67.7% for attentive campaign period deciders.  This difference is significant at the 99% level. 
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this is the case, then the solution to concerns about the quality of the average voter may 
be as simple as convincing the electorate of the importance of being attentive to and 
knowledgeable about politics before, during and after the campaign period.  Such a 
modest project is, however, best left for another time. 
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6 –  VALIDATION OF TIME-OF-VOTING-DECISION 
RECALL:  RETHINKING EXCLUSION CRITERIA AND 
DATA FORMAT (RESEARCH NOTE) 
 
 
The validity of survey data is important to many fields of inquiry.  If survey 
participants give incorrect responses, conclusions of studies based upon such data are 
meaningless; it is impossible to properly explore relationships between variables when 
one or more of those variables are based upon significantly flawed data.  Inaccurate data 
will, at best, introduce noise into a study’s results, thus reducing the certainty of 
conclusions.  At worst, they can introduce bias, which could lead to inaccurate 
conclusions.   
One variable that political scientists have been especially concerned about with 
respect to validity is time-of-voting-decision (TOVD) recall (see Campbell et al., 1954; 
Plumb, 1986; Chaffee and Rimal, 1996).   In national election studies around the world, 
this variable is measured through a post-election question which asks respondents to 
report when vote decisions became final.  There are concerns, however, that 
respondents may not be able to recall accurately when a vote decision is made 
(Campbell et al. 1954), that it may not always be possible to determine when one’s 
mind is made up if such a decision is made unconsciously (Plumb, 1986), or that 
respondents may intentionally be dishonest and provide researchers with responses 
thought to be socially acceptable (Bradburn et al., 1979).  Not surprisingly, then, studies 
of American data have found TOVD recall to be largely invalid, with validity rates 
estimated as low as 40%  (Plumb, 1986) or 58% (Chaffee and Rimal, 1996).  
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In spite of the American findings and general concerns about the quality of 
TOVD recall data, Canadian TOVD data have been found to be largely reliable.  
Fournier et al. (2001) examine data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study (CES), and 
conclude that CES TOVD recall data reflect a “good approximation” (100) of actual 
TOVD results in this country.  The authors find the voting behaviour of roughly 80% of 
respondents to be consistent with reported TOVD.  This difference between the 
American and Canadian data may be a result of the different methodologies employed 
to explore TOVD validity, variations in campaign lengths, American and Canadian 
questionnaires,164 party systems, political cultures or other factors.  Whatever the 
reason(s), the fact that TOVD recall can generally be considered valid in Canada means 
that, while American data must be treated with caution, this variable is of use in 
Canada, and has the potential to be applied to countries with similar political systems 
and electoral studies (such as Great Britain or Australia). 
The goals of this research note are to build upon Fournier et al.’s work to 
suggest a new method of sorting election study respondents on the basis of TOVD 
validity, to provide justification for this new method, and to illustrate the importance of 
the removal of invalid cases.  Fournier et al. not only show that CES TOVD recall data 
are relatively accurate, but their paper suggests a method which allows for the 
identification of invalid cases.  Their approach, and the approach introduced here, can 
be applied to any country that has an election study with pre-and post-election 
components.   
                                                 
164 The NES has many more TOVD options than does the CES, and covers a much longer period of time.  
This stems from the fact that American campaigns (including primaries) are much longer than those in 
Canada. 
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TOVD recall validity is determined on the basis of three factors.  The first, 
TOVD recall, is measured through a single post-election question.  The options 
provided to respondents can vary, but for example, the options in the 2004 CES are:  
before the campaign, before the debates, just after/during the debates, last two weeks of 
campaign and election-day.  The second factor is the stability of vote intention/choice 
between the pre- and post-election CES questionnaires.  If pre-election vote intention 
does not match post-election vote choice the respondent is considered ‘unstable’ (this 
includes individuals who express no vote preference during the campaign).  Otherwise, 
respondents are classified as having a stable vote preference.  The third factor is the date 
of each respondent’s pre-election interview.  The CES employs a rolling cross-section 
design, meaning that the date of the pre-election questionnaire can vary significantly 
(interviews generally begin on the first day of the campaign and conclude the day 
before the election).  Interview dates can be matched with TOVD time periods.  TOVD 
validity is determined by comparing interview date to the stability of vote choice.165  
Table 6-1 shows the possible combinations of these variables. 
TABLE 6-1:  STABILITY OF VOTE CHOICE VS. INTERVIEW DATE 
  
Stable vote 
preference  
Unstable vote 
preference 
TOVD before interview Scenario 1 (S1) Scenario 2 (S2) 
TOVD matches interview Scenario 3 (S3) Scenario 4 (S4) 
TOVD after interview Scenario 5 (S5) Scenario 6 (S6) 
 
Fournier et al.’s method (hereafter referred to as the “fully restrictive” approach) 
classifies the TOVD responses of S1 cases as valid.  For these cases reported TOVD is 
before the pre-election questionnaire, and the pre- and post-election vote choices 
                                                 
165 The assumption made here, and by Fournier et al., is that responses to other questions are valid. 
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correspond with one another.  Unstable respondents who claim to have a TOVD earlier 
than the pre-election questionnaire (S2) are considered invalid.  If a vote choice is made 
prior to the pre-election interview, pre- and post-election vote choice responses should 
match.  Also considered invalid are S5 cases, for whom reported TOVD is after the 
interview and vote choice is stable.  S6 cases (those with a reported TOVD after the 
pre-election interview) are considered valid; vote choice should not be stable if a 
decision has yet to be made.  Notably, Fournier et al. exclude S3 and S4 respondents 
from their analysis, not because these cases are considered invalid, but because validity 
cannot be determined (when the interview and TOVD periods coincide it is impossible 
to determine if interviews were conducted before or after a vote decision is made).  The 
80% overall validity rate reported by Fournier et al. authors does not consider S3 and 
S4 cases.166  In summary then, S1 and S6 cases are considered valid, S2 and S5 cases 
invalid, and the validity of S3 and S4 cases is indeterminate. 
Excluding S3 and S4 cases, however, has become especially problematic since 
the format of the TOVD question was changed in 2006.  In that iteration of the CES, the 
number of TOVD options available to respondents was reduced from five to three 
                                                 
166 While the fully restrictive approach discards S3 and S4 cases because their TOVD validity is 
uncertain, S1 and S5 cases are classified as valid, despite the fact that their validity is uncertain.  S1 
respondents are considered valid since vote choice is stable, and reported TOVD falls before the pre-
election interview.  However, it is possible that some S1 respondents change their mind between the time 
of their pre-election interview and election day, only to change their opinions again, with their preference 
returning to the party that they initially stated a preference for (thus making TOVD recall invalid).  A 
similar concern applies to S5 respondents, who are considered unreliable since their reported TOVD is 
after the pre-election interview, yet their vote choice responses are stable.  These voters also could have 
changed their minds twice (or more) between the two sets of interviews, eventually returning to their 
initial preference (thus making their TOVD recall valid).  Consequently, even if a vote preference is 
coded as stable, there is no way to know if these preferences change between interviews.  The only way 
to avoid this problem would be to interview respondents more frequently during the course of the 
campaign to monitor the stability of vote preferences more closely during the campaign, and even then, 
there may be unobserved attitude changes between interview points. Accordingly, there may be some S1 
respondents coded as valid that should not be, and some S5 respondents coded as invalid who should not 
be.   
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(before the campaign, during the campaign, and on election-day).167  Since all pre-
election questionnaires are administered during the campaign, all individuals with a 
reported TOVD during that period would be classified as either S3 or S4 and removed 
under the fully restrictive approach.  Accordingly, the exclusion criteria employed by 
the fully restrictive approach must be re-evaluated. 
I propose two modifications to the fully restrictive approach.  First, S3 and S4 
respondents should not be discarded.  This change deals with the issue of collapsing the 
campaign-period TOVD alternatives into a single option, and serves to increase the 
sample size for analyses where TOVD is included as a variable.  Whereas Fournier et 
al.’s approach is conservative in that it removes S3 and S4 cases because TOVD 
validity is unknown, the method introduced here takes the opposite approach.  The 
format of CES data since 2006 dictates that these cases must be retained, despite their 
uncertain validity.  However, if the 80% validity rate observed by Fournier et al. holds 
for these voters, the noise introduced by the inclusion of such individuals is likely to be 
less harmful than the loss in sample size caused by their removal.  Indeed, in elections 
where only three TOVD options are provided to respondents, if S3 and S4 cases are 
removed, the only TOVD groups that can be compared are pre-campaign and election-
day deciders.  This omits a sizable portion of the electorate, including an entire TOVD 
group, and clearly is unacceptable. 
Second, to allow for comparison between elections, TOVD recall responses are 
reduced to three options (pre-campaign, during the campaign, and election-day), even 
when more options are available in the data.  While a higher number of options allows 
                                                 
167 This change no doubt reflects the fact that this campaign was unusually long (55 days versus the usual 
36), and included four debates instead of the usual two. 
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for more variation on this variable, the fact that the CES question was changed in 2006 
means that focusing only upon three TOVD options is necessary when evaluating 
TOVD trends over time.  Furthermore, even when five options are available, the length 
of the TOVD periods may differ dramatically from one election to the next.  For 
instance, the ‘before debates’ period is 22 days long for the 2000 election, but only 15 
days in 1997.  TOVD validity can still be evaluated for campaign deciders (with three 
TOVD options instead of five).  Since all campaign period respondents will now be 
grouped together, this modification means that fewer S2 and S5 respondents will be 
coded as invalid.  This new method of sorting individuals on the basis of TOVD validity 
is termed here the “partially restrictive” approach. 
To summarize, the partially restrictive approach does not exclude S3 and S4 
respondents, and considers only one campaign period TOVD option (as well as 
election-day).  Table 6-2 shows TOVD patterns for raw CES data, and the cases 
remaining after the fully and partially restrictive approaches are applied for four recent 
Canadian Federal Elections.168  For the partially restrictive results from 2000 and 2004, 
campaign-period deciders are grouped together as ‘campaign deciders’ when evaluating 
TOVD validity.  For illustrative purposes, however, all five TOVD periods are shown 
for these elections.  In other words, cases are sorted as though these individuals fall into 
the ‘campaign period’ TOVD category, but the valid cases are then disaggregated to 
allow for a comparison of the fully and partially restrictive approaches in the table. 
 
 
                                                 
168 All analyses here exclude non-voters, those who do not know when the decision was made and those 
who refuse to provide survey responses. 
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TABLE 6-2:  CLASSIFICATION OF TOVD VALIDITY BY LEVEL OF 
RESTRICTION 
      2000 2004 2006 2008 
 Total N   1881 2206 2518 1735 
Raw Data TOVD 
Before Campaign 52.0% 49.2% 57.2% 52.4% 
First two weeks 
of campaign 10.2% 12.5% 
29.2% 32.8% Around debates 8.7% 6.5% 
Last two weeks 
of campaign 16.5% 18.4% 
Election-day 12.6% 13.4% 13.6% 14.8% 
Fully 
Restrictive 
% cases 
removed  
Scenario 2 9.4% 7.7% 7.3% 7.8% 
Scenarios 3 and 4 21.1% 20.8% 29.2% 32.8% 
Scenario 5 2.1% 2.6% 2.9% 3.5% 
Retained (%) 67.4% 68.9% 60.6% 55.9% 
Retained (N) 1268 1521 1525 970 
TOVD 
of 
retained 
cases 
Before Campaign 63.2% 60.3% 82.4% 79.9% 
First two weeks 
of campaign 7.2% 6.2% 
0.0% 0.0% Around debates 7.0% 5.3% 
Last two weeks 
of campaign 7.1% 12.4% 
Election-day 15.5% 15.7% 17.6% 20.1% 
Partially 
Restrictive 
% cases 
removed  
Scenario 2 9.4% 7.7% 7.3% 7.8% 
Scenarios 3 and 4 6.4% 7.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Scenario 5 2.1% 2.6% 2.9% 3.5% 
Retained (%) 82.1% 82.6% 89.8% 88.7% 
Retained N 1544 1821 2260 1539 
TOVD 
of 
retained 
cases 
Before Campaign 51.9% 50.4% 55.6% 50.4% 
First two weeks 
of campaign 10.9% 14.1% 
32.5% 37.0% Around debates 6.6% 4.9% 
Last two weeks 
of campaign 17.8% 17.6% 
Election-day 12.8% 13.1% 11.9% 12.7% 
 
 Not surprisingly, the partially restrictive approach has a significantly higher rate 
of case retention than does the fully restrictive approach (over 80% vs. less than 70% 
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for all four elections).  While the numbers of S2 and S5 cases removed are the same in 
both approaches, the retention of S3 and S4 cases in the partially restrictive method 
accounts for this difference.  In 2006 and 2008, all campaign-period deciders are 
removed through the fully restrictive approach, which, as described above, is highly 
problematic.  Not only does this significantly decrease the size of the data sample for 
these elections, but it eliminates all cases with a campaign-period TOVD. 
With both the fully and partially restrictive approaches, the share of the 
population in each TOVD group differs from the raw data.  This difference is 
particularly acute, however, in the case of the fully restrictive approach.  If this sorting 
method is applied the share of cases that fall into the pre-campaign and election-day 
categories increases significantly for all four elections, while the share of campaign 
deciders decreases.  In other words, a disproportionately high number of the cases 
removed are those listed as campaign-period deciders in the raw data.  If it were the 
case that campaign-period deciders are the most likely to provide invalid TOVD 
responses, such a finding might be acceptable.  However, there is no way to know 
whether this is true using these data, nor is there any obvious theoretical reason to 
expect this to be the case.  The differences between the partially restrictive results and 
the raw data are much smaller in comparison.  The share of respondents removed from 
each TOVD group corresponds more closely with the share of respondents that fall into 
each TOVD category in the raw data.   
Regardless of this difference, the fact that so many cases are thrown out due to 
response invalidity means that it is difficult to estimate the actual breakdown of TOVD 
in the electorate.  If many raw data are known to be invalid, and the validity of many 
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retained cases is uncertain, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the TOVD patterns 
of the population using either raw or filtered data.  However, even if the exact 
breakdown of TOVD patterns is unknown, it is possible to explore the relationship 
between TOVD and other factors.  Data need not be representative of the population if 
the goal is simply to explore a relationship between variables.   
In order to properly study such relationships, it is important to validate the 
partially restrictive approach.  This can be done by testing whether the retention of 
cases of uncertain TOVD validity introduces bias into the sample.  S3 and S4 cases are 
retained in the partially restrictive approach, and if their inclusion biases results in some 
manner it would be better to remove such cases.  It is possible to explore such bias by 
comparing S3 and S4 cases to those which are otherwise considered valid (S1 and S6), 
with respect to factors known to have a relationship with TOVD.  If differences 
between these groups are observed, it would suggest that these cases are, in fact, 
introducing bias.  As pre-campaign and election-day deciders cannot fall into S3 or S4, 
this analysis is limited to campaign-period deciders, and since all campaign deciders are 
categorized as either S3 or S4 in 2006 and 2008, this analysis must be limited to the 
2000 and 2004 elections. 
A similar test can be conducted to explore the extent to which the retention of 
cases known to be invalid introduces bias, thus potentially providing support for the 
removal of invalid cases.  S1 and S2 respondents can be compared among pre-campaign 
deciders, as can S6 and S5 cases for election-day deciders (there must be no TOVD 
variation for these comparisons to be meaningful).  If significant differences exist 
between these groups with respect to factors known to be related to TOVD, it would 
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indicate that the retention of invalid cases introduces bias.  Together then, these 
comparisons explore the appropriateness of the partially restrictive approach, and, more 
generally, the need to explore TOVD validity and exclude invalid cases. 
Table 6-3 shows the results of these comparisons.  Values in the first two 
columns indicate the difference in average values of S3 and S4 (combined), and those 
cases otherwise considered valid (S1 and S6) for campaign period deciders.  Values in 
the remaining columns indicate the difference between the average values for retained 
cases and the average values for cases removed under the partially restrictive approach.  
The approach receives validation if results in the first two results columns are 
statistically insignificant (meaning that S3 and S4 cases are not biasing results in the 
dimensions considered here) and if the differences in the remaining columns are 
statistically significant (proving that cases where TOVD is known to be invalid would 
indeed introduce bias if retained).  The correlates considered here include several socio-
demographic and attitudinal factors expected to be related to TOVD (Fournier et al., 
2004; Kenski, 2007; Lucas and Adams, 1978).  With the exception of age, all variables 
are coded on a scale from 0 to 1.169   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
169 Information on the election study questions used to operationalize these variables is found in 
Appendix 6-1. 
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TABLE 6-3:  VALIDATION OF PARTIALLY RESTRICTIVE APPROACH 
  
S3 and S4 vs. 
otherwise 
retained             
(campaign 
only) 
S1 vs. S2                                                               
(pre-campaign only) 
S6 vs. S5                                                       
(election-day only) 
  2000 2004 2000 2004 2006 2008 2000 2004 2006 2008 
Age -0.08 0.7 -1.15 -0.46 0.73 0.85 1.13 0.37 1.85 1.64 
Gender (1=female) -0.01 .07a -.18c -.09b 0.02 -.10b .14a 0.09 -0.03 .24c 
Education  0.02 -0.001 0.06c .06c .08c .05b -0.04 0.001 0.03 -0.001 
Income -0.01 -0.01 .06b .07b .06a .11c 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.001 
Interest in election -0.01 0.02 .06c .13c .09c .12c 0.01 -.09b -0.05 -0.01 
General political 
interest -0.02 0.002 .06
c .09c 0.01 .15c -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
Media Attention -0.01 0.01 0.02 .10c .09c .07c -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Campaign 
knowledge* 0.02 -0.02 .11
c .20c 
 
  -0.001 -.07a 
  
General knowledge 0.02 -0.02 .11c .11c .08c .12c -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Strength of 
Partisanship 0.01 -0.03 .27
c .25c .25c .27c -.09a -.10b -.16c -.08a 
N (retained) 276 365 801 917 1256 775 197 239 269 195 
N (removed) 270 300 177 169 184 135 40 57 74 61 
a: significant at the 90% level, b: significant at 95%, c: significant at 99% 
*: Campaign specific knowledge questions were not asked in 2006 and 2008. 
 
Table 6-3 provides no evidence that the retention of S3 and S4 cases introduces 
bias, and demonstrates the necessity of removing cases known to be invalid.170  The 
comparisons of S3 and S4 cases to other campaign period deciders show no statistically 
significant differences, with the exception of gender in 2004, and even then, this 
difference is only significant at the 90% level.  These findings suggest that S3 and S4 
cases are not introducing bias into the campaign deciding TOVD group.  To be safe, 
however, when variables other than those explored in Table 6-3 are being considered, a 
similar analysis should be conducted to ensure that S3 and S4 cases are not introducing 
bias. 
                                                 
170 The patterns observed here hold when the 1988, 1993 and 1997 elections are considered (results not 
shown) 
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The remaining results demonstrate that invalid S2 and S5 cases should be 
removed before TOVD can be employed as a variable.  The comparison of S1 and S2 
pre-campaign deciders shows statistically significant differences for all variables except 
for age.  Excluding this factor, 30 of 34 comparisons show differences significant at the 
95% level or higher.  The cases thrown out are more likely to be female, less educated, 
have a lower income, and be less politically interested, knowledgeable and partisan.  
The findings among election-day deciders (S5 and S6) are less strong, although they too 
suggest that the retention of invalid cases can introduce bias.  Statistically significant 
differences were observed for gender, election interest, campaign knowledge and 
strength of partisanship.  The weaker results for this set of comparisons may be due to 
the fact that there are far fewer election-day deciders than there are pre-campaign 
deciders (meaning that statistical estimates for the former group are made with less 
certainty).  Altogether, the above results do suggest strongly that the removal of S2 and 
S5 cases is warranted.  In 2008, for example, the cases removed from the pre-campaign 
period are more likely to be female than male, but those removed from the election-day 
group are more likely to be male.  Women tend to be later deciders than men (Fournier 
et al. 2004, Kenski 2007), and the inclusion of cases with invalid TOVD responses 
would significantly dampen the observed relationship between TOVD and gender. 
Survey data are unavoidably imperfect, and while TOVD recall data have been 
found to be particularly flawed, it is possible to minimize the impact of invalid TOVD 
responses.  Doing so allows us to employ this variable with greater confidence.  This 
note has suggested a new method of sorting election study respondents on the basis of 
TOVD validity, provided logical and empirical justification for the new method, and 
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shown the importance of the removal of invalid cases.  While the data considered here 
are exclusively Canadian, the principles discussed are applicable to other settings.  
Provided that pre- and post-election survey data are available, TOVD validity can, and 
should, be examined using the partially restrictive approach. 
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7 - CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The preceding sections of this dissertation have covered a number of seemingly 
disparate issues.  Nevertheless, they are held together by a common variable:  TOVD.  
By employing this variable in new ways, academic contributions have been made here 
to the study of political attitudes, voter sincerity, campaign effects, cognitive dissonance 
theory, correct voting, and the validation of survey data.   
The usefulness and versatility of this variable have been clearly demonstrated.  
TOVD was employed as a dependent variable in the dissertation’s first article, an 
independent variable in the second, an indicator of campaign effects in the third, and a 
moderating variable in the fourth article.  While concerns over the validity of TOVD 
recall data may have hampered the usefulness of this variable in the past, the 
introduction here, in a research note, of a new method of identifying invalid TOVD 
responses means that this variable can now be employed with greater confidence by 
researchers.  This variable’s potential, therefore, can now be more fully realized. 
 This final portion of the dissertation summarizes and synthesizes this 
dissertation’s primary findings.  The contributions of this work are reiterated, and 
discussed in relation to one another.  The section concludes by commenting on the 
potential for future research on the topic of TOVD. 
 
7.1 – SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
Through they all in some way involve TOVD as a variable, the articles above 
deal with a variety of subjects.  The first and second articles explore the relationship 
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between political attitudes and TOVD, and more specifically, they cover topics 
including the impact of summary attitudinal evaluations upon behaviour, and cognitive 
dissonance theory.  The third and fourth articles consider the important topic of 
campaign effects, but also shed light upon the study of voter sincerity and correct 
voting.  TOVD thus has been employed to advance our knowledge of many topics of 
study. 
Although placed near the end of this dissertation, the research note on the 
validation of TOVD data arguably is the most critical part of this work.  If TOVD 
responses are invalid, as some authors have found to be the case with American 
National Election Study Data (Plumb, 1986; Chaffee and Rimal, 1996), data on this 
variable are of little use.  If invalid responses introduce noise, the study of relationships 
between TOVD and any other variable will produce results of diminished certainty.  
Building upon Fournier et al.’s (2001) work on the validation of Canadian TOVD data, 
the research note shows that invalid responses in fact introduce bias, which is much 
more worrisome than simple noise.  Cases with invalid TOVD responses have been 
found to differ from valid cases with respect to several factors known to be related to 
TOVD.  As a result, it has been shown here that the retention of invalid cases serves to 
dampen the strength of any observed relationships between TOVD and other variables.  
In other words, studies that do not remove cases with invalid TOVD responses may fail 
to find relationships that exist between TOVD and other factors.  Accordingly, only 
after TOVD validity is evaluated, and invalid cases are removed, should this variable be 
employed.  Fortunately, the format of Canadian TOVD data is such that invalid cases 
can be easily identified. 
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Considering only those cases with valid TOVD responses, this dissertation’s 
first two articles explore the relationship between attitudes and TOVD.  These articles, 
which borrow heavily from the psychology literature, consider the impact that pre-
election attitudes have upon TOVD, and in turn, the impact that TOVD has upon post-
election attitudes.  The results of the first article are consistent with expectations that an 
early TOVD is associated with low levels of attitudinal inconsistency (Berelson et al., 
1954; Lavine, 2001), high levels of intensity (Fournier, 2005; Petty and Krosnick, 
1995), and summary evaluations in the direction of the party voted for (Lewis-Beck et 
al. 2008).  A new measure of ambivalence was introduced in order to tap into all three 
of these attitudinal dimensions simultaneously.  Results reveal that this measure is 
better able to explain TOVD patterns than measures which tap into fewer dimensions. 
The article also argues that measures of attitudinal consistency, intensity and 
direction should take into account the strength of the relationship between political 
attitudes and vote choice.  Existing measures of ambivalence (see Lavine, 2001; 
Fournier, 2005; Lewis-Beck, 2009) fail to acknowledge that some attitudes can be more 
important to summary evaluations than others.  The article introduces a new method of 
assigning weights to the various factors included in summary evaluations, and finds that 
attitudinal measures based upon these weights are better able to explain TOVD than are 
those which consider all separate attitudes to be of equal importance. 
The second article reverses the role of TOVD and attitudes, exploring the impact 
that the former has upon the latter.  Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory 
posits that when pertinent cognitions are inconsistent with one another, a sense of 
psychological discomfort arises.  It has been shown here that the act of voting, a 
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behaviour which cannot be undone and thus which becomes a cognition after the fact, 
triggers attitude change as individuals attempt to minimize any discomfort they may be 
experiencing.  The article finds that voters experience a spreading of alternatives 
(Festinger, 1964), relative to non-voters, and shows that political scientists should be 
aware that attitudes are not always independent variables. 
The article goes on to consider the impact of a number of behavioural, affective, 
and cognitive factors upon changes in attitudes between pre- and post-election waves of 
the CES, thus adding to our understanding of the political implications of cognitive 
dissonance.  In essence, the act of voting is found to act as a catalyst for attitude change, 
and several factors are found to moderate the extent of this attitude change after one 
votes.  One of the cognitive variables considered was TOVD.  Individuals who have 
long known for whom they will vote need to justify their early decisions by shifting 
their post-election attitudes, as the act of voting commits them fully to this decision.  
Not only do they need to justify their behaviour, but also how long they held the 
intention to vote for the candidate they did.  The article concludes by noting that, 
because voting can have such a strong impact upon attitudes, survey questions used to 
measure attitudes should, if possible, be asked prior to an election. 
Clearly, however, attitudes can be influenced by factors other than the act of 
voting.  While it was once widely believed that campaign periods had only minimal 
impacts upon voters (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954), it is now generally 
accepted that they can influence the attitudes and vote intentions of certain types of 
individuals (Jacobson, 1983; Bartels, 1987; Johnston et al., 1992; Blais et al., 2003).  
This dissertation’s third and fourth articles add to the literature on campaign effects, and 
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employ a TOVD variable to explore the impact of the campaign period upon insincere 
voting and rates of correct voting.   
The third article explores the relationships between vote sincerity and TOVD.  
While the literature on strategic (or tactical) voters is well established (Black, 1978; 
Blais and Nadeau 1996; Blais et al. 2001), protest voters (who are also classified here as 
insincere in that they vote for a party that is not their first preference) are largely 
overlooked.  The article introduces a new method of operationalizing protest voters, 
defining them as politically dissatisfied individuals who vote for an uncompetitive non-
traditional party that is not a genuine first preference, and evaluates the relationship 
between sincerity and TOVD. 
Insincere voters are found to be relatively late deciders, as they use the 
campaign period to gather information about the competitive prospects of parties.  
Strategic voters abandon their first preference in the hope of preventing a disliked party 
from winning, and protest voters, as operationalized here, vote for a party which they 
believe to have no chance of victory.  In both cases, information on how much of a 
chance each party has of winning is necessary.  Polls are released on nearly a daily basis 
during the course of a campaign, so campaigns provide voters with an excellent 
opportunity to update competitive expectations (Blais et al., 2006, Johnston and 
Vowles, 2006).  The article argues that insincere voters postpone their decisions in 
order to gather such information.  For these voters, therefore, the campaign period has 
an important impact upon their vote decisions. 
The dissertation’s fourth and final article similarly contributes to the literature 
on campaign effects, but adds also to the burgeoning literature on the subject of correct 
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voting.  Introduced only 15 years ago (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997), the notion of a 
“correct” vote represents the voting decision individuals would make under conditions 
of perfect information.  This definition assumes that individuals do not have perfect 
information and that they wish to vote correctly.  The chapter introduces a new method 
of measuring correct voting rates, combining election study data with Comparative 
Manifestos Project data.  It differs from the existing literature in two important ways.  
First, it argues that correct voting should focus upon policy promises and preferences 
only, as opposed to factors considered in existing work, such as partisan identification, 
leadership evaluations, evaluations of government performance and social group 
linkages (Lau and Redlawsk 2006, Lau et al. 2008).  Second, it argues that estimates of 
party policy positions should be based upon objective indicators, as opposed to the more 
subjective approaches taken in existing work, where party positions are generally based 
upon the opinions of ‘experts.’  Comparative Manifestos Project data are based upon 
analysis of the content of official party platforms, and provide such an indicator.  
Estimates of party positions are based upon information that comes directly from parties 
themselves, as opposed to being filtered through the media and personal biases.  This 
article thus represents at least two advances in the field of correct voting. 
After estimating the rate of correct voting for the 2004 Canadian federal 
election, and finding that the results of that election could have been very different had 
the entire population voted “correctly,” the article turns to evaluate the impact of the 
campaign period upon the likelihood of voting correctly.  TOVD is employed as a 
moderating variable between campaign period attentiveness and correct voting.  
Contrary to what one might expect, individuals who make their minds up before the 
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campaign begins are found to have higher correct voting rates than those who decide 
during the campaign.  While early deciders, by definition, do not factor campaign 
period information into their vote decisions, they nevertheless are relatively successful 
when it comes to voting correctly.  Among campaign period deciders, however, 
attention to the campaign does have a statistically significant and positive impact upon 
correct voting rates.  For highly attentive campaign period deciders, the campaign does 
seem to have a positive impact (provided that one accepts the assumption that voting 
correctly is desirable).  As with the article on voter sincerity, therefore, this article 
contributes to the literature on campaign effects. 
This dissertation has illustrated the versatility and value of TOVD as a variable.  
Concerns over the validity of TOVD have been dealt with, which has allowed the 
articles above to make contributions to a variety of fields of study.  Political attitudes 
have been found to have an impact upon TOVD, but it is now known that they, in turn, 
can be influenced by this variable.  The consistency, intensity and direction of summary 
evaluations of an attitude object have been shown to have a noteworthy effect upon 
TOVD patterns.  In return, psychological tension caused by the knowledge that one has 
long known for whom one would vote has been found to influence changes in attitudes 
towards parties between CES questionnaire waves.  The dissertation also contributes to 
the study of insincere voters and correct voting, along the way adding to the literature 
on campaign effects.  Accordingly, though all of the articles contained here share 
TOVD as a common variable, a broad array of subjects and literatures has been 
considered.  This dissertation now concludes with a discussion of the ways in which this 
variable can be considered in future work. 
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7.2 – DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As mentioned several times throughout this dissertation, the topic of TOVD has 
received relatively little scholarly attention.  Given the importance of voting and 
elections to the field of political science, and the immense effort and money invested by 
political actors in campaigns, the dearth of literature is somewhat surprising.  In 
particular, understanding why voters make their minds up when they do, or studying 
TOVD as a dependent variable, seems an especially worthwhile pursuit.  Knowing what 
types of individuals are susceptible to persuasive attempts, and why, can increase our 
understanding of election outcomes and political marketing. 
While there has been some research conducted which uses TOVD as an 
indicator of campaign effects, or persuasion (see Fournier et al., 2004), there is room for 
research into factors which make individuals susceptible to persuasive attempts during 
the course of a campaign.  Compatible with the findings of this dissertation, Fournier et 
al. (2012) have shown that campaigns influence ambivalent and attentive individuals.  
Future work can be conducted, however, to explore the types or sources of messages 
that are most likely to influence voters, individual-level factors that make one more or 
less susceptible to political persuasion, and how voters can most easily be persuaded to 
abandon their most preferred party.  The question of how best to identify potential late 
deciders, and then to convince these individuals to vote in a particular way, undoubtedly 
receives ample attention from political actors.  Since these actors are likely less than 
anxious to share this type of knowledge with the general public, however, there is a 
market for this type of research in the academic realm. 
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Also worth studying is the distinction between individuals who go from 
indecision to decision during the course of a campaign, and those who start off 
supporting one party, and change their minds and eventually vote for another.  In the 
2008 CES, for example, just under 65% of respondents who made their vote decisions 
either during the campaign or on election-day had no pre-election vote preference 
(meaning that they went from indecision to decision).  The remaining 35% changed 
their vote intentions during the campaign (meaning that their pre-election vote 
intentions do not match post-election vote recall responses).171  Differentiating between 
these two groups of campaign period deciders could conceivably reveal that these voters 
differ from one another in interesting ways, including the manner in which they respond 
to political stimuli.   Thus, in addition to comparing early to late deciders, differences 
between voters within TOVD categories are worthy of academic attention. 
Furthermore, while the articles above deal only with individual level data, it may 
also be worth considering the impact that system-level factors have upon TOVD 
patterns.  The number of parties contesting an election, the electoral system, the number 
of positions being contested in an election and the length of campaigns all could 
influence the point in time at which voters make their decisions.  These factors, which 
apply to all voters within a particular political realm, could have an impact upon 
population level TOVD patterns.  This type of system-level information could improve 
our understanding of the impact of political institutions, and even national political 
cultures upon this aspect of voting behaviour. 
Accordingly, while this dissertation has focused exclusively upon Canadian 
data, future work should include data from other settings as well.  Provided that TOVD 
                                                 
171 Values based upon data validated using the partially restrictive approach. 
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data can be validated, research on this subject can be expanded to other countries where 
similar election study data are available.  For instance, despite being a former British 
colony, New Zealand has a different electoral system from Canada and Britain, meaning 
that the impact of this variable upon TOVD can be examined in a most similar systems 
study.  Similarly, Australia’s elected Senate allows for the impact of bicameralism upon 
TOVD to be evaluated, and British data can be used to explore the consequences of that 
country’s complex regional party system.  An examination of Canadian provincial 
election data, where available, may also yield noteworthy results, and could provide 
insight into any influence that provincial peculiarities may have upon TOVD patterns.  
There thus is ample room for both cross-national and sub-national studies on the 
correlates of TOVD. 
In conclusion, while this dissertation has added significantly to the academic 
literature on the subject of TOVD, much remains to be done on the subject.  This 
dissertation has helped us to better understand why individuals make their vote 
decisions when they do, the impact that TOVD has upon their attitudes, the relationship 
between the sincerity of one’s vote decision and TOVD, and whether or not late 
deciding individuals make “better” choices that do early deciders.  Future work on the 
causes and correlates of TOVD can build upon these findings, and continue to expand 
our knowledge of this fascinating and important variable. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX 2-I:  ASSIGNING WEIGHT VALUES 
If some variables influence vote choice more than do others, some factors 
should be weighted more heavily in the calculation of summary attitudinal measures.  
Accordingly, the relative importance of each factor in the multi-stage recursive model is 
considered here by assigning a weight to each variable for each party.172  Basically, 
weight values are determined by comparing the likelihood that an individual who holds 
a particular attitude will vote for a particular party, to the likelihood that an individual 
who has a negative value for that attitude will vote for that same party.  For instance, an 
individual who has a positive attitude towards Stephen Harper is much more likely to 
vote Conservative than is an individual who has a negative impression of the Prime 
Minister.  If the difference between these likelihood values is high, a variable can be 
said to be important to vote choice.   
The strength of the relationship between each factor included in the multi-stage 
recursive model and vote choice is used to determine how influential a variable is in the 
calculation of summary evaluations.  Some of the seven stages of the multi-stage 
recursive model consist of multiple variables (Blais et al. 2002, Gidengil et al. 2009), 
and weights must be calculated for each variable, as well as each stage of the model.  
Variable and stage weights (which range from 0 to roughly 1) are multiplied by 
respondents’ attitudinal scores (which range from 0 to 1) when weighted summary 
attitudinal measures are calculated.  In the unweighted measures considered in Table 2-
                                                 
172 Weights are based upon population wide trends, rather than individual specific data.  While it would 
be ideal to have knowledge of how important various factors are for specific individuals, this information 
is not available in the CES. 
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2, all stages of the model, and variables within the stages of the model, are considered 
equally important (i.e. their weight values are all equal to 1).  Applying variable and 
stage weights when calculating summary attitudinal measures means that the measures 
of consistency, intensity and direction can be examined in a more nuanced fashion than 
if all variables and stages were simply weighted equally.   
All weights are based upon the log of the relative risk of a vote for a particular 
party for each variable and stage of the model.  Relative risk is the ratio of the 
probability (p) of an individual exhibiting a characteristic voting for a particular party to 
the probability (q) of a person who does not exhibit that characteristic voting for that 
same party.173  p is calculated by determining the percentage of the population that 
exhibits the characteristic or attitude of interest that votes for a particular party, while q 
reflects the percentage of the population not exhibiting that characteristic or attitude 
voting for the party.  If, for example, 50% of women were to vote for Party X, while 
only 25% of men vote for X, the relative risk of women voting for X, relative to men, is 
2 (or 0.5/0.25).  Women would be considered twice as likely as men to vote for Party X.  
Conversely, men would be 0.5 (or 0.25/0.5) times as likely as women to vote for X.   
Ratios like relative risk, however, are skewed measures (deviations of less than 
1 are compressed, compared with those greater than 1).  A ratio of 0.5 on the low end 
                                                 
173 An alternative approach would simply be to consider the absolute dissimilarity between vote shares for 
individuals with a characteristic and those without.  However, this approach does not take into account 
the difference in vote shares received by each party.  A dissimilarity of value Y for characteristic X for a 
relatively successful party should not be treated the same as if the same value were observed for a smaller 
party.  This characteristic is clearly more of a factor for the weaker party than it is for the stronger one.  
Ratios reflect this important distinction. 
Another alternative would have been to base weights upon bivariate regression coefficients.  That is, vote 
choice could be regressed onto each variable, for each party, and coefficients (which are already centered 
around 0) could be used as weights.  This approach produces weight values which are comparable to 
those calculated here.  Nevertheless, weights are based here upon the log of relative risk, as this method is 
mathematically parsimonious and produces results which are simpler to interpret than are logistic 
regression coefficients. 
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represents the same amount of dissimilarity as does a ratio of 2 on the high end (as the 
above example illustrates).   Taking the log (base 10) of relative risk values eliminates 
this skewness (for the example above it produces values of +0.301 for women and -
0.301 for men).  Positive and negative deviations thus are assigned the same magnitude 
(and they are shifted to be centered around 0 rather than 1).  Taking the log of the 
relative risk is necessary when positive and negative scores from multiple variables are 
to be combined to calculate respondents’ ambivalence and indifference scores.174   
In the calculation of both variable (λ) and stage (Λ) weights, voters must be 
categorized as either having a high or low value.  Vote shares for the party under 
examination are then calculated for these two groups, and weights are based upon the 
log of the relative risk of the high value group compared to the low value group.  
Individuals with a neutral value (0 on a scale from -1 to 1) are excluded from the 
calculation of weights (although they are considered in the analysis in the body of this 
article), as the goal here is to compare individuals who have positive attitudes to those 
who have negative attitudes.  The exclusion of these neutral175 individuals accounts for 
                                                 
174 Since log scales are non-linear, the impact of dissimilarity upon the log of the relative risk decreases as 
dissimilarity increases.  The derivative of the log of the relative risk is not a constant, 
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5, so when dissimilarity between high and low values increases, the magnitude of 
the calculated weight does not increase by that same factor, or by some constant multiple of that factor.  
Put another way, the impact of the log of the relative risk diminishes as the dissimilarity between the high 
and low values increases.  This does not pose a problem here, however, as it expected that increases in 
dissimilarity near zero will have a greater impact upon a vote decision than that same dissimilarity when 
the dissimilarity is large.  For example, if a dissimilarity of 0.1 increases to 0.2, weight calculated for this 
variable would increase by more than if a dissimilarity of 0.4 was increased to 0.5.  While the change in 
dissimilarity is the same (0.1), this latter change is assumed here to less important to vote choice than 
when the initial dissimilarity is small.  The log scale is compatible with this logic. 
175 For example, when calculating the Liberal issue variable weights, individuals who believe that the 
Liberals are the best able to deal with an issue are compared to those who believe another party is best 
suited.  Individuals who have a neutral opinion are excluded in the calculation of this weight. 
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the variation in sample size between the stages of the model in Tables 2-I-1 (which 
considers variable weights) and 2-I-2 (which considers stage weights) below. 176 
Variable weights are calculated separately for each party to reflect the fact that 
factors may be of greater importance to voters of one party than they may be to 
supporters of other parties.  For example, a university education is positively associated 
with a Liberal vote, negatively associated with a Conservative vote, and has no 
statistically significant association with either an NDP or Bloc vote (as Table 2-I-1, 
below, shows).  The association between this variable and a Liberal vote is stronger 
than it is with a Conservative vote, a fact reflected in the different magnitudes of the 
weights: +0.169 for the Liberal and -0.091 for the Conservatives.177  This variable is 
thus assumed to be a more important factor to Liberal voters than it is for Conservative 
voters.  Variables are only included if they are found to have a statistically significant 
relationship with a vote for a particular party, so this factor is not included in the 
calculation of attitudinal measures for NDP and Bloc voters.  Variable weights are 
displayed in Table 2-I-1. 
Stage weights are also calculated for each party for each stage of the multi-stage 
recursive model.  For blocs based upon only one variable, the variable and stage 
weights are the same.  When this is not the case, data from variables which have been 
shown here to have a statistically significant relationship with a vote for the party under 
consideration are combined to determine, based upon that stage alone, whether 
individuals have a high or low value for the party that they voted for (i.e. whether 
                                                 
176 While variable and stage data are forced to values of either 1(high), 0(neutral) or -1(low) when 
weights are being calculated, their original values are used in the calculation of ∑P and ∑N from Table 2-
1.   
177 The magnitude of variable weights ranges from 0 to approximately 1; there are few instances where 
the magnitude is slightly greater than 1. 
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individuals have more pressures which should predispose them to voting for the party 
that they do than those which should lead one to vote against that party).  These two 
types of individuals are compared to calculate the log of the relative risk of voting for 
each party, for each stage.  As with the variable weights, individuals with neutral values 
for the stage under examination are excluded from the calculation of stage weights.  
Stage weights are displayed in Table 2-I-2. 
High and low values are determined for the variables and stages of the multi-
stage recursive model in the following manner: 
• Sociodemographic characteristics:  Individuals with a characteristic associated 
with the party voted for are coded as high, and those without are coded as low. 
• Underlying Values and Beliefs:  Indices are created for several types of 
underlying values and beliefs, and values for each variable and are coded to 
range from -1 to 1.  Respondents are coded as ‘high’ if they have a positive 
value, and negative if they have a negative value.  The survey questions used to 
create these indices, as well as all other CES questions used in this article are 
contained in Appendix 2-III. 
• Partisanship:  Partisans of the party voted for (regardless of the strength of 
partisanship) are coded as high, and partisans of other parties are coded as low.  
Non-partisans are not considered in these calculations. 
• Economic evaluations:  For Conservative (the incumbent party) voters, 
individuals who believe that the government has had a positive impact are coded 
as high, and those who believe that it has had a negative impact are low.  This is 
reversed for all other parties.   
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• Issues:  Individuals who believe that the party under consideration is best at 
dealing with a particular issue are coded as high, and those who believe another 
party is best are coded as low. 
• Leadership Evaluations:  Those who give a higher rating to the leader of the 
party voted for than for the other three major parties are coded as high, and those 
who give a higher rating to any other leader are coded as low. 
• Evaluations of Government Performance:  For Conservative voters, Individuals 
who are satisfied with the performance of the government are coded as high and 
those who are dissatisfied are coded as low.  This is reversed for all other 
parties. 
∑P and ∑N from Table 2-1 are calculated on the basis of the presence and 
strength of positive and negative, party specific attitudes, as well as variable and stage 
weights.  If an individual has an attitude or characteristic positively associated with a 
party, or a negative attitude or a lack of a characteristic negatively associated with a 
party, this factor is included in the calculation of ∑P.  Positive attitudes or 
characteristics negatively associated with a party or negative attitudes or a lack of 
characteristics positively associated with a party are factored into ∑N.  ∑P represents 
the summation of the product of positive attributes, normalized variable weights and 
normalized stage weights, and ∑N expresses the summation of the product of negative 
attributes, normalized variable weights and normalized stage weights. 
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TABLE 2-I-1:  VARIABLE WEIGHTS 
    Liberals Conservatives 
    Low High λ N Low High λ N 
Socio-
demographic 
Factors 
Visible Minority 0.26 0.38 0.17c 
1306 
0.41 0.27 -0.19c 
1306 
Native French Speaker 0.28 0.23 -0.09b 0.47 0.22 -0.34c 
Public Employee 0.27 0.27 -0.01 0.42 0.32 -0.12c 
Union member 0.28 0.22 -0.10b 0.42 0.32 -0.12c 
University Education 0.23 0.34 0.17c 0.43 0.35 -0.09c 
Gender (female = 1) 0.28 0.28 -0.003 0.42 0.38 -0.04 
Rural/urban (rural = 1) 0.29 0.23 -0.09c 0.38 0.47 0.10c 
Catholic 0.26 0.27 0.007 0.46 0.31 -0.17c 
Protestant 0.29 0.23 -0.10 b 0.30 0.56 0.26c 
Non-Christian 0.25 0.32 0.12b 0.43 0.29 -0.17c 
Under 35 0.29 0.21 -0.14c 0.42 0.32 -0.11c 
35-54 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.41 0.38 -0.04 
Over 54 0.26 0.3 0.05 0.36 0.45 0.10c 
Low income Quartile 0.27 0.25 -0.04 0.4 0.4 0.01 
Middle income 0.28 0.25 -0.05 0.42 0.37 -0.05 
High income Quartile 0.25 0.31 0.09b 0.38 0.45 0.07b 
Atlantic Resident 0.24 0.39 0.21c 0.4 0.37 -0.04 
Western Resident 0.3 0.17 -0.25c 0.35 0.53 0.19c 
Quebec Resident 0.28 0.23 -0.09b 0.48 0.2 -0.37c 
Ontario Resident 0.24 0.35 0.16c 0.37 0.47 0.11c 
Underlying 
Values and 
Beliefs 
Free Enterprise 0.3 0.24 -0.10c 2078 0.29 0.68 0.38c 2078 
Social Conservatism 0.3 0.21 -0.17c 2036 0.27 0.63 0.38c 2036 
Anti-Quebec Sentiment 0.32 0.19 -0.22c 1748 0.3 0.63 0.32c 1748 
Regional Alienation 0.31 0.29 -0.03 906 0.46 0.33 -0.15c 906 
Political Dissatisfaction 0.26 0.3 0.05 1994 0.51 0.3 -0.23c 1994 
Partisanship 0.06 0.7 1.06c 1196 0.12 0.89 0.89c 1196 
Economic 
Evaluations 
Sociotropic 0.44 0.11 0.60c 331 0.11 0.73 0.81c 331 
Egocentric 0.46 0.08 0.76c 188 0.16 0.8 0.70c 188 
Issues 
Fighting Crime 0.16 0.64 0.60c 1276 0.09 0.65 0.86c 1276 
Healthcare/social 
programs 0.17 0.58 0.52
c 1355 0.26 0.84 0.51c 1355 
Jobs/the economy 0.11 0.61 0.75c 1327 0.12 0.78 0.82c 1327 
Protecting environment 0.2 0.55 0.44c 1386 0.31 0.92 0.47c 1386 
Leader Evaluations 0.15 0.8 0.72c 1309 0.07 0.87 1.08c 1309 
Evaluations of Government 
Performance 
0.15 0.42 0.44c 1511 0.07 0.67 0.99c 1511 
b:  Coefficient significant at the 95% level, c : Coefficient significant at the 99% level. 
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TABLE 2-I-1:  CONTINUED 
    NDP Bloc 
    Low High λ N Low High λ N 
Socio-
demographic 
Factors 
Visible Minority 0.20 0.32 0.21b 
1306 
0.48 0.25 -0.28c 
368 
Native French Speaker 0.24 0.11 -0.33c 0.13 0.51 0.59c 
Public Employee 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.43 0.57 0.13b 
Union member 0.19 0.29 0.19c 0.44 0.57 0.11b 
University Education 0.22 0.19 -0.06c 0.47 0.46 -0.01 
Gender (female = 1) 0.17 0.24 0.13c 0.46 0.48 0.02 
Rural/urban (rural = 1) 0.22 0.17 -0.12 0.47 0.46 -0.01 
Catholic 0.24 0.16 -0.18c 0.41 0.48 0.06 
Protestant 0.20 0.21 0.01 0.75 0.22 -0.54b 
Non-Christian 0.18 0.30 0.23c 0.46 0.51 0.04 
Under 35 0.19 0.29 0.19c 0.45 0.52 0.07 
35-54 0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.46 0.48 0.02 
Over 54 0.23 0.17 -0.13c 0.50 0.42 -0.07 
Low income Quartile 0.20 0.23 0.07 0.49 0.42 -0.07 
Middle income 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.42 0.50 0.08 
High income Quartile 0.22 0.18 -0.09 0.48 0.42 -0.05 
Atlantic Resident 0.20 0.24 0.07 
    
Western Resident 0.17 0.30 0.26c 
    
Quebec Resident 0.25 0.11 -0.36c 
    
Ontario Resident 0.21 0.19 -0.04         
Underlying 
Values and 
Beliefs 
Free Enterprise 0.26 0.10 -0.42c 2078 0.52 0.12 -0.63c 415 
Social Conservatism 0.26 0.13 -0.31c 2036 0.54 0.18 -0.47c 338 
Anti-Quebec Sentiment 0.20 0.19 -0.03 1748 0.44 0.00 -1.00c† 523 
Regional Alienation 0.20 0.25 0.09 906 0.10 0.74 0.89c 194 
Political Dissatisfaction 0.15 0.31 0.31c 1994 0.33 0.45 0.13b 332 
Partisanship 0.07 0.80 1.04c 1196 0.09 0.91 1.03c 323 
Economic 
Evaluations 
Sociotropic 0.30 0.11 0.44c 331 0.57 0.24 0.38c 83 
Egocentric 0.27 0.05 0.70c 188 0.72 0.50 0.16 28 
Issues 
Fighting Crime 0.14 0.59 0.63c 1276 0.34 0.91 0.44c 323 
Healthcare/social 
programs 0.08 0.37 0.64
c 1355 0.34 0.88 0.42c 338 
Jobs/the economy 0.12 0.56 0.66c 1327 0.35 0.92 0.42c 324 
Protecting environment 0.17 0.48 0.44c 1386 0.43 0.88 0.31c 352 
Leader Evaluations 0.06 0.56 1.01c 1303 0.13 0.85 0.83c 307 
Evaluations of Government 
Performance 
0.13 0.30 0.36c 1511 0.24 0.64 0.42c 393 
† There are no cases where Bloc voters hold anti-Quebec sentiment (meaning that a ratio cannot be  
calculated), so this cell is assigned a value of -1.   
b:  Coefficient significant at the 95% level, c: Coefficient significant at the 99% level. 
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TABLE 2-I-2:  STAGE WEIGHTS 
    
Socio-
demographic 
Factors 
Underlying 
Values and 
Beliefs 
Partisan-
ship 
Economic 
Evals Issues 
Leader 
Evals 
Evals of 
Gov. 
Perf. 
L
ib
er
al
s 
Low 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.15 
High 0.34 0.32 0.70 0.43 0.80 0.80 0.42 
Λ 0.23 0.23 1.06 0.26 0.87 0.72 0.44 
N 1306 906 1196 331 1276 1309 1511 
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
es
 
Low 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.37 0.10 0.07 0.07 
High 0.51 0.71 0.89 0.73 0.94 0.87 0.67 
Λ 0.36 0.38 0.89 0.30 0.98 1.08 0.99 
N 1306 906 1196 331 1276 1309 1511 
N
D
P
 
Low 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.13 
High 0.30 0.25 0.80 0.28 0.74 0.57 0.30 
Λ 0.33 0.41 1.04 0.18 0.92 1.01 0.36 
N 1306 906 1196 331 1276 1309 1511 
B
lo
c 
Low 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.44 0.31 0.13 0.24 
High 0.51 0.61 0.91 0.61 0.94 0.85 0.64 
Λ 0.56 0.30 1.03 0.14 0.48 0.83 0.42 
N 368 194 323 83 323 307 393 
Note:  All differences between high and low values are statistically significant at the 99% level. 
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APPENDIX 2-II:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES 
TABLE 2-II-1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES 
    Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
Subjective Ambivalence 0.36 0.61 -1 1 965 
Intensity 
Unweighted 0.56 0.12 0 0.9 939 
Weighted 0.4 0.15 0 0.89 939 
Direction  
Unweighted 0.61 0.79 -1 1 939 
Weighted 0.6 0.8 -1 1 939 
Griffin's Ambivalence 
Unweighted -0.08 0.19 -0.45 0.36 939 
Weighted -0.12 0.13 -0.45 0.25 939 
Actual Ambivalence 
Unweighted 0.53 0.54 0 2 939 
Weighted 0.44 0.57 0 2 939 
Revised Griffin's 
Ambivalence 
Unweighted 0.01 0.3 -0.45 1.1 939 
Weighted -0.06 0.22 -0.45 0.94 939 
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APPENDIX 2-III:  CES QUESTIONS 
Sociodemographic characteristics:  Visible minority; religion (Catholic, non-Christian, 
non-religious); region (West, Atlantic, Ontario, Quebec); urban/rural; french native 
speaker; age; public sector worker; union member; university educated; income; gender. 
 
Underlying values and beliefs:  Free enterprise (government should narrow the gap 
between rich and poor, leaving the economy to the private sector, labour mobility, the 
profit system, and individual responsibility); social conservativism (feelings about gays 
and lesbians, same sex marriage, feminists, conceptions of gender roles); anti-Quebec 
sentiment (feelings towards Quebec, more/less done for the province); regional 
alienation (is your province treated worse than others); political disaffection (does the 
government care what you think, ratings of political parties in general, ratings of 
politicians in general, do the parties differ, do politicians lie to get elected, do 
politicians keep their promises, satisfaction with Canadian democracy); anti-racial 
minority sentiment (feelings towards minorities, should more/less be done for 
minorities) 
 
Partisanship:  Do you usually think of yourself as a ____?  How strongly? 
 
Economic perspectives:  Sociotropic (has national economy gotten better or worse, has 
government made it better or worse); egocentric (have personal finances gotten better or 
worse, has government made them better or worse) 
 
Issue opinions:  Which party is best with dealing with: fighting crime, improving 
healthcare/social programs, creating jobs/dealing with the economy, the environment? 
 
Leadership evaluations:  On a scale of 1-100, how do you feel about leader X? 
 
Government performance:  How satisfied are you with the performance of the 
government under Stephen Harper? 
 
Other questions:  Post-election vote choice recall; pre-election vote intention; time of 
vote decision recall; are your feelings about party vote for all positive, mostly positive, 
or mixed; how much attention did you pay to the election on TV/radio/newspapers/the 
internet; how interested are you in the federal election; how interested are you in 
politics in general; knowledge of Republican nominee for American Presidential 
election; the name of one’s Provincial Premier; the name of any Cabinet Minister and 
the name of the Governor General. 
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APPENDIX 3-I:  CES QUESTIONS 
Vote intentions:  Which party do you think you will vote for?  Is there a party you are 
leaning towards (if stated that they are undecided)?  If you decided to vote, which party 
do you think you will vote for (if stated that they would not vote)? 
 
Difficulty of decision/initial ED:  How do you feel about the ___ Party?  (pre and post 
election questionnaires) 
 
Importance of vote:  1988:  What is the most important campaign issue to you?  How 
strongly do you support/oppose free trade?  2004, 2006: Do you agree or disagree with 
the following statement:  All political parties are the same, there really isn’t a 
difference? 
 
Partisanship:  In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a:____? 
 
Unpleasant effort:  2004:  How difficult is it for you to get to a polling station?  2006:  
Have you ever donated to a political party?  When was this?   
 
TOVD: When did you decide that you were going to vote ___? 
 
Vote choice:  Which party did you vote for? 
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APPENDIX 3-II:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – DISSONANCE VARIABLES 
TABLE 3-II1-1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – DISSONANCE VARIABLES 
    Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1988 
(N=1028) 
Change in ED -1.72 20.11 -79.5 95 
Importance of Vote 0.69 0.31 0 1 
Partisan 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Unpleasant Effort n/a 
Pre-campaign TOVD 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Supported Losing Local Candidate 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Liberal Voter 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Conservative Voter 0.52 0.50 0 1 
NDP Voter 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Interviewed After Debate 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Initial ED 30.51 22.03 -65 100 
2004 
(N=702) 
Change in ED 3.95 18.86 -72.5 91 
Importance of Vote 0.71 0.31 0 1 
Partisan 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Unpleasant Effort 0.09 0.18 0 1 
Pre-campaign TOVD 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Supported Losing Local Candidate 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Liberal Voter 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Conservative Voter 0.43 0.50 0 1 
NDP Voter 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Interviewed After Debate 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Initial ED 33.26 22.29 -45 100 
2006 
(N=1311) 
Change in ED -3.44 19.33 -105 82.5 
Importance of Vote 0.64 0.32 0 1 
Partisan 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Unpleasant Effort 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Pre-campaign TOVD 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Supported Losing Local Candidate 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Liberal Voter 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Conservative Voter 0.49 0.50 0 1 
NDP Voter 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Interviewed After Debate 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Initial ED 38.43 21.93 -33 100 
Note: Results include only those cases included in the Models in Table 3-2. 
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APPENDIX 4-1: CES QUESTIONS 
Time of vote decision:  Which party did you vote for?  When did you decide that you 
were going to vote for ___?  Which party do you think you will vote for?   
 
Strategic Voting:  Was the party voted for your favourite?  Party thermometer scores.  
Leader thermometer scores.  Was there a local candidate you particularly liked?  In your 
local riding, which party has the best chance of winning?  After ___ (response to 
previous question), does any other party have a chance of winning?  2006 only:  Does 
any other party have a chance of winning? 
 
Protest Voting:  Dissatisfaction:  How satisfied are you with the way democracy works 
in Canada?  Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: All federal parties 
are basically the same, there really isn’t a choice, and Politicians are ready to lie to get 
elected. 
Party thermometer scores.  Leader thermometer scores.  Was there a local candidate you 
particularly liked?   
 
Control Variables:  Gender, age (greater than or less than 50), partisanship, How much 
attention do you pay to TV, newspaper, radio, the internet? (the highest score from 
these media is used), How interested are you in this federal election?  Are your feelings 
about (the party the person voted for): all positive, mostly positive or mixed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 
 
212 
 
APPENDIX 5-I:  CMP VARIABLES USED TO CALCULATE PARTY POLICY 
POSITIONS 
TABLE 5-I-1:  POLICY DIMENSIONS AND CMP VARIABLES  
Policy Dimension "Left" Position (-1) "Right" Position (+1) 
Foreign Special 
Relationship/Protectionism 
Foreign special relationships: 
negative 
Foreign Special relationships: 
positive 
Protectionism: positive Protectionism: negative 
Militarism 
Military: negative Military: positive 
Peace: positive 
 
Social Conservatism 
Traditional morality: negative Traditional morality: positive 
Non-economic demographic 
groups: positive Law and order: positive 
Multiculturalism: positive Multiculturalism: negative 
Underprivileged minority 
groups: positive   
Planned vs. Market Economy 
Market Regulation: positive Free Enterprise: positive 
Economic planning: positive Economic Orthodoxy: positive 
Environmental Protection 
Environmental Protection: 
positive Productivity: positive 
Anti-Growth Economy: positive   
State-provided services and 
Social Justice 
Welfare state expansion Welfare state limitation 
Education expansion: positive Education expansion: negative 
Social Justice: positive   
Sovereignty (Quebec only) Coded as anti-sovereignty Coded as pro-sovereignty 
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APPENDIX 5-II:  CES VARIABLES USED TO CALCULATE INDIVIDUALS’ 
POLICY POSITIONS 
TABLE 5-II-1: POLICY DIMENSIONS AND CES VARIABLES  
Policy Dimension CES Question 
"Left" 
Position    
(-1) 
"Right" 
Position    
(+1) 
Foreign Special 
Relationship/Protectionism 
Do you think Canada's ties with the 
United States should be [closer or more 
distant]? 
More 
distant Closer 
How do you feel about the United States? Negative Positive 
Overall, free trade with the U.S. has been 
good for the Canadian economy? Disagree Agree 
Agree or disagree: International trade 
creates more jobs in Canada than it 
destroys. 
Disagree Agree 
Militarism 
Should the government spend more, less, 
or about the same on defense/military 
spending? 
Less More 
Canada decided not to participate in the 
war against Iraq.  Was this a good or bad 
decision? 
Good Bad 
Social Conservatism 
Do you favour or oppose same-sex 
marriage, or have no opinion on this? Favour Oppose 
Agree or disagree: Society would be better 
off if more women stayed home with their 
children. 
Disagree Agree 
Agree or disagree: We must crack down 
on crime, even if that means that criminals 
lose their rights. 
Disagree Agree 
Agree or disagree: Immigrants make an 
important contribution to this country. Agree Disagree 
How much do you think should be done 
for racial minorities? (more/less) More Less 
How do you feel about aboriginal 
peoples? Positively Negatively 
How much do you think should be done 
for women? (more/less) More Less 
Planned vs. Market 
Economy 
Agree or disagree: The government should 
leave it entirely to the private sector to 
create jobs. 
Disagree Agree 
Agree or disagree: If people can't find 
work in the region where they live, they 
should move to where the jobs are. 
Disagree Agree 
Should personal taxes be increased, 
decreased or kept about the same as now? Increased Decreased 
Should corporate taxes be increased, 
decreased or kept about the same as now? Increased Decreased 
 
CONTINUED ON NEXT… 
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TABLE 5-II-1 CONTINUED: 
 
Policy Dimension CES Question 
"Left" 
Position    
(-1) 
"Right" 
Position    
(+1) 
Environmental 
Protection 
Should the government spend more, less, or 
about the same on the environment? More Less 
Agree or disagree: Protecting the environment is 
more important than creating jobs. Agree Disagree 
State-provided 
services and Social 
Justice 
Should the government spend more, less, or 
about the same on welfare? More Less 
Should the government spend more, less, or 
about the same on healthcare? More Less 
Should the government spend more, less, or 
about the same on education? More Less 
How much should be done to reduce the gap 
between the rich and poor in Canada? More Less 
Sovereignty 
(Quebec only) 
Are you very favourable, somewhat favourable, 
somewhat opposed, or very opposed to Quebec 
sovereignty? 
Opposed Favourable 
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APPENDIX 5-III:  DETERMINING POLICY POSITIONS 
5.III.1 - CMP DATA 
The conversion of observed category counts (the units of CMP data) into points 
on a continuous policy dimension requires some scaling procedure.  Budge (1999) 
suggests that a party’s position be based upon the difference between positive (or R) 
and negative (or L) scores for a policy dimension, divided by 100 (the salience score for 
the entire manifesto), or:  
(5-III-1) 
However, equation (5-III-1) has the effect of pushing a party’s position towards 
the centre (or 0) as the salience of an issue decreases, meaning that party positions can 
be grossly misestimated.  For instance, a party may be staunchly pro-military, giving 
only positive mentions to this issue, yet for some reason may devote relatively little of 
its manifesto to the topic.  According to (III-1) this party may actually be classified as 
centrist when compared to a party that devotes more of its manifesto to the topic, but 
has more balanced positive and negative mentions with respect to this dimension.178 
 To deal with this problem, Kim and Fording (2002) have proposed a measure 
which controls for the relative salience of the issue – termed a “relative proportional 
difference” estimate.  By dividing by the sum of R and L, rather than by 100, a party’s 
position is decoupled from the relative importance placed upon a dimension.  In other 
                                                 
178 For instance, Party A may have a value of 11 for R and 1 for L, and Party B may have a value of 30 
for R and 15 for L.  Equation 5 would assign a value of 0.10 for Party A, and 0.15 for Party B, suggesting 
that B is to the right of A.  While B may consider this issue to be of greater importance than A, it is 
difficult to justify them being placed to the right of A, which had only 1 L mention for this dimension. 
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words, unrelated quasi-sentences do not affect position estimates.179  This logic is 
expressed mathematically as follows:  
(5-III-2)
 
 To obtain scores on both the right (à1) and left (à-1) of centre (0) it is 
necessary to include both “positive” and “negative” CMP variables.  If only positive (or 
only negative) variables are considered, all parties would be located on the same side of 
zero.  While this may actually be the true in some instances, the inclusion of both types 
of variables leaves open the possibility that this is not the case.  A similar problem 
arises when a party makes only positive mention of an issue.  According to (5-III-2), 
this would push that party’s position to an extreme value of 1, or -1, regardless of 
salience.  To minimize the number of instances in which this happens the number of 
variables included in each index has been increased as much as is reasonably possible.  
Nevertheless, this problem occurs twice with the data here – both times with the 
Conservative Party.  That party is a perfect +1 for militarism since it has a score of 0 for 
both the “military negative” and “peace positive” CMP variables.  It also has a score of 
+1 for planned vs. market economy as its manifesto has scores of 0 for both “market 
regulation positive” and “economic planning positive.” 
Whenever possible, calculations of party positions are based upon equation (III-
2).  However, the format of the data dictates that positions for two of the seven 
dimensions considered here must be calculated using a slightly different approach.  The 
                                                 
179 According to this method Party A would receive a value of 0.92, and Party B would have a score of 
0.33 – values that intuitively seem much more accurate. 
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first uniquely scaled variable is “state-provided services and social justice.”  Party 
positions are calculated using five CMP variables, and while two of these variables have 
the potential to pull party positions towards the negative side of 0 (welfare state 
limitation and education limitation), no party gives any mention of welfare state 
limitation in its manifesto, and the only party to mention education limitation is the 
NDP (and only a value of 0.17).  Using formula (5-III-2), this would mean that all of the 
parties would be pulled to the extreme negative side of the party position scale (-1 for 
all parties but the NDP, and the NDP would have a value of -.98), thus they would all 
seemingly have the same position (making the distance between the positions of 
individuals and parties the same for each party).  To get around this problem party 
scores for this dimension are coded by dividing their respective salience scores by the 
salience score of the party which gives this topic the greatest attention in its manifesto 
(in this case that party is the Liberals, who devote 30.35% of their overall manifesto to 
this dimension).180  With the Liberals coded as a -1, for instance, a party that devotes 
half as much of its manifesto to this dimension would receive a score of -0.5.  While 
this methodological deviation is undesirable, this augmented approach is preferable to 
relying upon (5-III-2) to calculate positions and giving all parties virtually the same 
score.  Without this change almost all voters would be closest to the NDP in this 
dimension (as almost all voters are to the right of -0.98), which is clearly unreasonable. 
                                                 
180 This method is compatible with the directional theory of party competition, whereby individuals are 
assumed to support the party that has the most extreme positions on issues that they care about, within a 
“region of acceptability” (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989)  For instance, according to this theory, an 
individual who is supportive of environmental protection will vote for the party that has the strongest 
stance on this issue (i.e. is willing to go the furthest to protect the environment).  This data remains, 
however, compatible with the spatial theory of vote choice.  All parties are simply coded on the same side 
of the scale. 
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 The second variable for which party positions are scaled in a unique manner, 
sovereignty, applies only to Quebec.  The CMP contains no category explicitly related 
to the topic, but since the issue is of such obvious importance in Quebec this variable 
cannot be ignored.  As such, party positions are assigned here simply as +1 for the Bloc, 
and -1 for all other parties (coding the Bloc as -1 and all other parties as +1 would have 
no effect on the results above).181  These values are then compared to the results of a 
single CES question on the topic of sovereignty.  As above, this variable suffers from 
the problem of little variation in party position (only the Bloc has a value other than -1).  
An individual opposed to sovereignty can cast a correct vote for any of the parties other 
than the Bloc.  This does not pose a problem for “overall” correct vote calculations - it 
simply means that the results of this variable are displayed slightly differently in the 
results section when policy dimensions are examined independently in Table 5-III-1.  
Party position and salience scores are as follows:182 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
181 It would be theoretically possible to apply positions to parties with respect to Quebec nationalism, 
rather than sovereignty (by focusing on CMP variables like centralisation vs. decentralisation and 
national way of life positive and national way of life negative), but the 2004 version of the CES does not 
contain the questions necessary to make such a comparison.  These four CMP variables are used, 
however, to determine the relative salience of this issue for each party.  Not surprisingly, this issue is of 
greater importance to the Bloc than it is for any other party. 
182 The issue of corruption was of significant importance in the 2004 campaign. The CMP does have a 
variable for negative mentions of political corruption (the scores for the parties are as follows:  Liberals 
1.08, Conservatives: 7.85, NDP: 1.51 and Bloc: 2.81).  Unfortunately, the 2004 CES does not have a 
question that is comparable to these scores.  Such a question would be of a form similar to:  “What is 
your opinion of government corruption?  Strongly opposed, opposed, supportive, strongly supportive.”  
Such a question is clearly worthless since there would almost certainly be no variation in the responses 
(presumably people would be strongly opposed to corruption).  As such, this issue is not considered here. 
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TABLE 5-III-1:  PARTY POSITIONS AND SALIENCE 
Policy Dimension 
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc 
Position Salience Position Salience Position Salience Position Salience 
Foreign Special 
Relationship/ 
Protectionism 
0.86 2.04 0.67 4.48 -0.63 6.35 0.22 5.04 
Militarism 0.87 4.06 1 3.55 -0.2 2.5 -0.16 2.66 
Social Conservatism -0.42 3.26 0.58 12.33 -0.44 5.35 -0.17 8.09 
Planned vs. Market 
Economy 0.44 9.76 1 2.99 -0.49 7.19 -0.72 5.61 
Environmental 
Protection -0.33 4.5 -0.64 4.11 -0.8 14.89 -0.5 9.59 
State-Provided Services 
and Social Justice -1 30.35 -0.52 15.69 -0.66 20.08 -0.38 11.51 
Sovereignty -1 17.75 -1 10.66 -1 17.56 1 19.7 
 
 
5.III.2 - CES DATA 
As with CMP data, all answers are coded to correspond with either a “right” or 
“left” position (coding choices are shown in Appendix II).  Depending upon the number 
of options given to respondents (scales range anywhere from 3 options to a 100 point 
scale), values from -1 to 1 are assigned.  Responses from multiple questions are 
combined, weighting each question equally, to determine an overall position for 
individuals with respect to each dimension.   
Most CES questions have a “don’t know” response option.  Since respondent 
policy positions are based upon multiple questions, there are two ways in which these 
responses can be dealt with.  The first option is to consider only those individuals who 
give responses to all questions.  Following this method the study’s sample size would 
be significantly diminished (as failing to respond to a single question would mean that 
an individual is removed from the pool of data).  In cases where a high number of 
questions are combined to calculate respondent scores for a single dimension, attrition 
from the removal of such cases would be significant.  This approach also means that the 
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sample would become less representative of the population (as only those individuals 
who have opinions on each and every question would be included).   
A second approach to dealing with this issue is to code “don’t know” responses 
as a 0 (i.e. the centre position on the left-right scale).  This approach has the effect of 
moderating the overall dimension scores (towards 0) of individuals who give such 
responses.  While individuals are not explicitly stating a centrist position, the fact that 
they fail to provide an answer corresponding with the extremes of the scale suggests 
that they should not be positioned at the exterior of the scale (i.e. near -1 or 1).  
Individuals who truly belong on the extreme edges of the scale should be expected to 
provide responses corresponding to those positions.  On the other hand, those 
individuals who have extreme positions on some components of a policy dimension (i.e. 
punishment of young offenders), and no positions on others (i.e. should more or fewer 
immigrants be admitted to Canada) should not be considered extreme with respect to 
that overall dimension (in this case, social conservatism).  As such, “don’t know” 
responses are dealt here by assigning a value of 0 to the respondent’s position for the 
appropriate CES question.  Table 5-III-2 shows descriptive statistics for individual 
policy positions. 
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TABLE 5-III-2:  INDIVIDUAL POLICY POSITIONS – DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
Dimension Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. N 
Foreign special Relationship/Protectionism 0.13 0.39 -1 1 1286 
Militarism -0.17 0.59 -1 1 2250 
Social Conservatism -0.11 0.34 -1 0.85 1271 
Planned vs. Market Economy 0.03 0.39 -1 1 2198 
Environmental Protection -0.22 0.46 -1 1 1294 
State provided services and Social Justice -0.51 0.34 -1 1 2250 
Sovereignty (Quebec only) -0.11 0.82 -1 1 480 
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APPENDIX 5-IV:  ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
TABLE 5-IV-1:  CORRECT VOTING AND ATTENTIVENESS BY TOVD 
High attention 0.38 (.21)a 
Before debates -0.49 (.30) 
Before debates X high attention -0.21 (.41) 
During/just after debate -0.56 (.40) 
During/just after debate X high attention 0.30 (.55) 
After Debates -0.43 (.26) 
After Debates X high attention 0.12 (.38) 
Election-day -0.97 (.34)c 
Election-day X high attention 0.53 (.47) 
Age -0.01 (.01) 
Partisanship 0.17 (.15) 
Motivation 0.41 (.22)a 
Conservative voter 1.37 (.17)c 
Bloc voter 2.93 (.34)c 
NDP voter 1.90 (.21)c 
Canada outside Quebec 0.24 (.25) 
Constant -1.78 (.41)c 
N 1055 
Psuedo-R2 0.1434 
Entries report coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) 
a: coefficient significant at 90%, b: coefficient significant at 95%, c: coefficient significant at 99% 
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APPENDIX 6-I:  CES VARIABLE NOTES 
Variables included in Table 6-3:  Age (in years), gender (male = 0, female == 1), 
education (Highest level completed: no schooling (0),…professional/PhD (1)), income 
(<$20,000/yr (0),… <100,000/yr(1)), interest in election (no interest at all (0),… a great 
deal of interest (1)), general political interest ((no interest at all (0),… a great deal of 
interest (1)), media attention (based upon highest score to questions about attention to 
various types of media:  no attention (0),… a great deal of attention (1))., campaign 
knowledge (an index of questions on campaign promises:  all responses incorrect 
(0)…all responses correct(1)), general knowledge (an index of questions on general 
political knowledge: all responses incorrect (0)…all responses correct(1)) and strength 
of partisanship (non-partisan(0),…strong partisan(1)). 
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